

DECEMBER 1980

The Review of Metaphysics

A PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

ARTICLES • CRITICAL STUDIES • NOTES AND OBSERVATIONS
PROBLEMS AND PERPLEXITIES • BOOKS RECEIVED
ANNOUNCEMENTS

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Accidents and Possibility

Comments on

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of Contingency and Selection

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"As Much Clear as the Subject Matter Allows"

Head, Heart, and God

Aristotle and the Question of Character

Comments on

\$1.75

VOLUME XIV, NO. 4

ISSN 0034-3322

The Review of Metaphysics

A PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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Sustaining Institutional subscription (yearly)	25.00
Ten Year Index, 1947-1957	1.00
Previous volumes	\$10.00 each

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The *MLA Style Sheet* (Revised Edition), published by the Modern Language Association of America, 6 Washington Square North, New York 3, is the *Review's* authority on matters of style. Contributors are asked to follow the *Style Sheet* in preparing their manuscripts.

Articles appearing in the *Review of Metaphysics* are indexed in the *International Index to Periodicals*.

Address manuscripts and related correspondence to the editor, and all other correspondence to the managing editor, 303 Lindley Hall, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. Material submitted for publication should be accompanied by return postage.

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Published quarterly by the Philosophy Education Society, Inc., 303 Lindley Hall, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

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ANNOUNCEMENTS

ARTICLES

THE LOGIC OF DESCRIPTION AND VALUATION

ROBERT S. HARTMAN

(1) *The Relationship Between Value and Non-Value Terms*

THE GAP BETWEEN VALUE and non-value predicates appeared in G. E. Moore as the difference in descriptive power of the two kinds of predicates, called by him "non-natural intrinsic" and "natural intrinsic" predicates. The latter "describe the intrinsic nature of what possesses them in a sense in which predicates of value never do. If you would enumerate *all* the intrinsic [natural] properties a given thing possessed, you would have given a *complete* description of it, and would not need to mention any predicate of value it possessed; whereas no description of a given thing could be *complete* which omitted any intrinsic [natural] property."¹ This difference in descriptive power of the two kinds of predicates Moore came to regard as *the* differentia between fact and value; and his incapacity to define it with precision he regarded as his failure to construct the scientific ethics he envisaged. To make the differentia precise he says, forty years after *Principia Ethica*, "it would be necessary to specify the sense of 'describe' in question; and I am no more able to do this now than I was then."² Yet he sees clearly that "a solution of the problem is to be found in the different way in which [intrinsic natural properties] are related to one particular sense in which we use the word 'description.'"³ Once the precise nature of the descriptive properties is known, he believes, it will be clear not only in which sense "good" is "an importantly different *kind*" of property from the de-

¹ "The Conception of Intrinsic Value," *Philosophical Studies*, Cambridge, 1922, p. 274.

² "Reply to My Critics," *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, Paul A. Schilpp, ed., Evanston, 1942.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 592.

scriptive one,⁴ but also in which sense yet it depends upon and follows from the descriptive properties.⁵

We shall in this paper try to present "a solution" of this problem and state with precision both the sense in which natural predicates "describe," while value predicates do not, and the sense in which value predicates "follow from" descriptive ones. We shall reach an unexpected result: not only are the value predicates "a different kind of predicates" from what the descriptive predicates are thought to be, but the descriptive predicates themselves are a different kind of predicates from what they have been thought to be. They are one particular, and the most significant, set of *value predicates*. And it is precisely this special significance for valuation that makes them both "descriptive" and "factual"!

We shall determine the precise, mutual relationship between the set of descriptive and the corresponding set of value predicates entirely *a priori*, on the basis of an axiom presented in earlier papers which states that *value properties are sets of descriptive properties*.⁶ We shall not need any support in empirical observation; the strength of our procedure lies exclusively in the fertility of the axiom. But we shall find that this formal determination leads to results which empirical observation confirms, and which confirm empirical observation.

The value axiom enables us to determine *with precision all the possible relations in which a thing's value properties stand to its descriptive properties*; and to do so on the basis of nothing but the thing's descriptive properties.

The problem to be solved, then, is this: Given the set of a thing's descriptive properties, to define, in terms of these properties, not only (a) the thing's value properties but also (b) the

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 588, 590.

⁶ Robert S. Hartman, "A Logical Definition of Value," *Journal of Philosophy*, 1951, LXVIII, 413-20; "The Analytic, the Synthetic and the Good: Kant and the Paradoxes of G. E. Moore," *Kant-Studien*, 1953-1954, XLV, 67-82; 1954-1955, XLVI, 3-18; "Value Propositions," in Ray Lepley, ed., *The Language of Value*, Columbia University Press, 1957; "The Science of Value," in Abraham Maslow, ed., *New Knowledge in Human Values*, Harper and Brothers, 1959; "Value Theory as a Formal System," *Kant-Studien*, 1958-1959, L, 287-315.

relations between the value properties, and (c) the relation between the value properties and the descriptive properties. Or, more simply, *if a thing has n descriptive properties, what does it mean for it to be good, fair, bad, and no good?*

According to the axiom, a thing is *good* if it has *all* its intensional properties; *fair* if there are more intensional properties which it has than which it lacks, *bad* if there are more intensional properties which it lacks than which it has, and *no good* if it lacks most of the intensional properties. We were able in this way to define the fundamental value terms—value predicates in Moore's terminology—in terms of the descriptive predicates, by introducing intensional quantifiers, or qualifiers.⁷ We shall now express the same matter arithmetically. By "intensional properties," of course, we shall again mean properties of *particular* things, that is, things as members of classes, of at least two things. These properties are signified by the predicates contained in the intension of the class concept; and these predicates are *descriptive* in the sense of the word here used. We do not speak, then, of *unique* things, subject to singular concepts, nor of *constructs*, subject to formal systems. Their value laws—those of intrinsic and systemic value—follow from the laws of extrinsic value here discussed.

Given a set of n descriptive properties, a thing of the corresponding class is *good* if it has n properties, it is *fair* if it has more than $n/2$ properties, it is *bad* if it has less than $n/2$ properties, and it is *no good*, we shall stipulate, if it has only one, or n/n or n^0 properties. Thus, if the intension in question contains 9 predicates, the thing is *good* if it has the corresponding 9 properties, *fair* if it has 8, 7, 6, or 5 properties, *bad* if it has 4, 3, or 2 properties, and *no good* if it has 1 of its properties. There is no difficulty in the case of an *odd number* such as 9 to determine what is "more than $n/2$ " and "less than $n/2$," because $n/2$ always is between two integers, the higher of which is more and the lower of which is less than $n/2$. With *even numbers*, say, 10, there is a difficulty in determining fairness and badness, for $n/2$ represents neither fairness nor badness nor, for that matter, goodness or no-goodness. In these cases, we must introduce a

⁷ See especially Ray Lepley, *op. cit.*, pp. 210 ff.

fifth fundamental value term, *average*, ("indifferent," "so-so," "passable," "all right," etc.) which holds when the thing has $n/2$ of its properties. But this, now, introduces a difficulty in odd sets of properties. A thing cannot have, we assume, halves of properties—although when the pattern here discussed is developed this notion may become feasible. How then shall we determine the value *average* with odd sets of properties? Let us stipulate that *average* holds with sets of odd properties when the thing has $(n \pm 1)/2$ of its properties. Thus, in the case of a set of 9 properties, a thing has the value *average* if it has either 5 or 4 properties; it is *fair* if it has more than 5—that is 6, 7, or 8 properties—and *bad* if it has less than 4—that is 3 or 2 properties. Our value scale, then, is as follows:

Arithmetical Determination of Value

<i>Value Property</i>	<i>Number of Properties Possessed by Thing</i>
Good	n
Fair	$> n/2$
Average	$n/2$
Bad	$< n/2$
No Good	n/n

We shall now more in detail determine $\leq n/2$. Introducing $m < n/2$, any number larger than $n/2$ (but smaller than n) is $n/2 + m$, and any number smaller than $n/2$ (including 1) is $n/2 - m$. Thus, in the case of 10, m has the values 4, 3, 2, or 1, and hence $n/2 + m$ the values 9, 8, 7, or 6. These are the values for "fair," so that we define "fair," for even-property things, as the possession of $n/2 + m$ properties. On the other hand, $n/2 - m$ has the values 1, 2, 3, or 4. The first is the value for "no good," the other three are the values for "bad." We thus define "bad," for even-property things, as possession of $n/2 - m$ properties, except 1.* For odd-property things we stipulate the range of

* Strictly speaking since we defined "bad" as the subaltern of "no good" (Lepley, *op. cit.*, p. 206) we should say that $n/2 - m$ is the range of "no good" except the values > 1 , which are the range of "bad."

fairness as $[(n-1)/2] + m$, the range of badness as $[(n+1)/2] - m$, except 1, and that of average as $(n \pm 1)/2$. This means, in the case of a 9-propriety thing, that its range of fairness is 8, 7, and 6, its range of badness 3 and 2, and its range of average 4 and 5. The range of average of odd-propriety things is thus slightly larger than that of even-propriety things, and the range of fairness and badness of even-propriety things slightly larger than that of odd-propriety things. In odd-propriety things, a small slice of the fairness and badness range is included in the average range. Since the value properties in practice pass into one another, this overlapping is of no practical importance. But it is of importance for the theoretical pattern.

The definitions of the value predicates in terms of the descriptive properties n , then are as follows:

Arithmetical Definitions of Value Terms

Value Predicate	Number of Descriptive Properties ¹	
	Even	Odd
"Good"	n	n
"Fair"	$n/2 + m$	$[(n-1)/2] + m$
"Average"	$n/2$	$(n \pm 1)/2$
"Bad"	$n/2 - m$	$[(n+1)/2] - m$
"No good"	n/n	n/n

As is seen, these definitions not only give the relations between the set of descriptive and that of value properties, but also enable us to state significant relations between the value properties themselves. First of all, we shall determine with precision a notion which is being used over and over in value theory without any significant meaning, that of a *sum of values*. Especially it is often said, without any justification, that "the value of a whole is more than the value of its parts." We shall not go into details here of what may be meant by "whole," "part" and the like; but shall simply perform some obvious operations with the values here defined.⁹

⁹ The details in question will be discussed in the author's forthcoming *The Measurement of Value*. Two comments, however, are in order here. First, that Moore did think in terms of arithmetical operations with

By adding the values defined, we obtain the sum of all possible fundamental values corresponding to a set n of descriptive properties. As is seen, this sum is not, of course, equal to n ; this is only the value *goodness*. But it is the arithmetical expression, for sets of even properties, $n + n/2 + m + n/2 + n/2 - m = 2.5n$. We do not include the factor 1 or n/n which is included in the factor $n/2 - m$ when $m = n/2 - 1$. For odd-propertyed things the corresponding sum is $2.5n \pm 0.5$. Thus, in a thing of 10 properties, the sum of its possible values or its *value sum*, is 25, in a 9-propertyed thing it is 23 (or 22), and so on. While, then, usually, it makes no sense to speak of the "sum of values" of a thing, or of different things, or of the sum of goodness plus fairness, plus averageness, plus badness, plus no-goodness of a thing, or of things, it does make sense to speak of such a sum or sums when the respective values can be arithmetically determined. This they can be in terms of the descriptive properties whose set *defines* them. The arithmetical definitions refine the logical definitions, through axiological quantifiers, mentioned before. In other words, the arithmetical definitions make precise the axiological quantifiers *all*, *some*, *not some*, etc. (properties). In doing so they open up, beside the relations between descriptive and value properties, precise arithmetical relations among values themselves.

The first such relation, then, is the *value sum* possible in a thing of n descriptive properties. We shall denote it by V , and write

$$V_n = 2.5n \quad \text{I.}$$

understanding that this will always represent the nearest whole number.

We now have reached a most significant and peculiar result.

(intrinsic) values (see on this point Austin Duncan-Jones, *Philosophy*, XXXIII, July, 1958, 245 ff.). Second, that the problem is more complex than Moore thought. It is, for example, not at all certain what is a unit or "one" property. Since analytic properties contain, and are contained in, one another, a property containing another is different in its "oneness" from a property contained in another. The exact determination of "one" depends on the complete logical solution of the intensional structure, especially the distinction of denumerable and non-denumerable (discursive and non-discursive) structures. Cf. Moore, "Reply to My Critics," *op. cit.*, pp. 586. f.

If a thing has 10 properties, then the *value sum* of the thing is worth 25 properties of the thing. How a thing of 10 properties can have 25 properties is not immediately clear but will be clear at once if we think of the thing's properties as capable of combinations rather than as being a fixed set. But it is not for the moment even necessary to think of them in this manner. The formula makes clear that the sum of the value properties a thing has is greater in descriptive properties than the totality of its descriptive properties. Obviously, the sum of its value properties must be of greater value than any one value property it has, say goodness. Thus, if the thing is good, if it has *all* its descriptive properties, and if the sum of its values includes the value Goodness, this sum must be *more* than *all* the thing's descriptive properties. How a thing can have more properties than it has is the secret of valuation. The clue lies in the different ways in which a thing "has" its descriptive properties and "has" its value properties. The "having" of the two *kinds* of properties by the thing is itself of two *kinds*, as will become clear in the following. For the moment, however, let us interpret the formula merely as meaning that whatever the number of descriptive properties of a thing, the sum of its value properties equals 2.5 times that number.

We shall now determine the product of fundamental values possible with a thing. We shall only give the formula for even-propertyed things, of which the formula for odd-propertyed things is a negligible deviation. The product of the fundamental values possible with a thing is $[n(n/2 + m)][n/2(n/2 - m)]$. The *value product* then is

$$V_p = n^2/2(n^2/4 - m^2). \quad \text{II.}$$

Since m has all the values $< n/2$, there are as many values of this formula as are the values of m . In other words, there is no one value product of a thing but a number of *value products*. There is a product for each value of m , which means that there are $n/2 - 1$ such products. The total of the thing's value products then is

$$V_{p_i} = V_{p_1} + V_{p_2} + \dots + V_{p_{(n/2-1)}}. \quad \text{III.}$$

For example, for the 10-proprieted thing, the four possible value products are

m	V_m
1	1,200
2	1,050
3	800
4	450

The sum of these, or the *total value product*, is 3,500. As is seen, the larger m , the smaller the corresponding value product, and the smaller m , the larger the corresponding value product. There is no reason why the various value products should only be added. They could also be multiplied and thus form a higher and definite value product. This *product of value products* or *secondary value product* of the thing is

$$V_p = V_{r_1} \times V_{r_2} \times \dots \times V_{r_{(n-1)}}. \quad \text{IV.}$$

In the case of a ten-proprieted thing, this is 4.5×10^{11} . As is seen, the number of descriptive properties a secondary value product of a thing is worth, is already astronomically much larger than the number of the descriptive properties, or Goodness. A set of 10 descriptive properties can, by some valuational operation, become a set of billions of properties.¹⁰

(2) *The Essence of Valuation*

This we can understand only if we grasp the fundamental reason for the possibility of valuation: the mobility of the descriptive properties. In valuation, the thing's descriptive properties can appear in any kind of combination, the thing becomes fluid. Indeed, this combinatorial arrangement of the thing's properties is valuation. A ten-proprieted thing is *good* only if it has all ten properties. The other fundamental values are subsets of ten. It is *average* if it has any 5, say, a, b, c, d, e , or

¹⁰ This gives a theoretical basis to Hilliard's empirical formulation of the value content of a glass of burgundy which is 3.6×10^{10} (based on 158 properties). A. L. Hilliard, *The Forms of Value*, New York, 1950, pp. 278 f.

f, g, h, i, j , or a, d, f, g, i , etc. In all there are 252 sets of 5 properties or ${}_{10}C_5$ 5-sets of ten in which the thing can be average. There are other numbers of sets in which it can be fair or bad. In the fairness of having 8 properties, there are 45 possible sets, and in the badness of having 3 properties 120 sets, etc. The totality of sets in which a thing can have value properties, is $2^n - 1$. In other words, there are 1,023 different value possibilities of the ten-propertyed thing; for every set of its properties represents one value, be it "good," "fair" (of different degrees), "average," (of different degrees for odd properties), "bad" (of different degrees), or "no good."¹¹ This total possibility of values we shall call the *total value* of the thing

$$V_t = 2^n - 1.$$

V.

It now becomes clear in which way a thing "has" its descriptive properties and "has" its value properties. The value

¹¹ The relevance of this procedure for the practice of valuation appears in the following examples. Suppose a job definition consists of ten properties or job requirements. In how many ways can an employee fulfill or not fulfill the job? In $2^{10} = 1,024$ ways (including the value zero). There is 1 way of *good* performance, 385 ways of *fair* performance, 252 ways of *average* performance, and 385 ways of *bad* performance. It is not sufficient, therefore, to say that a worker is doing a fair job. It must also be determined which of the fair sets of properties his performance fulfills—9, 8, 7 or 6—and which set within these sets. Thus, there are 120 different possibilities of fulfilling 7 out of 10 job requirements. Which of the 120 is he fulfilling? By dividing the possible number of performances on any value level through the possible total of *all* performances one obtains the percentage of performance expectation: 0.098 percent for *good*, 37.64 percent for *fair*, 24.64 percent for *average*, 37.64 percent for *bad*. The difference between this theoretical expectation and the actual performance of the shop is an objective measure of shop performance. The same procedure can be applied to any other extrinsic valuation, e.g., that of a company's product, say, a refrigerator. If the refrigerator, in the mind of the public, is determined by 10 properties, the theoretical expectation of evaluation of it is $2^{10} = 1,024$; there are 385 ways in which the product may appear *fair*, or *bad* and 252 ways in which it may appear so-so. These ways may in turn be broken down; of the 385 ways in which the thing may appear *fair*, there are 10 ways in which 9 properties may be accepted, 45 ways in which 8 may be accepted, 120 in which 7, and 210 ways in which 6 properties may be accepted. The corresponding percentages of expectation are, respectively, 0.98, 4.4, 11.73, and 20.53. Again, the actual acceptance as against the possible acceptance is an objective measure of the product's success.

properties are all possible subsets of descriptive properties; and the descriptive properties are the corresponding set. The value properties are the combinatory possibilities of the descriptive properties; and valuation consists, precisely, in dissolving sets of descriptive properties and rearranging them as value properties.

Dissolution and resolution, as Galileo has made clear, is the activity of the creative scientist who dissolves the secondary properties into primary properties and rearranges the latter. Thus creative science is valuation in a profound and specific sense; and the valuer is a scientist in the same sense. While the natural scientist dissolves secondary properties, the valuer dissolves *sets* of secondary properties, that is, intensions; and he recombines their elements into new configurations which *are values*. The valuer, thus, makes the descriptive sets fluid, dynamic; he breaks up intensions into their elements and rearranges the latter to form values. Since these elements are the secondary properties, he uses secondary properties as primary properties of value, and *sets* of secondary properties—intensions—as secondary properties of value. *The secondary properties thus are the primary properties of value.*

The much discussed analogy between natural and moral science now becomes precise¹² and the relation between fact and value resolved in an unexpected way. If the $2^n - 1$ possible sets of descriptive properties are values, then *the set n of descriptive properties is only one among the value sets; it is that set which serves as norm or standard for the value sets.*

This means that the relation between fact and value becomes inverted: a thing is a certain number of combinatory sets of properties, or values, $P = V_n$. This number, P , is being interpreted as $2^n - 1$, where n is any one set selected to serve as norm for all the rest, and in terms of which the rest is determined. This set n is regarded as the *normal* set in terms of which the thing is considered as such a thing; and it is at the same time the *normative* set for the thing's value: the set is posited as normal by virtue

¹² Closest to the solution here presented is Edmund Husserl in *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*, The Hague, 1954.

of its normativity and as normative by virtue of its normalcy. As normal, the set determines the thing as *fact*, as normative, it determines the thing as *value*. As the former, it is called the *description of the thing*, as the latter it is called the *thing's goodness*. Thus, if the normal set of a thing called "table" is the set of n properties— a, b, c, \dots —then this set *describes* the thing as a table; and the thing so described is the table in, and as, fact. But the same set, by virtue of its being the normal or descriptive set, is also the normative set, for it determines all the other sets as its subsets; and as determining all its subsets, or values, the thing is itself a *value*, namely a good table. In this aspect, it is a norm for all its other values, bad table, no good table, etc.

Thus, the descriptive properties as such determine the thing as fact; and the same descriptive properties, as representing the set n among $2^n - 1$ possible sets, determine the thing as value. The thing as having n properties is a fact; but as having these same n properties regarded as one set among $2^n - 1$ possible sets, is a value. In the first case it is a *table*, in the second case, it is a *good table*. The first expression means that the thing is what it is; but the second means that in being what it is it is at the same time a part of a number of other possibilities of being what it is. Everything thus is what it is and not another thing; but it can be what it is in different ways. And each of these ways is one of its values. A value predicate is a subset of a description.

Thus, the factual set of descriptive properties is a fixation of one set out of the variety of valiative sets. It is the fixation of a most important, indeed, the most important such set: the set that makes order out of the chaos of property combinations. If this chaos has the number p of properties, then the first step in making order out of it is regarding p as a totality of sets, $p = P = 2^p - 1$. The second step is to determine x , or solve the equation $x = \log_2(p + 1)$. Given p , the number of properties in question, x , can be determined as the number n of properties to serve as *norm* for the whole collection. This number, then, is the *number of descriptive properties*. Among the totality of properties the *specific* properties must therefore be selected to form this basic set. The resulting set is the set of descriptive properties of the thing,

and a thing having these properties is regarded both as such a thing and as a good such thing. It is in this way that perception and conception produce the description and with it the value standard of things.

This not only clarifies the use of the analytic concept as value standard,¹³ but also throws light on the process of abstraction, especially the relation of analytic Definition to Exposition and Description in the Kantian sense.¹⁴ Our perception cuts out of the undifferentiated chaos of properties a certain set for differentiation into thinghood.¹⁵ This set is the set of properties Kant called Description. It must be differentiated down to the minimum set of descriptive properties, Definition. We now learn that this minimum set is in a logarithmic relation to the original set. Thus, in the Kantian terminology, the first determination of a set, p , is *Description*. The conception of it as a set of sets, $2^p - 1$ constitutes *Exposition*. The final crystallization of n , or solution of the equation $x = \log_2(p + 1)$ is *Analytic Definition*. This Definition constitutes the thing as *fact*; but the totality of descriptive properties is not lost; it reappears, now ordered and through the medium of the intension, as the totality of sets $2^n - 1$. Thus, the original setting of Description constitutes not only, as Kant says,¹⁶ the "raw material" for the Definition, but also for the thing's value properties. Valuation is the process of re-integrating the thing, ordered and in a new medium, into the matrix out of which it was originally cut.¹⁷

¹³ See Robert S. Hartman, "General Theory of Value" in Raymond Klibansky, *Philosophy in the Mid-Century*, Florence, 1958, pp. 29 ff.

¹⁴ For details see Robert S. Hartman, "The Analytic and the Synthetic as Categories of Inquiry," in *Perspectives in Philosophy*, Ohio State University, 1953, pp. 55-78.

¹⁵ Cf. H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, New York, 1937, pp. 11 f.

¹⁶ *Logic*, Par. 105. The Definition was, for Kant, a *measure*, both *abgemessen* (praecisio) and *angemessen* (adaequatio). *Logic*, Introduction, Sec. VIII.

¹⁷ Actually, what was cut out must be at least two things whose common properties are being determined. For what has been described is the process of abstraction, but from a purely intensional point of view: a set of properties p is being differentiated into a set of n properties Φ , where $(2n - 1)/n = p [\log_2(p + 1)]$. Only when the n properties of Φ have thus been determined follows the extensional application: all things which have

The analytic set of descriptive properties, then, the *intension*, is the set which language and custom have fixed in order to be able to deal with things and not become diverted by the multiplicity of value forms in which things may appear. It is the common denominator of these forms. Factuality, then, is nothing but the fixation of one value set as normative for all value sets. It is the one value set distinguished among all the others and awarded for its distinction with factuality. Factuality then, far from being the decline and fall of value is, on the contrary, its special mark and significance. The ground for the fixation in factuality of a particular value set is the capacity of this set to serve as common denominator for the multiplicity of value sets, its capacity of ordering these values in an organized manner, of serving as *norm* and *standard* for these values, which become determined by reference to it.

A fact, therefore is a fact by virtue of its fundamental value significance. *The normativity for value* is, from the point of view of value, the very essence of the factual, it is that which defines the

properties Φ are members of the class in question. Or: there are as many things of the class in question as there are extensions of set Φ . It may well be that abstraction really is not a drawing off of common properties from different things but, on the contrary, an application of a fixed set of properties Φ to certain things which seem to fit it. This would explain not only analogy but also induction. Induction, then, would not be the transference of properties abstracted from a set of known things to an infinite set of unknown things but the same as "abstraction": the application of a set Φ , intensionally determined by the process described, to any thing that fits it. Since the set Φ is at the same time the value standard of the things which Φ fits, induction and abstraction, thus defined, would constitute the process of producing value standards. In this case, the analytic concept would be a synthetic or formal concept: that construct of properties whose application to things results (a) in classes, (b) in extrinsic valuation. The synthetic process by which analytic intensions would be constructed would, precisely, be the process defined by $(2n-1)/n = p [\log_2(p+1)]$. This formula is almost identical with the prime number theorem, $p = n/\log_e n$, and would signify that the proportion of relevant items to a total number of items is equal to the proportion of a number of primes to the total number containing them. This may open up a new deductive approach to induction. (On the general relationship of induction to valuation see J. Bronowski, *Science and Human Values*, New York, 1958. Also Albert Einstein on the "combinatory play" in creative thinking, in J. Hadamard, *The Philosophy of Invention in the Mathematical Field*, Princeton, 1945, pp. 142 f.

factual as factual. There is, thus, more between fact and value than has been dreamt of in our philosophy. Fact is the one specific value, among a totality of values, which is used as value measure.

By measure is meant the isomorphism of a numerical set with material prepared for measurement by this set, through being broken down into primary properties. Fact, thus, we said, was the primary property of value. Descriptive properties are primary value properties and their set, the intension, is the value measure. Values, as measureable, are combinations of descriptive properties, just as lengths, as measurable, are combinations of centimeters. In science, secondary properties are broken down into primary properties which serve as units of measurement and are re-assembled in terms of a standard of such units in order to measure the original secondary entity. In like manner, in valuation, the totality of value sets, P , is broken down into primary value properties (descriptive properties), which serve as units of value measurement and are reassembled in terms of a standard of such units, the set n or intension, in order to measure the original secondary entity, the total value P , now determined by the formula $V_i = 2^n - 1$, and all its subsets, which are the values. The set n or value standard, is called *fact* and happens to be the very set of secondary properties from which natural science has taken its point of departure. Just as all natural science is broken-down factuality, so all factuality is broken-down valuation.

We usually see only the factual nature of fact and not its valuational normativity:¹⁸ only the broken down aspect but not the reality it measures. Thus, we are living in a broken down world, a world of primary rather than secondary value properties. The real world is the value world which we must build up from the normative set of value properties which we regard as the normal set. Fact, in other words, is our still unrecognized medium for value. We have the magic wand in our hand but think it is merely another stick. Value reality is the gigantic and multi-

¹⁸ See the famous Thurber cartoon in *Men, Women and Dogs*, of a dejected male at a party and two females gossiping behind his back: "He doesn't know anything except facts."

farious domain, $2^n - 1$, of which we only discern, vaguely, occasional subsets. We have a world by the tail, but think the tail is the world.

Formal axiology arrives at a Copernican inversion of fact and value: rather than value being a kind of fact, *fact is a kind of value*; rather than value being the norm of fact, *fact is the norm of value*; rather than fact being real and value unreal, *value is real and fact is unreal*. Value is the reality of which fact is the measure. Fact is to value as a measuring rod is to a mountain. It measures the mountain, but that is all. The geometer is no mountaineer. Fact measures value, but that is all. To live in the world of fact is not living in the world of value. But charting a realm is the first condition for conquering it. The geometer precedes the mountaineer. To recognize the measuring capacity of fact for value is the first condition for conquering the value realm.

From this it follows that it is misleading to base value on oughtness. Based on the superficial observation that what ought to be is not yet, "oughtness" was considered as the differentia of value and "isness" as that of fact. Oughtness then was identified with "normativity," and hence value with the norm for fact. All this was a typical Aristotelian procedure, based on the observations of common sense. A more thorough examination would have shown that *norm* means *measure*;¹⁹ and that in this sense value is not a norm for fact, but that the norm for fact, in this exact sense, are the primary properties. Axiologists, if they had wanted to understand value as scientists understand fact—through the primary properties—ought to have looked for a measure of value, that is, *the primary properties of value*.²⁰ Instead, they repeated

¹⁹ "Latin *norma* was a carpenter's square. Hence pattern, rule . . . With the sense of rule or standard already acquired in Latin, it came into English as *norm*." (Joseph T. Shipley, *Dictionary of Word Origins*, Ames, Iowa, 1955). The Greek root is γνῶμων, which originally meant *the means of knowing, the one who knows, the expert*. Thus, the meaning of "norm" is the opposite of "normative" in the contemporary axiological sense; it is "cognitive."

²⁰ See Robert S. Hartman, "Value, Fact and Science," *Philosophy of Science*, XXV, No. 2, April, 1958, pp. 97-108. On the nature of "ought" see below pp. 215 ff.

ad nauseam the Kantian distinction, which is a distinction of secondary value properties and obstructs to this day the true understanding of value.²¹

²¹ According to Theodor Lessing, *Der Bruch in der Ethik Kants*, Bern, 1908, and *Studien zur Wertaxiomatik*, Leipzig, 1914, Kant's metaphysics of morals, as against his metaphysics of nature, confuses theory and practice, system and application, norm and cause. "The categorial nature of formal elements in the theoretical sphere cannot be compared with the categorial nature of the moral imperative. The reason is that in the theoretical sphere the material of sensibility cooperates with its 'forms' in order to bring about objects of cognition, whereas in the *practical* sphere there is no materiality which *ought to be* formed. Kant himself sees very well this difference as soon as he tries to realize, for the sake of the parallelism of his two Critiques, the forced analogy of the morally good as the rule of practical reason with the schemata of theoretical reason (in the 'Typic of Pure Practical Judgment'). It then looks as if the 'system of ends' to be formed by the imperative would be the counterpart to the sensible material to be shaped by the forms of intuition and the categories. But where, indeed, does Kant get his 'ends' from? They are suspended in thin air! The moral law, in the sense of Kant, *cannot* possibly be deduced in the way that are synthetic *a priori* judgments, as those of mathematics. These judgments can be demonstrated very simply in actual mathematics. But there is no existing actual scientific ethics as there is actual scientific mathematics. Rather, the moral law, instead of being deduced and demonstrated, is a *principle invented* by Kant . . . There is no material of ethics in the field of voluntary actions, formed and to be formed by the categories. The pure moral law, according to Kant, is to determine the actual ends of the will *normatively* and from case to case. How then could it be thought of as *a priori connected* with *given* ends of the will? The result is that the Kantian parallelism of categories on the one hand and pure values on the other is purely fictitious." (*Der Bruch* . . . , p. 40). In other words, while the differentiation of the categories comes about through deduction from formal logic, the differentiation of the intelligible world comes about—if at all—inductively through the totality of moral actions. There is no reason, of course, why there should not be theoretical categories corresponding to moral phenomena as there are corresponding to natural phenomena. To locate the categorial counterpart of moral phenomena in the intelligible sphere and thus overleap theoretical reason is due, in the last analysis, to Kant's identifying the *doing* of morality with knowing *about* this doing. "Ought" thus became a hybrid, a word as action or an action as word, and gave rise to the *normative fallacy*, which denies rationality, in the form of theoretical logic, to value judgments. Ontologically, this is due to Kant's profound, almost Hobbesian pessimism about human nature (cf. Kurt Lisser, *Der Begriff des Rechts bei Kant, Kant-Studien, Ergänzungsheft* Nr. 58, Berlin, 1922, pp. 1 ff.). There is a profound irrationalism in Kant which, through the word "ought," infected value theory. On the other hand, contemporary "logics" of imperatives,

The primary properties of value, it turns out, are the descriptive properties. They enable us to *understand* value just as the primary properties of fact enable us to *understand* fact. As natural science by means of the primary properties created a new world of fact, so axiological science by means of the primary value properties—fact as measure of value—can create a new world of value.

In regarding the descriptive properties as a fundamental kind of value properties we perform in moral philosophy the very operation Galileo performed in natural philosophy, when he changed the Aristotelian physics into the science of mechanics: we invert the fundamental relation of the philosophy in question.

For Aristotle rest was the "natural" state and motion was defined in terms of rest. Galileo inverted this relation and defined rest in terms of motion—cutting out, in the process, "*causes*" and therewith the teleological, psychological, metaphysical, and other paraphernalia of Aristotelian physics. Rest became a specific and significant kind of motion. It was defined as, and became rest by virtue of, being motion: zero motion. This solved the problem and changed the philosophy in question into a science. In a similar way, we invert the relation of fact and value. Value had been defined in terms of fact; and Moore's achievement was to do so in exact terms: value properties *follow from* descriptive properties and *are* non-descriptive properties. We invert this relation and define fact in terms of value—cutting out, in the process, "*oughts*" and therewith the teleological, psychological, metaphysical, and other paraphernalia of contemporary value theory. Fact becomes a specific and significant kind of value. It is defined as, and becomes fact by virtue of, being value: the measure of value. As Galileo had made fluid, so to speak, the point of rest by

commands, etc., are not in the Kantian tradition. For Kant, the "imperative" was not so much a command as a "practical proposition," called an "imperative" only for lack of a better expression (See on this point A. R. C. Duncan, *Practical Reason and Morality*, London, 1957, pp. 97 ff.) Kant intended to develop the system of pure practical propositions *a priori* in a "Metaphysics of Morals." But what he wrote, eventually, under this title was far different from what he had envisaged, twelve years earlier, in the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*.

inserting it into a matrix of motion, so we make fluid the set of descriptive properties by inserting it into the matrix of value properties. This is "a solution of the problem" and should, as Moore envisaged, change the philosophy in question into a science.

Moore's question, then, in which sense natural properties describe and non-natural properties do not, has the following answer, which well justifies Moore's lifelong puzzlement: *Natural properties describe as primary value properties.*

Natural properties describe insofar as they serve as norm for non-natural properties. The intension is *one* value property broken down to form a *set* of a different kind of properties. These properties—the elements of the set—are called "descriptive" properties. But their essence is not so much to describe as to serve as units of a standard to measure value properties, to serve as elements of a *set* which is equivalent to *one* specific value property.²² This value property is called "goodness," and the set as equivalent to, and measure of, it is called "intension." The relation between a thing's descriptive properties and its goodness, therefore, is not so much that the goodness depends on the descriptive properties as that the descriptive properties depend on the goodness: the goodness, namely, as measure or standard of the thing's values. Thus, the goodness of the thing is not the norm for the thing's factuality, but it is the norm for the thing's value possibilities.

The thing's factuality is this norm seen without its normative qualities, the measure seen without its measuring capacity—like a meter rod seen as merely a stick. It is the crack in our understanding between fact and value, seen as merely a crack. The razor sharp and deep crack between fact and value is not really

²² This equivalence appears in the logical rather than arithmetical solution of the problem as the reducibility of the value property. See Robert S. Hartman, "The Analytic, the Synthetic and the Good: Kant and the Paradoxes of G. E. Moore," *Kant-Studien*, 1954-1955, pp. 14 f. In the logical solution, the value property appears as a second-order descriptive property, in the arithmetical solution the descriptive property appears as a primary value property. In the first case, the value property appears as a quantification of the descriptive properties; in the second case, the descriptive properties appear as a specification and differentiation of the value property. Both solutions, thus, are complementary, one the inverse of the other.

between fact and value. It is *fact*. On both sides of it runs value. It is the sharp line that runs through value and measures it. As such it is part of value itself. It thus has a double nature: it is value as the measure and fact as the crack; just as the meter rod is norm as the measure and fact as the stick. Since the norm of value is the intension, mere factuality is the intension seen merely logically and not axiologically.

Mere fact, thus, is a void within value. It is value deprived of its value meaning, and hence of its essential character; it is the shell of value. It is what appears on the surface, what the senses perceive but the mind does not comprehend—like a savage finding a spring scale and bouncing up and down on it. Thus we bounce up and down on the world of fact, uncomprehendingly and giving it a beating. We do not understand its essential meaning, its capacity for measuring value, its *symbolic representation of the value world*. To call the natural properties "descriptive" is calling them by their *obvious* name, their sense characteristic, their aspect of describing the normal appearance of things. Their *essential* nature is not that of being descriptive of the normalcy of fact but normative for the measure of value—just as the essential nature of the scale is not to serve as trampoline but as a measure of weight. It is fact itself, in its symbolic meaning for, and endless recombination as, value by which we must "purge the world of the tedious stuff of the obvious," to speak with Tolstoy.²³

As "descriptive" the natural properties appear as primary, as "goodness" they appear as secondary value properties. If we call the value properties tertiary, then fact properties are secondary and natural science properties primary; and the relation of secondary to tertiary is as the relation of primary to secondary.

This relationship expresses in a nutshell the content of formal axiology. It is the essence of valuation.

As primary value property, each secondary or descriptive property can appear in any of the various subsets of the set V_1 , which constitute the value combinations. The total number of ways in which all descriptive properties can be arranged in value sets is

²³ Henry James Forman, *The Story of Prophecy*, New York, 1939, p. 254.

what we call the *valency of the descriptive properties*. It is their capacity of forming value combinations, analogous to the valencies of the chemical elements of forming chemical combinations.²⁴ This valency is

$$V_e = 2^{n-1}n \quad \text{VI.}$$

Thus, the ten properties of the ten-propertyed thing can form value combinations in 10×2^9 or 5,120 ways. They have the valency 5,120, and can appear 5,120 times in different value combinations. The properties of a 20-propertyed thing can appear so in over five million ways. Thus, the value mobility of the descriptive properties is considerable.

(3) *The Relationship Between the Value Terms*

So far we have specified the Moorean relation between descriptive and value properties. We shall now examine the mutual relationships of the value properties themselves. This will further illuminate the Moorean relation. We shall do this by the simple operations of Addition and Subtraction, Multiplication and Division, of the corresponding arithmetical expressions. The results are the following, using the notations introduced earlier²⁵—"G" for "goodness," "B" for "fairness," "D" for "badness," "T" for "no-goodness"—and adding "M" for "average," signifying "middle," "medium," or "mean" value. Again, we shall only discuss the even-numbered sets. The formulae refer to the value properties of one or of several things within the class in question:

²⁴ Cf. Abraham Edel, "The Logical Structure of G. E. Moore's Ethical Theory," *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, Paul A. Schilpp, ed., Evanston, 1942, p. 168. Also cf. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, last paragraph and "Critical Examination of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason," Par. 6 (Prussian Academy Edition V, 93, 163).

²⁵ "Value Propositions" in Ray Lepley, ed., *The Language of Value*, pp. 210 ff.

	<i>Value Addition</i>	VII.
Goodness		
plus Fairness	$G + B = n + n/2 + m = 1.5n + m$	a
Goodness		
plus Average	$G + M = n + n/2 = 1.5n$	b
Goodness		
plus Badness	$G + D = n + n/2 - m = 1.5n - m$	c
Goodness		
plus No-Goodness	$G + T = n + 1$	d
Fairness		
plus Average	$B + M = n/2 + m + n/2 = n + m$	e
Fairness		
plus Badness	$B + D = n/2 + m + n/2 - m = n$	f
Fairness		
plus No-goodness	$B + T = n/2 + m + 1$	g
Average		
plus Badness	$M + D = n/2 + n/2 - m = n - m$	h
Average		
plus No-goodness	$M + T = n/2 + 1$	i
Badness		
plus No-goodness	$D + T = n/2 - m + 1$	j
	<i>Value Subtraction</i>	VIII.
Goodness		
minus Fairness	$G - B = n - (n/2 + m) = n/2 - m$	a
Goodness		
minus Average	$G - M = n - n/2 = n/2$	b
Goodness		
minus Badness	$G - D = n - (n/2 - m) = n/2 + m$	c
Goodness		
minus No-goodness	$G - T = n - 1$	d
Fairness		
minus Average	$B - M = n/2 + m - n/2 = m$	e
Fairness		
minus Badness	$B - D = n/2 + m - (n/2 - m) = 2m$	f
Fairness		
minus No-goodness	$B - T = n/2 + m - 1$	g

Average minus Badness	$M - D = n/2 - (n/2 - m) = m$	h
Average minus No-goodness	$M - T = n/2 - 1$	i
Badness minus No-goodness	$D - T = n/2 - m - 1$	j
Fairness minus Goodness	$B - G = n/2 + m - n = m - n/2$	k
Average minus Goodness	$M - G = n/2 - n = -n/2$	l
Badness minus Goodness	$D - G = n/2 - m - n = -n/2 - m$	m
No-Goodness minus Goodness	$T - G = 1 - n$	n
Average minus Fairness	$M - B = n/2 - (n/2 + m) = -m$	o
Badness minus Fairness	$D - B = n/2 - m - (n/2 + m) = -2m$	p
No-Goodness minus Fairness	$T - B = 1 - n/2 - m$	q
Badness minus Average	$D - M = (n/2 - m) - n/2 = -m$	r
No-goodness minus Average	$T - M = 1 - n/2$	s
No-goodness minus Badness	$T - D = 1 - n/2 + m$	t
<i>Value Multiplication</i>		IX.
Goodness times Fairness	$G \times B = n(n/2 + m)$	a
Goodness times Average	$G \times M = n \times n/2 = n^2/2$	b
Goodness times Badness	$G \times D = n(n/2 - m)$	c
Goodness times No-goodness	$G \times T = n$	d

Fairness

times Average	$B \times M = n/2(n/2 + m)$	e
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Fairness

times Badness	$B \times D = (n/2 + m)(n/2 - m)$ $= n^2/4 - m^2$	f
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Fairness

times No-goodness	$B \times T = n/2 + m$	g
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Average

times Badness	$M \times D = n/2(n/2 - m)$	h
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Average

times No-goodness	$M \times T = n/2$	i
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Badness

times No-goodness	$D \times T = n/2 - m$	j
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Value Division

X.

Goodness/Fairness	$G/B = n/(n/2 + m) = 2n/(n + 2m)$	a
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Goodness/Average	$G/M = 2$	b
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Goodness/Badness	$G/D = n/(n/2 - m) = 2n/(n - 2m)$	c
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Goodness/No-goodness	$G/T = n$	d
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Fairness/Average	$B/M = (n/2 + m) : 2/n = 1 + 2m/n$	e
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Fairness/Badness	$B/D = [(n/2 + m)/(n/2 - m)]$ $= [(n + 2m)/(n - 2m)]$	f
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Fairness/No-goodness	$B/T = n/2 + m$	g
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Average/Badness	$M/D = [n/2/(n/2 - m)]$ $= [n/(n - 2m)]$	h
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Average/No-goodness	$M/T = n/2$	i
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Badness/No-goodness	$D/T = n/2 - m$	j
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Fairness/Goodness	$B/G = (n/2 + m)1/n = 0.5 + m/n$	k
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Average/Goodness	$M/G = n/2 \times 1/n = 0.5$	l
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Badness/Goodness	$D/G = (n/2 - m)1/n = 0.5 - m/n$	m
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No-goodness/Goodness	$T/G = 1/n$	n
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Average/Fairness	$M/B = [n/2/(n/2 + m)]$ $= [n/(n + 2m)]$	o
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Badness/Fairness	$D/B = [(n/2 - m)/(n/2 + m)]$ $= [(n - 2m)/(n + 2m)]$	p
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No-goodness/Fairness	$T/B = [1/(n/2 + m)] = [2/(n + 2m)]$	q
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Badness/Average	$D/M = [(n/2 - m) : 2/n] = 1 - 2m/n$	r
No-goodness/Average	$T/M = 2/n$	s
No-goodness/Badness	$T/D = [1/(n/2 - m)] = [2/(n - 2m)]$	t

What do these formulae mean? It is easy to see what value *addition* means, namely, a situation in which the value statements added are made together. For example, to take the simplest case, let us say a thing is being judged by four people as being good, fair, so-so, and bad. Let us take a girl being judged by four young men, and all four having agreed on the same definition of "a girl." The first says: "What a girl!" meaning she has all the girl properties, that she is n . The second says: "I really don't think she is so hot," meaning she is so-so, she has $n/2$ girl properties. The third says: "I think she is pretty good," meaning $n/2 + m$, and the fourth says: "I don't know what you fellows see in her," meaning that, though she is still a girl, she does not have much of the girl qualities, she is $n/2 - m$. If we ask ourselves what is the value of the situation of the four young men saying this about the girl, or what their judgments add up to, we would have value addition; we would have to add up the judgment in question, that is, $n + n/2 + n/2 + m + n/2 - m = 2.5n$. This would be the value of the total situation in question. The girl, as seen by the four young men, does have, as was said above (1), two and a half times the properties she has.

Value measurement, thus, is not necessarily the same as intensive measurement by degree. If we have four bodies of different heat, one 10° , one 20° , one 30° , and one 40° , we cannot say that the warmth of the total situation is $10^\circ + 20^\circ + 30^\circ + 40^\circ = 100^\circ$. Degrees do not add up, they can only be averaged. We can determine what the temperature of the room would be, having these four bodies. Again, if in a class of students one has the grade 60, another the grade 70, another 80, and another 90, then it makes no sense to say that the total grade is 300. We can, however, speak of the average grade which is 300 divided by 4, or 75. With value addition it *does* make sense to say that the total value of the situation is $2.5n$, for value judgments do not fuse one with another; and equal judgments, e.g., of "fair," usually mean different sets of properties. But even if they do not, the value situa-

tion may be cumulative. A girl regarded as "good" by four young men is regarded as four times good, or $4n$, and not just as once good (similarly it may be said that a room regarded as hot by four people is, as far as the people are concerned, four times hot). Four girls regarded as "so-so" by one young man are each regarded as so-so, or $4 \times n/2 = 2n$. This does not mean that the situation is twice good, anything beyond n is beyond the term "good." It means that the situation has accumulated $2n$ properties of girlhood, similar to the way that a team acquires points, which are points of excellence, depending on the definition of the particular sport, or as a worker acquires points in job fulfillment.²⁶ By the same reason, the girl seen by four young men acquired $2.5n$ points. Value addition, thus, may be compared to, or actually be, *scoring*, the "points" in question being descriptive properties.

On the other hand, there may be average value of a situation; the average value of the one girl in the above situation is $2.5n : 4 = 5/8 n$, which means "fair," and that of the four girls is $4n : 4 = n$. If it should be held that, at least in the case of value judgments concerning identical or overlapping value properties, only averaging should be permitted, it would mean a prohibition of "scoring" which would not seem to be justified.

The interpretation of value *subtraction* is more difficult. Value subtraction cannot mean the subtraction of value judgments, for any value judgment, even a negative one, once it is made is made and cannot disappear. Any value judgment thus means addition, although it may be a negative one. It cannot mean silence, for in this case no judgment is uttered and the addition is ± 0 . Rather, value subtraction must have a very definite axiological meaning.

It is *ought-value*.

Let us look at the first four values in VIII:

$$G \rightarrow B = n/2 - m, \quad G - M = n/2, \quad G - D = n/2 + m, \quad G - T = n - 1.$$

²⁶ Above f.n. 11, p. 199. The responsibility of a supervisor of several workers "is not different from those below him, but is rather the sum of them all." E. F. L. Brech, *Organisation: The Framework of Management*, London, 1958, p. 290.

These results represent the values of "ought" of a thing that is fair, average, bad, and no-good, respectively. Since a thing ought to be good, that is, ought to be n , its value of ought is n less that which the thing is.²⁷ Hence, the value of ought is determined by the formula $o = n - x$, where x is the value the thing has at the moment of valuation. The formula means: " x ought to be n through o ."

The formulae above then mean the following:

$G - B = n/2 - m = D$ means B ought to be G through D .

$G - M_1 = n/2 = M_2$ means M_1 ought to be G through M_2 .²⁸

$G - D = n/2 + m = B$ means D ought to be G through B .

$G - T = n - 1 = G - 1$ means T ought to be G through $G - 1$.

D , M_2 , D , $G - 1$ are the ought-values of B , M_1 , D , and T with respect to G .²⁹

Thus, whenever it is said that x ought to be y there is the formula $y - x = o$, where y is the norm in question, usually n ; hence $n - x = o$. Depending on whether the value x is "fair," "average," "bad," or "no-good," the ought-value—that through which the subtrahend ought to be the minuend—is, respectively, $n/2 - m$, $n/2$, $n/2 + m$, $n - 1$. In a fair thing its ought-value is bad, in an average thing it is average, in a bad thing it is fair, and in a no-good thing it is good less 1 (which is practically good). All these are axiologically synthetic oughts, that is, the thing is not what it ought to be.³⁰ The value of synthetic ought of a thing, is, logically, the contrary (or subcontrary) value of the thing³¹ and, arithmetically, the complementary value of the thing, $n - x$. The analytic ought value is 0 since $n - n = 0$. In a good thing the value of ought is 0; analytic ought means that the thing is what it ought to be.

From $n - x = o$ follows that $n - o = x$, which means that o

²⁷ See Lepley, *The Language of Value*, pp. 207 f.

²⁸ The prohibition above may mean the M 's here must be different.

²⁹ Perhaps here a modulus symbolization could be introduced: " $G \equiv B$ (ought D)."

³⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 212 ff.

³¹ See square of oppositions, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

ought to be n through x ; in other words, x is the ought-value of its ought-value. The ought-value of x is that through which x ought to be n ; it is the *complement* which makes x into n . Of three values in the relation $V_1 - V_2 = V_3$, V_3 is the ought-value of V_2 , and V_2 is the ought-value of V_3 , both with respect to V_1 . $V_2 + V_3 = V_1$. If we substitute in the formula $n - o = x$ for o its value $n - x$, according to the last formula, $o = n - x$, then $n - (n - x) = x$, which means that $(n - x)$ ought to be n through x : x is the ought-value of $n - x$, which latter is the ought-value of x , namely o . This formula, peculiar as it may seem, will help us to understand value multiplication.

The formulae of subtraction point to a generalization of ought-values. If we call *all* subtractions ought-values, then *all* values under **VIII** are ought-values. This means that the norms in question are not merely G , but all the values possible; the formula then is the general one, mentioned above, $o = y - x$, where y is the norm in question. Thus, if the norm is "no good" and the thing is good, the ought-value would be $1 - n$ (**VIII**, n). Here "ought" is applied to "good" with respect to "no good"—which it ought not, by the definition of "ought." It is an illegitimate use of "ought."

The norm "no-good" for a good thing is a no-good norm. On the other hand, the norm "average" could be a good norm for a no-good thing since "average" lies in the positive direction of "ought,"³² from "no-good." A no-good thing ought to be (at least) average. The ought-value of a no-good thing with respect to average is $n/2 - 1$ (**VIII**, i) and is a legitimate use of ought since it is positive in the sense defined.³³ The ought-value of a good thing with respect to bad is $-(n/2 + m)$, since ought-value $o = y - x$, where the norm $y = n/2 - m$, or bad, and $x = n$. Hence $n/2 - m - n = n/2 - m$ (**VIII**, m) or $-(n/2 + m)$. This is the (negative) ought-value of a good thing with respect to "bad"—and it is the negative value of "fair." A good thing ought not to be bad; if it ought to be bad then the ought-value is the negative of the positive ought-value of a bad thing (**VIII**, c).

³² *Op. cit.*, pp. 208 f.

³³ *Ibid.*

In general, if a thing with value x ought not to be y , then the corresponding ought-value is the negative of the positive ought-value of y ; $o = y - x = -(x - y)$.

The notion of ought-value helps us to understand some of the relations implied in the formulae VII-X—relations not only between descriptive and value properties, but also between the value properties themselves. As is seen,

$$\begin{array}{ll} n = B + D & \text{VII f} \\ = G \times T & \text{IX d} \\ = G/T & \text{X d} \end{array}$$

This means that the number of descriptive properties equals the sum of the values Fairness and Badness, the product of the values Goodness and No-goodness, and the quotient of the values Goodness and No-goodness. The relations are obvious from the definitions of Goodness (the set of descriptive properties, n , used as value measure), of No-goodness (1), and of Fairness and Badness ($n/2 + m$, $n/2 - m$).

The following relations are not so obvious and quite beautiful:

$$\begin{array}{ll} n = (G \times M)/(G - M) & \text{XI (VIII b, IX b)} \\ = (G \times B)/(G - D) & \text{XII (VIII c, IX a)} \\ = (G \times D)/(G - B) & \text{XIII (VIII a, IX c)} \end{array}$$

As is seen, the number of descriptive properties corresponds to artful combinations of the value properties Goodness and Average, and Goodness, Badness and Fairness. Since $G - M$, $G - D$, $G - B$ are the ought-values of, respectively, an average, a fair, and a bad thing, the goodness of the thing, n , equals the quotients of Goodness times Average, and the Ought-value of an average thing; Goodness times Fairness, and the Ought-value of a fair thing; Goodness times Badness, and the Ought-value of a bad thing.

We have, by definition,

$$n = G \quad \text{Def.}$$

Furthermore,

$$\begin{array}{ll} n/2 = M & \text{Def.} \\ = (M \times D)/(G - B) & \text{XIV (VIII a, IX h)} \end{array}$$

and

$$n^2 = 2GM \quad \text{XV (IX b)}$$

From the above equations follow, among others, the following relations between value properties:

$$(G \times B)/(G \times M) = (G - D)/(G - M) \quad \text{XVI (XI, XII)}$$

$$(G \times D)/(G \times M) = (G - B)/(G - M) \quad \text{XVII (XI, XIII)}$$

$$(G \times D)/(G \times B) = (G - B)/(G - D) \quad \text{XVIII (XII, XIII)}$$

The product of Goodness and Fairness is to the product of Goodness and Average as the difference of Goodness and Badness is to the difference of Goodness and Average. The product of Goodness and Badness is to the product of Goodness and Average as the difference of Goodness and Fairness is to the difference of Goodness and Average. The product of Goodness and Badness is to the product of Goodness and Fairness as the difference of Goodness and Fairness is to the difference of Goodness and Badness. Since $G - D$, $G - B$, and $G - M$ are the ought-values of respectively, a fair, a bad, and an average thing, the formulae mean that the ought-value of a bad thing is to that of an average thing as the product of a good and a fair thing is to that of a good and an average thing; the ought-value of a fair to that of an average thing as the product of a good and a bad to that of a good and an average thing; and the ought-value of a fair to that of a bad thing as the product of a good and bad to that of a good and a fair thing. Or, in general, *the ought-values of values are proportionate to the products of good and the complements of the values* (the ought-value of, say B , is the complement $G - B$, which is D , and $D : B = GD : GB = (G - B) : (G - D)$).

Let us now turn to the interpretation of *multiplication*. If the ought-values of a thing are subtractions of value, what is multiplication of values? According to equation **XI**, $G \times M = n(G - M) = G(G - M)$, that is, the product of Goodness and Averageness equals the product of Goodness times the Ought-value of Averageness. According to **XII**, the product of Goodness and Fairness equals the product of Goodness and the Ought-value of

Badness, $G \times B = G(G - D)$. In general, the product of n and x equals the product of n and the ought-value of x , $n \cdot x = n(n - o)$, and this, as we have seen, means $n \cdot x = n[n - (n - x)]$. In words, $x = n - (n - x)$ meant that $(n - x)$ ought to be n through x . The product of this by n , $n \cdot x = n[n - (n - x)]$, merely adds the factor n on both sides, meaning on the left side there is n and there is x , and on the right side that there is n , and $n - x$ ought to be n through x . A value multiplication, thus, is a more emphatic value subtraction or ought-value. The emphasis is on the norm which ought to be fulfilled through the ought-value. Any statements of the form "There is a norm n and there is an ought value x " is a value multiplication $n \cdot x$, and it means that $n - x$, or the ought value of x , namely o , ought to be n , and that there is n .

In terms of V_1 and V_2 , the product of V_1 times V_2 equals the product of V_1 times the ought-value of the complement of V_2 with respect to V_1 . The ought-value of the complement of V_2 is, by the definition of ought-value, V_2 . Hence, with respect to V_1 (that is, if the norm of the ought-value of V_2 is V_1) $V_2 = V_1 - (V_1 - V_2)$; V_2 is the ought-value of $(V_1 - V_2)$ with respect to V_1 ; $(n/2 + m)$ or Fairness is the ought-value of $[n - (n/2 + m)]$ with respect to n , that is, of $n/2 - m$, or Badness, with respect to Goodness. Any value product, then, $V_1 \times V_2 = V_1[V_1 - (V_1 - V_2)]$,—where $V_1 - V_2$ is the ought value of V_2 , which latter ought to be V_1 . If $V_1 = G$ and $V_2 = D$, then $G \times D = G[G - (G - D)]$; the product of Goodness and Badness is equal to the product of Goodness and the Ought-value of the complement of Badness, which is the ought-value of Fairness, that is Badness. If $V_1 = D$, $V_2 = G$, then $D \times G = [D - (D - G)]$; the product of Badness and Goodness is the product of Badness and the Ought-value, with respect to Badness, of the Ought-value of Goodness with respect to Badness, which is the Ought-value of negative Fairness (VIII, m) with respect to Badness, or Badness minus negative Fairness, that is, plus Fairness, which is Goodness. In other words, the complement of Goodness with respect to Badness is negative Fairness, and the latter's ought-value with respect to Badness is again Goodness. As is seen, value

multiplication, in this interpretation, is not commutative. It is, however, commutative in the arithmetical interpretation.²⁴

If we signify the complement of V by " V_d " (from Spanish "*debe*" = "ought"), and the ought-value of V by V_D , then $V_D = V_d$. Thus, $B_d = D$, $D_d = B$, $M_d = M$, $G_d = O$. The ought-value of a value is the complement of the value; that is, $B_d = G - B$, $D_d = G - D$, $M_d = G - M$, $G_d = G - G$. Hence $V_1 \times V_2 = V_1(V_1 - V_{2(d)})$, whence follows that $V_2 = V_1 - V_{2(d)}$ and $V_{2(d)} = V_1 - V_2$.

The product of two values, V_1 and V_2 , then, *relates the two values with respect to the latter's ought-value which ought to be the former value through the latter*, the product $V_1 \times V_2$ relates V_1 and V_2 with respect to the ought-value of V_2 which ought to be V_1 . The first factor V_1 is the norm which the complement of the second factor ($V_1 - V_2$) ought to fulfill [$V_1 - (V_1 - V_2)$]. But the norm V_1 is also the norm of the second factor itself, for whereas ($V_1 - V_2$) is to fulfill V_1 through V_2 , V_2 is to fulfill V_1 through [$V_1 - (V_1 - V_2)$], which means $n - (n - x) = n - o$, which is the ought-value of x . From this follows the *rule of value multiplication*: *The only permissible multiplier of a value is the norm of the value*. Thus, if I want to multiply V by, say K , then K becomes the norm of the value V , and the resulting formula is $KV = K(K - V_d)$. Since the norm of V is the totality of which V is a subset or a *part*, (as the norm of $B = n/2 - m$, is $G = n$, of which $n/2 - m$ is a subset), this norm, say K , is of a higher logical order than is V ; and the rule of value multiplication states that I may multiply a value only with the set of which it is a subset, or with the intension in which it is contained; in logical terms, I may multiply a set of properties only with the intension of which it is a part but not with another set of properties.²⁵

What then does multiplication of two sets of properties mean? It means logically, that the first set must serve as intension for

²⁴ For the corresponding case in arithmetic see N. R. Campbell, *Physics: The Elements*, Cambridge, 1920, pp. 306 ff. Arithmetical commutativity hides logical non-commutativity. Logically, $2 \times 3 \neq 3 \times 2$, even though both are 6, for " 2×3 " means two sets of three elements and " 3×2 " means three sets of two elements. In the first case the set of 6 consists of 2 sets, ${}_2C_3$, whereas in the second case it consists of 3 sets, ${}_3C_2$.

²⁵ For the mathematical meaning of this see N. R. Campbell, *loc. cit.*

the second: as the set of which the second is a subset; or, axiologically, that the first set is the norm for the second which the second set ought to fulfill. Thus, $B \times D = n^2/4 - m^2$ means, logically, that the first factor (the multiplier) here is the set of which the second (the multiplicand) is the subset; or, axiologically, that the multiplier is the *norm* the multiplicand is to fulfill; such that $B \times D = B[B - (B - D)]$. Hence, it implies that a bad thing ought to be fair. Similarly, all the formulae under **IX** imply that a thing with the value of the multiplicand ought to have the value of the multiplier. Value multiplication thus *implies* oughtness. Every value product is a product of a norm and a lower value, even if the latter is absolutely higher, as in $B \times G$. This implies the ought-value of G with respect to B (**VIII**, k).

Hence, if value subtraction is called ought-value (in $G - D = B$, B is the ought-value of D), a value product may be called a *normative ought-value*, meaning that $G \times D$ is the normative ought-value of which G is the norm which is to be fulfilled both by D and its ought-value, or complement, $G - D$; for $G \times D = G[G - (G - D)]$. The second factor of the product, D , may be called the *value-ought*, meaning a value which ought to fulfill a norm but is not an ought-value (the ought-value in question is $G - D = B$). A *normative ought-value thus is a product consisting of a value norm and a value-ought*. It is equal to the product of the norm and the ought-value of the value-ought's complement [the complement of D is B , and B 's ought-value is $G - B = G - (G - D) = D$]. A value-ought, thus, is a complementary value's ought-value; which means simply that it is its complement's complement. D , as a value-ought, is the ought-value of B , just as B , as a value-ought, is the ought-value of D .

Division is the opposite operation, the splitting up of the normative ought-value by the corresponding value-ought. The result is the norm which makes the value-ought into the normative ought-value. Thus $D/M = 1 - 2m/n$ (X , r), which is equivalent to $D = M(1 - 2m/n)$. Here the set D is split up into two sets, M and $(1 - 2m/n)$ whose multiplication results in D . Hence, D is the normative ought-value of which M is the norm and $(1 - 2m/n)$ the value-ought (or *vice versa*). M is what $(1 - 2m/n)$

ought to fulfill in order to become G. Similarly, all the quotients in X are norms to which the divisors are the value-oughts.³⁶ For example, $(1 + 2m/n)$ is the norm which M ought to fulfill in order to become B(X, e). A value quotient, then is a norm which the divisor ought to fulfill in order to become the dividend; it is a norm which is a division of a normative ought-value by a value-ought. Since the norm is a means for the value-ought to realize, by multiplication, the normative ought-value [e.g., the norm M is a means for $(1 - 2m/n)$ to realize D], the norm may be called the *multiplicative complement* of the value-ought with respect to the normative ought-value. Thus, M is the multiplicative complement of $(1 - 2m/n)$ with respect to D, for $M(1 - 2m/n) = D$.

While value multiplication is emphatic value subtraction, or ought-value, that is the emphasis of the positive in the lack of value through the complement, the meaning of value division is value diminution down to value cancellation. Thus, if $x = n - o$, then $x/(n - o) = 1$; if $B = G - D$, then $B/(G - D) = 1$. The pure number 1 has the lowest value dimension, "no-good," and values < 1 mean even less, down to 0, value neutrality or valuelessness. To understand this we must turn to another value operation, exponentiation.

The axiological interpretations of the value operations so far appear in the following Table.

³⁶ This does not seem to apply, however, to the forms which result in pure numbers > 1 , such as Xb , unless these numbers, e.g., "2," are given intensional meanings, similar to the value meaning given "1" above (and below pp. 226 f.). "2" may mean a set of two properties, such as genus and differentia. In this case, $M=1$, and $2M=2$ ($2 - M$) = $G=2$ ($2 - (2 - 1)$) = 2. In this case it makes sense to say that "M ought to be 2," namely, to fulfill the two properties which constitute G. For any value of $M > 1$, one would have to say "M ought to be double," and "2" would have to mean "double."

Axiological Interpretation of Value Operations

Value operation	Name	Factors
Addition	Scoring	Values
Subtraction	Ought-value (Value complements)	Norm; value
Multiplication	Normative ought-value	Norm; value-ought
Division	Norm (Multiplicative value complement)	Normative ought-value; value-ought

Although value exponentiation leads into a field of value calculation which is too extensive for the present purpose,²⁷ a few words will be appropriate.

A value product always means a norm multiplied by a non-fulfilled value-ought. An exponentiation of a value means its multiplication by itself. $G^2 = G \times G$. This would mean, accordingly, that the value would be split into two different kinds: logically, the multiplier would be the set of which the multiplicand is a subset; axiologically, the former would be the norm of which the latter is the value-ought. The former would be the set of Goodness, the latter a specific goodness. This would mean that the various goodnesses of things are combined to the set of Goodness, and that the latter is the norm of which the particular goodnesses of things are the value-oughts, that is, the norm to which they logically strive. The same is true of all other values. The exponentiation of Badness, D^2 , means that the various badnesses of things are combined to form the set of Badness, and that the latter is the norm of Badness of which the particular badnesses of things are the value-oughts, and to which they logically strive.

²⁷ See the author's "Value Theory as a Formal System," *Kant-Studien*, *op. cit.*

Value in *general* is, then, the set of all these sets of which specific values are subsets.

An exponentiation, thus, is a value as a normative ought-value. Values can, potentially, be exponentiated *ad infinitum*. Thus, there is possible $G^3, G^4, \dots G^n, \dots G^\infty$; $B^2, \dots B^n, B^\infty$, or, in general, $V^2, V^3, \dots V^n, \dots V^\infty$, which means that there is always possible a higher fulfillment of the value in question. Only the actual infinity of an exponentiated value, G^∞, B^∞ , or in general, V^∞ , where $V > 1$, is the fulfillment of the value and such fulfillment makes it another value (since $n^\infty = \aleph_1$), a non-denumerable continuum, whereas the values here in question are denumerable. Thus, " $G \times G = G^2$ " means that the actual good-value of a thing is an ought-value with respect to a higher good-value which includes all the good-values of things. But this higher good-value, in turn, is an ought-value with respect to an even higher good-value $G \times G \times G = G^3$, and so on *ad infinitum*. In other words, value fulfillment is never final. One value potentiality realized, or fulfilled, in turn implies another higher potentiality, which when fulfilled implies another higher potentiality and so on. We have here the axiological basis of *Teleology*. Even at "*infinitum*" the process does not stop, for here we have G^∞ , which is \aleph_1 and is an ought-value with respect to the value \aleph_2 . The exponents "2," "3," etc., signify the level of self-fulfillment of the value in question, the fulfillment of its nature of being this value, its level of perfection as this value. Thus D^2 is a more perfect bad-value than G^1 is a good-value. While the latter is n , the former is $(n/2 - m)^2$, which may be more than n . Note that all values > 1 denumerably infinitely potentiated, are equal to the new value dimension \aleph_1 , since any number > 1 with exponent \aleph_0 is \aleph_1 . The value \aleph_1 thus is a first "highest value," a *summa virtus* rather than a *summum bonum*, and a first link in an infinite series of such "transfinite" values."

A value to the exponent 1 is the value itself; yet the product in question is not without significance, since the form " $V \times 1$ " would mean that V is the norm of which 1 is the ought-value, and

²⁸ See Edwin T. Mitchell, *A System of Ethics*, New York, 1950, pp. 126 ff.

the form $1 \times V$ that 1 is the norm of which V is the ought-value. In the first case, $V \times 1 = V[V - (V - 1)]$, in the second case $1 \times V = 1[1 - (1 - V)]$. The question, then arises what besides "no-good," or having only one property, signifies "1." A clue may be found in the exponential meaning of "1." "1" signifies exponentiation by zero, since $V^0 = 1$. This means that a value multiplied zero times by itself is a "no-good"-value: a stagnant value which does not develop is no good (mathematically, exponentiation is "evolution"). Similarly, the product $V \times 0 = 0$ means that the value is the norm of nothing and nothing is the value-ought of it. Here the lack of development means that the value is no value. Thus, we have a scale between 0 and 1, signifying the scale from "no value" to "no-good value." This scale is that of fractions—which are between 0 and 1, and which therefore, represent values of "no good" or "less than no-good." Such values are found in value *division*, e.g., $X, 1, X, n$, and, X, s . They signify *transpositions* of value, that is, combinations of values which result in a value less than no-good. An example would be the combination of coffee and sawdust, which is less than no-good coffee and less than no-good sawdust. What does the exponent mean in such an operation?

The exponent means, as we said, the level of perfection of the value as this kind of value. A value to the exponent zero has zero perfection as this kind of value, and the symbol of such "zero perfection" is "1." A value of "zero perfection" as this kind of value is no good to such a degree as hardly to be said to be that kind of value. Yet, it is not 0, that is, nothing. On the other hand, a value to the exponent 1 always remains that kind of value. Thus, "1" is a symbol which, as exponent, signifies value stagnation and, as result of exponentiation, zero perfection of the value as such.

There is a third value operation which always results in 1. Exponentiation is possible not only as self-multiplication of a value, that is, in terms of a pure-number exponent, but also in terms of a value as an exponent. Thus G^G means the level G , or good, of the perfection of a G -value, the valuation of goodness in terms of goodness-attribution of goodness to goodness-approval of good-

ness as good. " G^D " means the level D, or "bad," of the perfection of a G-value, the valuation of G in terms of D: disapproval of goodness as bad. This does not mean lack in goodness. Rather, it means more than goodness, it means an abundance beyond goodness. And though it is a disapproval of goodness it is still a better value than a simple good-value. It recognizes G as G and in addition disapproves. In other words, $n^n > n^{n/2-n} > n^1$, since $m < n/2$. Any exponentiation by a positive value—even if it is smaller than the base value—enhances the value. In other words, any value valued in terms of a positive value becomes a higher value. Such a higher value we call a *value composition* or *abundance value*. A diamond is beautiful, but even more so when set properly in a unique setting; and even if the setting is not beautiful but functional, such as a cutter's tool, the original value of the diamond may be enhanced. On the other hand, exponentiation by a negative value devaluates the value. Thus, valuing good coffee in terms of good sawdust is a devaluation of the good coffee; and instead of the exponentiation G^G we have the exponentiation $G^{-G} = 1/G^G$, which is a fraction between 0 and 1, and is a *transposition*.

Now we are ready to have another look at the value symbol "1." As is seen, composition and transposition with the same values are inversely proportionate, and their product always is 1. Thus $G^G \times G^{-G} = 1$; or, in general $V^V \times V^{-V} = 1$. This means that the product of a composition and its corresponding transposition cancel each other, that is, cancel their respective value elements. The result is a situation without value. This we call a *mere fact*, in the sense discussed above p. 209. The symbol of *mere fact* is "1." Our theory shows that the *value of mere fact* is exactly between composition and transposition, between approval and disapproval. It is neither the one nor the other. *Mere fact* is value with the exponent 0. And a value to the exponent 1 is the *mere fact of a value*, a stagnant value.

The nature of Composition and Transposition as Approval and Disapproval, respectively, shows up a relation between value exponentiation and value subtraction. Approval expresses addition—exponentially—to an existing value, oughtness expresses sub-

traction—non-exponentially—from a value to be fulfilled (or addition to a non-existing value).³⁹ Approval thus is axiologically opposed to *oughtness*. A good chair to which—by a second value judgment—goodness is added, is axiologically opposed to a chair which *ought to be* good and hence *is not* good. Any approval of a good thing exponentially adds value to the goodness, since, in addition to *stating* the goodness of the thing—which is *attribution* of goodness—this goodness is in turn called good; goodness is attributed to goodness: "*x* is good and it is good that *x* is good." Approval thus is *attribution of goodness to the attribution of goodness*. Since approval is opposed to oughtness, or value lack, approval of a person as good is opposed not only to disapproval as bad, but to admonishing the person that he ought to be good—which latter is disapproval of him as bad. Disapproval is attributing badness to the attribution of badness. "X ought to be good" implies that *x* is bad and that it is bad that *x* is bad. "Ought" here is synthetic.⁴⁰ Approval, on the other hand, as just seen, means that *x* is good and that it is good that *x* is good. This may also be expressed in terms of analytic ought, since analytic ought is equivalent to "good"; "*x* is good" = "*x* is as *x* ought to be." Hence, Approval may be expressed in the following eight ways (where "is good" = A, and "is as ought to be" = B):

- (1) X is good and it is good that *x* is good (A A A).
- (2) X is good and it is good that *x* is as *x* ought to be (A A B).
- (3) X is good and it is as it ought to be that *x* is as *x* ought to be (A B B).
- (4) X is as *x* ought to be and it is as it ought to be that *x* is as *x* ought to be (B B B).
- (5) X is as *x* ought to be and it is as it ought to be that *x* is good (B B A).
- (6) X is as *x* ought to be and it is good that *x* is good (B A A).

³⁹ The formula $n - x = o$ (*x* ought to be *n* through *o*) is equivalent to $-n + x = -o$. Only *x* is positively there, *n* and *o* are both lacking: *x* ought to be *n*, which is not yet, through *o*, which is not yet either.

⁴⁰ Lepley, *The Language of Value*, p. 216.

- (7) X is as x ought to be and it is good that x is as x ought to be (BAB).
 (8) X is good and it is as it ought to be that x is good (ABA).

As is seen, approval and disapproval disclose a relation between "it is good that" and analytic "ought." "It is good that x is good" may be taken as a definition of analytic "ought," and "it is bad that x is bad" as a definition of synthetic "ought."⁴¹

The generalizations of ought-value discussed above p. 217, e.g., " x is good and ought to be bad" are equivalent to disapprovals of goodness and approvals of badness, that is, to uses of analytic "ought" combined with negative uses of synthetic "ought." " X is good and ought to be bad" is equivalent to " x is as x ought to be and x ought to be as x ought not to be." The italicized "ought" is synthetic, the others are analytic. On the other hand, " x is bad and ought to be good" is equivalent to " x is not as x ought to be and x ought to be as x ought to be" which is a positive use of synthetic "ought." Or, the same expressed by uses of synthetic "ought not," " x is bad and ought not to be good" = " x is as x ought not to be and x ought not to be as x ought to be," the illegitimate use; and " x is good and ought not to be bad" = " x is as x ought to be and x ought not to be as x ought not to be," the legitimate use.

The legitimate forms of *Disapproval* can be arrived at by denying all the forms (1)-(8) above: $\overline{A}\overline{A}\overline{A}$ (" x is not good and it is not good that x is not good" or " x is bad and it is bad that x is bad"), $\overline{A}\overline{A}\overline{B}$ (" x is bad and it is bad that x is not as x ought to be") $\overline{A}\overline{B}\overline{B}$, $\overline{B}\overline{B}\overline{B}$, etc. Illegitimate forms arise when positive and negative forms are mixed. These forms are of two kinds, contradictions and nonsense. Contradictions arise when there is a symmetric mixture, that is, the central form is different from the outer forms ($\overline{A}\overline{A}A$, $\overline{A}A\overline{A}$), while nonsense arises in all other cases. Thus, it is axiologically contradictory to say " x is good and

⁴¹ On the relation between "it is better that" and synthetic "ought" see *loc. cit.*, p. 208.

it is bad that x is good" ($\overline{A} \overline{A} A$) or " x is bad and it is good that x is bad" ($\overline{A} A \overline{A}$) but nonsense to say " x is good and it is bad that x is bad" ($A \overline{A} \overline{A}$).

Value composition thus reveals a logical pattern for Approval and Disapproval. Approval and Disapproval, on the other hand, are certain interpretations of Value Compositions, which reveal relationships between value exponentiation and value subtraction.

The latter are two of the operations possible when, as a solution of the Moorean problem, value properties are regarded as subsets of descriptions.

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AWARENESS AND POSSIBILITY

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IN MANY WAYS the nature of awareness lies at the very core of those problems which we recognize as peculiarly philosophical. Firstly, and most obviously, our concept of awareness will affect what we call knowledge. Secondly, metaphysics as a philosophical discipline might be said to be constituted by what can be known of reality by virtue of the fact that we know at all. Thirdly, and most vitally, the examination of awareness is an expression of man's alienation from himself; and one might say that such alienation is the very spring of the philosophical spirit.

I

It is not at all difficult to single out the critical feature of awareness by virtue of which it possesses such encompassing significance for philosophy. Awareness is subjective, and yet it appears to relate to what is other than the subject as other-than-the-subject. This is the so-called intentional or referential aspect of awareness.

In his book *Objectivity*,¹ William Earle has attempted to give the phenomenologically intentional aspect of awareness its philosophical due. To sharpen the issues, it may be well to review some of the main points of his treatment. Earle combines a realist view of the object of awareness (and of truth as correspondence to that object) with a partially Hegelian conception of awareness. Awareness, according to Earle, involves three stages, recognizable as thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The thesis is made up of the subject and object intertwined, and not yet distinguished from each other. The antithesis is constituted by a recoil of the subject from the object back upon itself. Earle terms this recoil a primary reflexivity of the subject, which, though ingredient in awareness,

¹ William Earle, *Objectivity*. New York: Noonday Press, 1955.

is not yet sufficient to constitute awareness. Whereas for Hegel the reflexive recoil of the subject back upon itself constitutes the object for the subject, for Earle this recoil of the subject in no way creates its object. The reflexive withdrawal of the subject from the object simply separates two metaphysically distinct entities. Hegel's separation of subject and object alienates the subject from himself; Earle's separation of subject and object alienates the subject from the world. But for both Earle and Hegel, *knowledge* of the object does not take place until a redemptive synthesis of subject and object occurs. In the Hegelian scheme the redemptive synthesis unifies the subject with himself. According to Earle, however, the redemptive synthesis achieves only knowledge of the object as *other* than the subject; that is, it is the object as distant from, therefore intended by, the subject that is known. The final stage in knowledge is thus constituted by a positive approach of the subject to a metaphysically distinct object. Earle must therefore insist, as he does, that immediate self-awareness is, in principle, impossible. He characterizes his own method as *retrospectively* reflexive, very different from the primary reflexivity involved in the constitution of awareness. To justify the validity and possibility of this retrospective reflexivity, he argues for the metaphysical identity of a subject forever outside of and beyond its own acts, and, of course, inaccessible to knowledge in a way that the world independent of the subject is not.²

On the following account of awareness, knowledge of the sub-

² In a recently published paper, Earle attempts to chart what he calls "The Life of the Transcendental Ego," (See this *Review*, XIII, September 1959, pp. 3-27), by pointing to the products of this ego in knowledge as belief, in emotions as value, and in volition as primarily the affirmation of life or its denial. Now, though emotions and perceptions are evidently intertwined with objects as metaphysically other than the subject, the volitional *revocability* of the affirmation of life (as indeed the revocability of any particular belief or value) seems to involve directly the reality of the ego as freedom. Indeed we may ask whether volitional revocability involves an object distinct from the subject at all. Is awareness of this revocability possible; if possible, is it possible only retrospectively? Yet what we may now be free to revoke may in the past have been incapable of being otherwise. It would seem, then, that by pointing to the revocability of decision, Earle himself has inadvertently indicated the difficulties inherent in maintaining the impossibility of immediate self-awareness.

ject is no more intrinsically retrospective than knowledge of that which is metaphysically independent of the subject. Hence, we should be capable of knowing real aspects of the subject just as we know real aspects of a metaphysically independent object. If the reality of the subject escapes us, so does the reality of the world.

In the Hegelian scheme, on the one hand, the initial intertwining of subject and object involves an essential instability, which necessitates the ejection of the object as other. It may be argued, parenthetically, that this essential instability is traceable to a teleological consciousness that has not yet attained its end. In Earle's scheme, on the other hand, we can find no possible explanation in the thesis for the recoil of the subject away from the object; nor in the antithesis for the return of the subject to the object. Perhaps that is just the way Earle would like to have it: that mind should be essentially irrational. Otherwise how could mind retain its freedom? The following account seeks to explain awareness in a way that will not deny the freedom of the subject. Indeed, as we shall see, it even draws upon the freedom of the subject. The point of view of this approach might be characterized as an expressive phenomenology, which finds awareness in the context of affectivity and volition.

II

We begin with a seemingly obvious and simple distinction, namely that between epistemological objectivity and metaphysical objectivity. That which is objective, epistemologically or metaphysically, is felt as other-than-the-subject, but in different senses. For now let us say that being an object for awareness constitutes epistemological objectivity. And we turn forthwith to a consideration of metaphysical objectivity.

To be metaphysically objective is to be other-than-the-subject in the sense of being causally independent of the subject. To be metaphysically other, the object must not depend on the subject for its existence. Of course, knowledge of what is metaphysically other is problematic. Yet, to walk down the stairs, or open a door, or drink a cup of coffee is to relate to what is metaphysically other. These are acts which are constituted as acts and defined as

distinct by their goal orientation. When they reach their goal, they are finished or consummated. The subject relates to a metaphysically objective realm as a source of resistance or limitation to the realization of a goal. The unrealized goal functions as a felt value which relates the subject to the future; and the metaphysically other is felt, however vaguely, as influencing the realization of that value in a way not constituted by the subject. This applies to our sense of objective reality even when we dream. The real world is felt as limiting the consummation of our acts; and we are concerned now with what is meant by objective reality, not with how that reality may be known. If the subject's goal is immediately realized, then no sense of metaphysical objectivity arises at all. Whatever facilitates the realization of a goal, as for example, the subject's body under certain circumstances, is simply not distinguished from the subject at all. In order that a sense of metaphysical objectivity arise, the realization of the subject's goal must then, at the very least, encounter some resistance; the point being that metaphysical objectivity emerges only as limiting the subject's activity. But how shall we account for knowledge of this resistance?

This view of the emergence of real objects has, thus far, distinctly pragmatic overtones. The pragmatists have, however, maintained that not only metaphysical but epistemological objectivity arises in this way. So the pragmatists have held that *knowledge* of objects develops when activity is blocked. But it is easy to see that mere resistance is not enough to account for such knowledge. Frustration may induce only a sense of impotence, or a temper tantrum. If, on the one hand, resistance is overcome on the basis of awareness of the object, then the whole question is begged. On the other hand, the mere process of overcoming resistance can hardly be identified with knowledge of the obstacle because, according to the suggested view, insofar as the activity is successful, the obstacle is eliminated. Where then shall we place the obstacle itself? Let it be agreed that the subject must feel he is in a problematic situation. This would only imply that the subject feels that, though activity is blocked, resistance *may* be overcome. In that case, however, have we not implicitly

introduced another factor, namely, the subject's sense of his future as a locus of alternatives?

III

To feel the future as a locus of alternatives one need not know what these alternatives are. Simply, the future is felt as indeterminate. The future is, of course, not yet realized. However, to be able to feel the future as indeterminate implies that the future must be felt as capable of *alternate* determinations; that is, the subject must feel his future as undecided or, what is the same, as decideable. Our thesis is that it is just this sense of alternative possibility or indeterminacy, or, if one prefers, of possibility *per se*, that is constitutive of awareness. Awareness, so understood, is essentially subjective freedom. For, insofar as the subject confronts his future as undecided or decideable, so is he immediately undecided or deciding; but then, in either case, and in some respect, he is immediately free from determination by what is metaphysically other than himself.

This being the case, awareness is to be differentiated from other feeling,³ not by relationship to an object distinct from the subject, but rather by the ingredient of alternative. If awareness is thus constituted as the sense of alternative, then we may expect awareness to arise as decision emerges. Decision may be characterized as the subject's felt formation of his future. All that is necessary for decision is that the subject should feel that he is bringing into existence what would not otherwise—without his act—be. Why should awareness not be ingredient in directing our body movements, as for example, in learning to walk, or in moving the arms at will? The kind of awareness involved would not be essentially different from the kind involved in saying what one intends to say. When one says what he intends to say, there is no clear-cut distinction between his intention, on the one hand, and its expression or realization, on the other. Yet the subject is somehow aware that his expression is realizing his intention.

³ The Whiteheadian view of awareness as a species of feeling is here retained. See, for example, A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York, Social Science Bookstore), p. 372.

Indeed, he is aware of his intention only insofar as he is, in one way or another, expressing what he wanted to say. His expression develops his intention. It is only through expression that intention is objectified for the subject. It may be said we are aware of intention through expression because expression embodies intention in a metaphysically independent medium. But we are not ordinarily aware of our words as such (i.e., as metaphysically independent); rather we are aware of words as expressing (i.e., as developing intention). Intention is separated from expression only as the indeterminate is separated from the determinate, since intention is, essentially, indeterminate expression. Intention constitutes a locus of the indeterminacy lying in the subject's future. The subject by expressing his intention, determines, or forms, or decides that locus, and if such expression did not *exclude* alternate expression, we would merely *feel*, rather than be *aware* of, our intention as expressed. In just this sense is our intention *selected*. Thus intention may be understood as the subject's decision to form his future in the way his expression shows. The locus of indeterminacy is then that sector of the subject's future which, as his expression, he intends to form. We may be tempted to speak of this formative awareness as self-awareness. Yet it is not that, for self-awareness would involve a felt contrast of subjective freedom and its absence. What we have in the ordinary expression of intention is awareness as ingredient in the formation of the subject's future. It is this latter kind of awareness that is similarly involved in learning to direct the body. The body becomes an expressive medium, capable of alternative actions, and the subject's intentional efforts determine his body movements as decisions to form his future in the way his body movements show.

Just as the subject's expression may be regarded as the determination of his intention, so the process of goal realization may be taken as the determination of his goal. A goal could not function as goal if its realization did not lie in the subject's future; and, as in the case of the expression of intention, the subject cannot really formulate what will satisfy or realize a goal except as that goal is satisfied, actually or imaginatively. A goal may, therefore, be understood as the subject's decision to form his future in

the way in which his activity in realizing the goal shows. However, expression is not ordinarily felt to be contingent in the same way that goal activity is. We distinguish between goal activity and the simple direction of our bodies because the realization of a goal does not depend only on the decision or intention of the subject. Goal activity overcomes resistance to its realization, and this resistance is felt by the subject as independently caused. Yet the discrepancy between intention and expression is sufficient to account for a sense of subjective limitation only. In goal activity, this discrepancy is objectified as independently caused, because the subject feels his power limited or resisted *as he removes the discrepancy*. Thus, the discrepancy becomes an avoidable alternative, whose determinacy is attested to by the subject's sense of limitation as he succeeds. It is through the subject's decision or selection that the alternative is avoided; wherefore he must be aware of his activity in removing the discrepancy as he is aware of his activity in the expression of intention. Yet, as limiting the subject's power, the avoided alternative is determinate and not merely possible. Being determinate, the avoided alternative is felt as metaphysically independent of the subject, though his awareness is restricted to its avoidance. On the other hand, as resistance disappears, so does the sense of metaphysical independence.

IV

The kind of awareness thus far sketched ties its object as expression to the intention expressed, so that the object is not known apart from the intention. It is highly particularized. With the loss of its genetic intention, the object also is lost. For the object cannot be recalled without recalling the intention expressed. Particularized awareness is expressive, and is certainly not to be identified with the objectified kind of awareness which we usually recognize as yielding knowledge of reality. In the remainder of this paper we shall be concerned with indicating how this objective kind of awareness may evolve out of its primitive ancestor.

It appears, then, that through goal-oriented activity a limitation may be objectified as metaphysically other without, however, being known except as avoided. A limitation which is objectified

is felt as a metaphysically independent determinant of the subject's activity. In order that such a determinant be known, i.e., become an object for awareness, the subject must open himself to this determinant in such a way that his immediate future is formed by the selected determinant rather than his own decision or goal. Instances of such subjectively imposed restraint are not at all hard to find. The subject refrains from determination of his immediate future whenever he refrains from decision. Just as the subject can determine his future by decision so can he refrain from the determination of his immediate future by withholding decision.

Contained in the subject's capacity to refrain from self-determination in this way is, I believe, the basis for objective awareness. This abstinence from self-determination is recognizable as the movement of primary reflexivity, the recoil of the subject from the object, that Earle speaks of as preliminary to full awareness. But we would characterize this movement instead as a recoil of the subject from determination of his immediate future. But abstinence from self-determination would collapse into mere passivity were not the subject correlatively to constitute his immediate future as indeterminate, or, what is the same, capable of alternative, or again, decideable. Insofar as the subject withholds decision, and simultaneously constitutes his immediate future as decideable, he restricts the determination by his immediate past to the constitution of possibility, and he is open to determination by what is not subjectively generated.

Objective awareness depends, then, on the subject's indecision constituting the relevant alternatives. If the subject restricts his self-determination to the constitution of possibility, he becomes aware of actuality, of determination *per se*. This awareness is not yet, however, of an object as metaphysically other-than-the-subject. The subject is, strictly speaking, aware of value as being ungenerated by himself and therefore "found," involving no differentiation of subject and object, and yet felt as excluding its alternative, the absence of that value. Perhaps mystical intuition is here adumbrated. In its combined valuative and cognitive aspects this experience is akin to aesthetic and ethical awareness. In the latter, however, the subject selects an aspect of actuality for emphasized feeling. Thus, by focusing, the subject restricts the

causal determination of his immediate future to an aspect of found actuality. In this way the subject becomes aware of the value of objects as metaphysically other-than-himself. Focusing is a goal activity, and like all goal activity overcomes resistance. In this case the resistance overcome is that of the avoided and interfering environment of the focused aspect of actuality. Indeed the latter is felt as a metaphysically independent object, only insofar as its avoided environment is unsuccessfully excluded. But the object for awareness is strictly speaking the subject's *feeling* of the focused determinant; for it is the subject's feeling of the focused aspect that is constituted as capable of alternation, and not the focused determinant.

To have knowledge of what is metaphysically independent of the subject as metaphysically independent of the subject, epistemological objectivity must coincide with metaphysical objectivity. The selected causal determinant of the subject's immediate future must be constituted as a locus of indeterminacy, capable of alternative. The subject must, then, become undecided with respect to the genesis of this determinant. Thereby, however, the selected determinant becomes part of a world now partially experienced, which defines real possibilities, among them the possibilities of the focused aspect of actuality. The indeterminacy of the selected object for awareness is then constituted by a world, and it is a part of the world that is resolved by the subject's focusing. I do not wish to imply that we have merely relational knowledge of objects as metaphysically other. We have knowledge of real objects *per se*, but the real object can be known only as resolving the possibilities constituted by a world as metaphysically independent of the subject. The possibilities of the object are thus defined by a spatio-temporal structure which gives both here and now meaning. At the most abstract level, the spatio-temporal structure provides the bare form for occurrence, but how this bare form is determined we learn only by focusing the selected aspect of actuality.

Indeed, as may have been noted, this feeling of a world is concretized whenever the subject focuses an aspect of actuality for causal determination of himself. As we have pointed out, even in evaluative awareness the subject must exclude the environ-

ment of the focused aspect. This environment is felt as limiting the effort to exclude it from attention and as therefore metaphysically other. In evaluative awareness, however, this unsuccessfully excluded environment is merely felt as metaphysically other. In knowledge of the object as metaphysically other, the environment, though excluded, constitutes as a part of the world, the very possibilities to be resolved by the subject's act of focusing the selected determinant. Thus the object for awareness emerges as a resolution of the indeterminacy constituted by the excluded environment, and as therefore belonging to, or characterizing this environment, which moreover, being excluded by the subject is also *his* environment. We may put this in another way. The object focused, though focused, remains for the subject *avoidable*, like the excluded environment, and becomes therefore a part of the subject's environment.⁴ The metaphysical independence of the object for awareness is attested to then by its avoidability, and this avoidability is guaranteed by the presence of the subjectively excluded environment as that which *may* be focused by the subject as a causal determinant of his immediate future. Thus colors and sounds are felt as metaphysically objective in just those respects which resolve the possibilities constituted by an environment excluded by the subject in the focused clarification of these colors and sounds.

V

If, now, awareness is the very sense of alternative—rendered possible, as we have earlier noted, by the real indeterminacy of the subject's future—radical self-awareness becomes ontologically possible, because an object metaphysically distinct from awareness is not necessary. Self-awareness is to be understood as the felt exclusion of alternative by awareness itself, or the felt exclusion of possible alternative by a determinate sense of alternative. As such, self-awareness is both objective and expressive, the sub-

⁴ Knowledge of metaphysical objectivity is not without its purely subjective effect. This effect is the subject's anticipation or expectancy of metaphysically independent determination of his future.

ject's indecision concerning his own nature being resolved by, and making possible, his decision to form his future as awareness. But perhaps the critical issue is not whether awareness requires an object other than itself, but whether self-awareness can occur without retrospective reflexivity, to use Earle's term. Self-awareness is not of a self, but as a self, eliminating by its own activity the alternative of its lack of reality; and it is immediate and not retrospective because the activity and the eliminated alternative are co-present.

It may be well to indicate briefly some implications of this account of awareness for the role of logic as the laws of thought in knowledge of reality. The laws of thought are the form of reality as known, but knowledge of reality is reality experienced or felt as excluding alternate possibility; therefore negation becomes an intrinsic part of knowing. It is important to note, however, that whatever alternate possibility is felt as excluded in knowledge of reality need not be known possibility. For it is as the felt exclusion of any alternative, rather than a specific alternative (as Whitehead seems to maintain⁵), that reality is known. To feel reality as the exclusion of any alternative is to be aware of reality as being. Because it is any alternative that is felt as excluded, such knowledge, though selective, is transparent, distorting nothing. We may put this in another way: in the law of non-contradiction, $\neg p$ is empirically specifiable only as an indefinite form. p can be given specific empirical content as a determinant of a locus of indeterminacy, but $\neg p$ must include whatever alternatives are excluded by p as such a determinant.

The laws of thought are to be interpreted, then, as the form of knowledge of reality. They apply to all possible reality because they apply to reality as known, and knowledge of reality is not distortive. Yet though knowledge of reality distorts nothing, neither is it a mere duplication of reality. Knowledge catches reality in the network of alternate possibility. Reality in the network of alternative possibility is reality which might be otherwise; but how otherwise one may not yet know. But to know is to cast what is felt against alternative. Functionally, knowledge provides

⁵ Whitehead, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

us with concrete alternatives, on the basis of which we can proceed from subjective indeterminacy to rational choice. What knowledge provides, then, is the basis for man's controlling his own future. The functionalists and pragmatists have maintained that knowledge is merely adjustmental. This is, I think, a gross oversimplification. Adjustment and choice are not the same. To have rational choice is to be free to adjust or not, on the basis of value. Indeed, knowledge produces its own adjustmental problems because reality known may be otherwise. Since rational choice carries with it the weight of responsibility, it is through knowledge that the ego or I emerges as a responsible subject, and therefore also a moral subject. Indeed, we might say that knowledge has as its motivation the emergence of a responsible subject, a subject who decides on the basis of value. We may not rationally choose to know or not know; but once we do know, we cannot escape the weight of the attendant responsibility.

If, however, awareness, as opening alternative possibility, alienates the subject from reality, knowing by determining that indeterminacy, removes such alienation. In this sense the Hegelian conception of cognition, which Earle retains, as a redemptive synthesis of subject and object, remains valid; but it is a redemptive synthesis which the subject is free to break.

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CONCEPTUALISM

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THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT that one is acquainted in perception with red things rather than redness alone. Nor can there be any doubt that one can name things with which one is acquainted. Each of these two facts forms the commonsensical background for an ontological criterion. According to the first criterion, what exists is what can be presented in perception independently of other things. Call this the *independence-criterion*.¹ According to the second, what exists is what can be named. Call this the *naming-criterion*.

Consider a visual field containing two red spots of the same shade of red. At least two sentences are true of it, namely, "this is red" and "that is red." Any satisfactory ontological analysis of this visual field must therefore do justice to the two facts that (a) there are two spots and not merely one; and (b), that these two spots nevertheless have something in common.

The realist gives the following description. He calls each of the two red spots a *fact*. Each fact is said to consist of two things, namely, an *individual* and a *property*. The individuals are named by "this" and "that," respectively. The property is named by "red." The two individuals are said to *exemplify* the same property. The realist thus counts three things altogether, namely, two individuals, which account for there being two spots, and one property, which accounts for the sameness in regard to color. This description forces the realist to repudiate the independence-criterion; for one cannot of course be acquainted either with a "bare" individual or with an unexemplified property. The realist accepts the naming-criterion instead. Upon his account, "this," "that," and "red" are names, and as such name existents. Notice, however, that in rejecting

¹ For an excellent analysis of the independence-criterion and its importance for the realism-nominalism issue see Edwin B. Allaire, "Existence, Independence, and Universals," *The Philosophical Review*, October 1960.

the independence-criterion, the realist has not denied the obvious fact that one is never presented either with individuals or with properties in isolation. This is as it should be.

The nominalist clings to the independence-criterion. He insists that the visual field contains only two existents, namely the two red spots; for they and only they are of a kind that can be presented independently. But this cannot be the whole of his account. To complete it, he must somehow also account for the two spots sharing the same property. There are three possible ways of doing that.

First. The nominalist may hold that "this" and "that" name the two red spots. Then he will also distinguish between so-called *proper names* and *common names*. "This" and "that" are (serve as) proper names; "red" is a common name. Hence, in "this is red" and "that is red," "this" and "that" name the two spots properly, while "red" names them both commonly. This analysis creates an insoluble problem. For, now the nominalist cannot account for the "is" in "this is red" and "that is red." Or, rather, the only plausible meaning he can assign to it is that of identity. And this will not do; for then it would follow from "this is red" and "that is red" that *this* and *that* are identical, that is, that there is only one spot and not two. Thus, upon the doctrine of common names, the nominalist may base his ontology on the independence-criterion, but only at the price of creating for himself a problem that seems to have no solution. The second possible version of nominalism is designed to avoid this impasse.

Second. A nominalist may conceive of the "is" as expressing a *part-whole relation*. He translates "this is red" and "that is red" into "this is part of red" and "that is part of red," respectively. In answer to the question what "red" refers to, he tells us that it refers to a *whole* composed of all the red things in the world.

This account, too, is unsatisfactory. As Quine has pointed out, it does not work for all properties.² Moreover, it provides no answer to the question as to what there is in or about the

² Cf. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*. Cambridge 1953, pp. 72-73.

two spots that justifies our saying that both belong to the same whole. Spread out as this peculiar whole is through space and time, we obviously cannot first look at it in order to judge that *this* and *that* are among its parts.³ It appears, then, that this analysis, far from yielding an ontology less populous than the realist's, actually adds to it. For, in addition to the referents of "this" and "that" and whatever else there must be to justify our saying that both *this* and *that* belong to the same whole, there is now, as a fourth entity, the whole itself.

Be that as it may, it is worth noticing that a proponent of the second way will have to reinterpret the independence-criterion somehow. It is hard to imagine how this could be done. Red, conceived as the whole in question, is not and cannot be presented in perception. Hence, by the independence-criterion, it does not exist. Yet, all the "parts" of this "whole" exist. Hence, so does the whole. Or one would have to be prepared to use "exist," "part," and "whole" so that existent parts can jointly make up a nonexistent whole. Furthermore, if "red" is taken to be the proper name of an existent "whole," what distinguishes this kind of nominalism from realism? Why, in other words, should anyone think that this account is preferable to the realist's? The answer lies in a third important criterion of existence. According to this criterion, what exists is what is localized in space and time. Call it the *localization-criterion*. Conceived as a whole composed of all red things, red may reasonably be held to be so localized; conceived as a property, as the realist does, it cannot. This consideration suggests that the second way primarily appeals to those philosophers who reject properties (universals) because they are either explicitly or implicitly guided by the localization-criterion. However, we saw that this way, too, is unsatisfactory. This brings us to the third and last possibility.

Third. Conceiving of the "is" in "this is red" and "that is red" once more as expressing a part-whole relation, a nominalist could attempt to read the two sentences as "red is part of this"

³ Compare, for instance, I. M. Bochenski, "The Problem of Universals," in *The Problem of Universals*, Notre Dame 1956, p. 47.

and "red is part of that," respectively. What, on this interpretation, is the referent of "red?"

If "red" is taken to be a (proper) name of a part of *this* and *that*, then it follows from the naming-criterion that red exists. In order to avoid this (to him) undesirable consequence, the nominalist who has taken the third way might try to fall back on the common-name doctrine, suggesting that "red" is a common rather than proper name. Unfortunately, in this context the suggestion makes absolutely no sense. For, if "red" is taken to be a common name, what would it be the common name of? Surely, it could not possibly be the common name of *this* and *that*, because then it would no longer make sense to say that red is "part of" *this* and *that*. Nor would it make sense to say that "red" is the common name of all red parts, because things that have common names also do or may have proper names. And what would be the proper name of this red part, i.e., the red part of *this*? Any possible answer to *this* question merely leads back to our *original* question, namely, as to how to account for the "sameness" in two numerically different things. Hence, there is upon the third way no possibility of taking "red" to be a common name. At this point the thoughtful nominalist can do one thing and one thing only. He must hold that "red" is a proper name, while at the same time rejecting the naming-criterion. "Red" can then be said to name properly without having to name an existent. Now, it seems, the nominalist can satisfactorily describe our paradigm of the two red spots without sacrificing the independence-criterion.

Thus we see that of the three ways only one, the third, is *prima facie* viable. In pursuing this way a bit further, we shall be able to uncover a serious shortcoming of the nominalist's position, and also prepare the ground for a discussion of conceptualism.

If "red," upon the nominalist's ontological analysis, turns out to be a name, then it must name something. In other words, though it be granted that "red" does not name an existent, it nevertheless must be the name of something. What, then, can the nominalist say about the ontological status of the thing named by "red"? Again, there is only one way out. The nominalist who

has chosen the third way must admit that there are, ontologically speaking, things which do not exist. Or, in traditional terms, he must distinguish between *subsistents* and *existents*.

The realist, though for entirely different reasons, must make the same distinction. To understand why this is so, consider a visual field containing two spots as before, but assume that only one of the two is red, while the other is green. The realist can of course account for there being two spots; and he can also account for there being two properties. But he cannot as yet account for the fact that *this* rather than *that* is green, or, for that matter, for the fact that neither individual is both red and green. Somehow he must find the right individual together with the right property. Moreover, his finding them together must be grounded in what he sees, that is, in what is presented to him in the visual field. Consequently, the realist claims that he is not merely presented with two individuals and two properties, unconnected as it were, but also with this individual *exemplifying* red and that individual *exemplifying* green. In short, he asserts that he is also presented with the nexus of exemplification. This nexus, though, is not named. Or, rather, any attempt to name it is futile. Hence it follows upon the naming-criterion that the nexus of exemplification is not an existent. Yet, the realist will admit that he is presented with it. This leads him to say that the nexus of exemplification subsists.⁴

As far as the ontological dichotomy between existents and subsistents is concerned, we have found no difference between the nominalist on the one hand and the realist on the other. Both must make the distinction. However, each of them draws the line between these two ontological modes at a different place. The realist holds that properties exist, while the nexus of exemplification merely subsists; the nominalist asserts that properties merely subsist, while wholes (facts) exist. A short-

⁴ Concerning the futility of naming exemplification and its connection with the famous Bradley paradox, see G. Bergmann, "Ineffability, Ontology, and Method," *The Philosophical Review*, January 1960. As far as I know, Bergmann is the first in his tradition and, also, the only contemporary analyst who recognizes the need to "ontologize logic." See also what is said below about the status of being-part-of and falling-under.

coming peculiar to the nominalistic analysis appears only when one asks whether or not the part-whole relation itself is somehow presented when one sees that, say, red is part of *this*. Usually and not surprisingly at all, the nominalist does not even raise this question. For, he obviously need not worry, as the realist must, as to how several *existents* stick together to form a whole. Yet, we saw, the nominalist does (or, at least, consistently must) talk about *subsistent* parts of wholes. This kind of talk eventually forces him to furnish an explication of the ontological status of the part-whole relation. His not facing the issue constitutes the shortcoming I just spoke of. In other words, as long as the nominalist does not secure some ontological status for the part-whole relation, the realist's analysis remains the only complete alternative.

It may be replied that only a small addition is needed to complete the nominalist's account. The nominalist could simply add that the part-whole relation subsists along with what he calls parts of wholes. This would not only complete his account, it would also be consistent with his insistence that universals, that is, properties and *relations*, merely subsist. Furthermore, he could consistently hold, with the realist, that the so-called part-whole "relation" is not really a relation in the ordinary sense, but, rather, a nexus, distinguished from "ordinary" relations by the circumstance that it cannot be named except at the price of futility. But notice, first, that this step does away with all the intuitive meaning we commonly attach to the terms "part," "whole," and "part-whole relation." Notice, secondly, that if the nominalist's account is completed in this way, properties (parts) belong to the same ontological mode as the nexus which binds them into wholes. This consequence is repugnant to those who insist on a distinction between the "descriptive" nature of "ordinary" relations and properties on the one hand and the "logical" nature of the nexus on the other.

These considerations notwithstanding, let us assume that, following the third way, the thoughtful nominalist gives ontological status to the part-whole relation by acknowledging that it subsists. A final comparison between his and the realist's view yields three similarities and three differences. (1) Both

distinguish between subsistents and existents. (2) Both agree that a certain subsistent nexus is presented. (3) Both acknowledge that "red" names an instance of an ontological kind. (1') The realist recognizes two kinds of existent and one kind of subsistent, while the nominalist recognizes only one kind of existent and two kinds of subsistent.⁵ (2') Accepting the naming-criterion, the realist asserts that properties exist, while the nominalist, guided by the independence-criterion, insists that they merely subsist. (3') The realist holds that bare individuals exist, although he agrees that they are never presented in isolation, while the nominalist does not accept them at all, either as existents or as subsistents. The basic difference, I submit, is (3'). For, (1') is merely a corollary of (2'); and (2') rests solely on what might be regarded the arbitrary decision of the nominalist to preserve the independence-criterion in face of the fact that properties must be named. But even (3'), it can be argued, is not really a decisive difference. For, as I shall not here show, the nominalist in his analysis of space and time eventually has to introduce some version or equivalent of the realist's bare individuals in the form of bare places in space and bare moments in time. And, surely, if bare individuals must be condemned as unintelligible, the same goes for bare places and bare moments. Be that as it may, the most important point to note is that the difference (2') flows essentially from the acceptance of two different kinds or modes of existence. Conceptualism, as I shall use the term, constitutes a radical attempt to widen the gap between these two modes, i.e., between existing individuals on the one hand and subsisting properties on the other.

The conceptualist notes first that both realists and nominalists speak of being presented with things in perception. Then he asks: What does it really mean to be so presented with, say, red? The nominalist, who asserts that "red" names a part of *this*, would undoubtedly also agree that there are other red things (of the same shade) and that "red" names parts of these things. Is it not then evident that in perceiving this red spot, I am only

⁵ In respect to N. Goodman's nominalism of his *The Structure of Appearance*, it could be said that his two subsistents are the two (undefined) relations of *overlapping* and *being affiliated*.

perceiving this (red) part and not all (red) parts named by "red"? If so, is it not also evident that what "red" names can never be completely presented in perception? The conceptualist is convinced by this argument. To the realist, he directs the following question. You say that "red" names a property of this individual, and you admit, of course, that other individuals have the same property. Now, while I am presented with this red spot, I am not also presented with all others. How then can the property be completely presented in this red spot? From these rhetorical questions my conceptualist draws the conclusion that whatever "red" may name, and he does agree that it names something, cannot be completely presented in the perception of one red thing. To speak traditionally, perception (*Anschauung*) can only present us with the "particular"; it is thought (*Denken*) that presents us with the "general."

The realist holds the conceptualist's conclusion to be unwarranted, pointing out that the latter fails to make a crucial distinction. Both individuals and properties are "wholly presented" in perception. Nor is there any difference in the way they are presented. The only difference is that while the (momentary) individual is also "wholly contained" in the perceptual field, the (timeless) property is not. This difference, my realist continues, is neither, epistemologically, one between ways of presentation nor, ontologically, one between modes of "existence." Rather, it is grounded in the way time, which roughly speaking is itself an existent, enters into the structure of the world. The conceptualist retorts to all this that he simply cannot understand any other sense of "being presented in perception" than that in which *this* (the red spot, the whole) is presented. In short, he denies that in perception one can be presented with anything but a particular *this*.^{*}

^{*} The realist of this paragraph is Gustav Bergmann. See his essay on "Elementarism" (reprinted in *Meaning and Existence*, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1959). Nor is this the only way in which his defense of realism benefits from his analysis of time. In his review of Strawson's *Individuals* he explains the impact of another fundamental gambit. Upon one view we "know" what has been "presented" to us. Upon the other, we "know" it only if we can recognize it if it is presented to us again. We

Historically speaking, the conceptualist has much of the recent tradition on his side. According to this strand of the tradition, predication (*Urteilen*) rests on simple awareness (*Vorstellung* or *Anschauung*). For example, the so-called judgment expressed by "this is red" is said to be based on the simple awareness (*Anschauung*) of *this*, or, perhaps, on the simple awareness that *this is (exists)*. Notice how well this fits in with the conceptualist's fundamental contention. What one is directly aware of is always a *this*. What is directly presented in perception is an undifferentiated whole. Predication is therefore, according to this strand of the tradition, a function of thought, not of perception. To predicate a universal of something is to transcend whatever is presented in perception, letting the mind go to work on what is so presented. Or, to say the same thing more precisely, in predication the mind "subsumes" a *this* under a *concept*. This is the root of the conceptualist's view that *predication involves concepts rather than properties*.

Nor is this all. The conceptualist draws aid and comfort from another classical consideration. If perception presents merely a particular *this*, then it is hard to see how one could possibly communicate about it. Knowledge, however, is undoubtedly communicable. Knowledge can therefore not possibly reside in perception. Rather, it must be expressed in predication or judgment. And since predication is already presumed by the conceptualist to be a matter of concepts, so must be knowledge. Concepts, therefore, and not properties, account for the possibility of communication and knowledge.

So far I have emphasized the conceptualist's point of view as well as the traditional roads leading to it. Now I shall ask whether the realist can answer the criticism which is implicitly contained in conceptualism. Specifically, can the realist account for how in perception one is presented not with a *this*, but, rather, with an individual, a property, and exemplification? I think that he can. But the story is a long one and I shall only hint at it in this context. The gist is this. The realist argues that one is never in perception

do so recognize properties but not, of course, "bare" individuals. That shows the impact.

presented with a mere *this*; and against this mistaken view he asserts that *perception* (like all awareness) is *propositional*. He holds that one never perceives a mere *this*, but, rather, (that) *this is red*. If this is so, then there is no reason for inventing a "second eye"; the mind's eye, if I may so put it, *the mental eye of the conceptualist* with which to "see" (general) concepts independently of perception.

But let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that the conceptualist's point of view is well taken and ask him how he himself would describe our paradigm of the two red spots. He answers, first, that "this" and "that" name the two red spots. He holds, second, that "red" names a concept, that is, something that can only be grasped by the mental eye.⁷ He continues, third, that "this is red" and "that is red" mean "this falls under the concept red" and "that falls under the concept red," respectively. Thus he agrees with the nominalist that "this" and "that" name the two red spots, i.e., in the realist's terminology, facts rather than individuals. He disagrees with both realist and nominalist in holding (a) that the referent of "red" is a concept, and (b) that the "is" must be explicated as "falls under." The last point is of crucial significance. We saw already that the nominalist has considerable difficulties in trying to secure ontological status for his part-whole relation. But whereas the nominalist's talk about this relation has at least a commonsensical ring to it, a fact that may help to conceal his difficulties, the conceptualist's falling-under nexus seems to be nothing but an invention of the metaphysician. Moreover, the conceptualist, no less than the nominalist, must somehow ground his nexus of falling-under ontologically; and it is hard to imagine how this could be done in a way that is not completely implausible. For what possible connection could there be between the *this* from the realm of perception and the concept from the realm of the mind. The falling-under nexus, therefore, proves to be a source of constant

⁷ This is so on either one of two further possibilities, namely, first, that concepts are taken to subsist solely "in the mind," or, second, that they are assigned to an "objective realm."

trouble to the conceptualist. Small wonder, then, that he should try to eliminate it completely, as Frege did.*

Let us ask, finally, what, if anything, the conceptualist has committed himself to with regard to the "existence" of concepts. It seems that he still has a number of alternatives.

First. The conceptualist could adopt the naming-criterion. Since concepts are named, they would then be said to exist along with the referent of "this" and "that."

Second. He could reject the naming-criterion and instead accept the independence-criterion. From the fact that concepts are named, it would then not follow that they exist. But notice that the independence-criterion was originally tailored to perception alone, not to thought. This shows that there is a third possibility.

Third. The conceptualist could introduce a new criterion of existence which replaces the old independence-criterion for perception. According to this new criterion, *what exists is what can be presented either in perception or in thought independently of other things.* To grasp that this is a real alternative, consider that according to many philosophers, although one cannot perceive red (or redness) in isolation, one can so think (of) it. If this be true, then upon the new criterion, concepts exist—not because they are named, but because they can be thought (of) independently.

In the history of philosophy, conceptualism is closely linked with nominalism. More often than not, conceptualists held that concepts subsist rather than exist. Nor is this surprising. Remember the so-called localization-criterion: what exists is what is localized in space and time. This criterion and the conceptualist doctrine that one can in perception be presented only with a particular *this* are just two sides of the same coin. More precisely, the things that are localized upon the one criterion are often held to be exactly those with which one can be presented upon the other. (Time and space have been called "Formen der Anschauung.") This makes it plausible, to say the least, that

* Frege's way out consists in saying that concepts are "unsaturated," so that they can "stick" to objects without requiring a special nexus. Compare my "Frege's Ontology," to appear in *The Philosophical Review*.

the conceptualist, however unwittingly, may also be guided by the localization-criterion. If so, he will deny that concepts exist.

Comparing all three, realist, nominalist, and conceptualist, we note these similarities. All three admit that there are two ontological modes, namely, existents and subsistents. All three are forced to make this distinction because they accept one of several criteria, naming, independence, or localization, as the most significant criterion of existence. The conceptualist, however, stands with the nominalist when it comes to separating existents from subsistents. To one who explicates different ontological uses of "exist" rather than adopting one himself, this is of little consequence. The deepest issue, I submit, is not whether universals are called "properties," or "concepts"; whether, perhaps, they are "parts" of something else; or whether, finally, they should be said to exist rather than merely being called subsistents. What then is this deepest issue? To state it, I avail myself of a metaphor I used a while ago. According to the conceptualist we have, as it were, two eyes; the eye of perception and the eye of the mind. With the latter we "see" the universal. This fundamental dualism both realist and nominalist reject.

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TEMPORAL DESCRIPTION AND THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF JUDGMENT, Part II *

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6. *Dispositional and Predictive Judgments and the "Future-Now"*

If we limit ourselves to verbal description to analyze the functions of judgment,⁴² then it is clear that what we mean when we say we judge that something is future is also what we mean when we speak of present dispositions and propensities. In such cases, we do not mean that the conditions necessary to fulfill a prediction must be present, or observable. Yet we do somehow present ourselves with these conditions in subjunctive conditional assertions. We could take this subjunctive aspect of a judgment as a sizing up of the dispositional properties of the content of that judgment, that is, of its *object*, as "state of affairs" or "thing" or "process." Dewey's "deliberation," defined as a "dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action" deals with a present object, or process: the "rehearsal" itself. This is the content of judgment-as-event. What it is a rehearsal of will become, if realized, the possible content of a later judgment-as-product. In this sense, restating a previous formulation, judgment-as-event is the *determining* aspect of judgment; judgment-as-product is the *determined* aspect of judgment. The unity of the two is a function of time, of the temporal relationality of the event and product aspects of judgment. For example: "the sugar in the spoon *will taste sweet*" is really a subjunctive conditional masquerading in categorical garb. What it *asserts* is "were I to taste the sugar in the spoon, it would taste sweet." That "the

* For Part I, see this *Review*, XIV (September 1960).

⁴² I am implying that alternative descriptions in mathematical or other possible analog languages may be more adequate to analyze certain characteristics of the functions of judgment, particularly those that relate to its temporal relations.

sugar in the spoon *does* taste sweet" is, on the face of it, a judgment-as-product. That is, it appears as the product of a determining set of antecedents. Yet it is not immediate to the *fact* of something definable as an experienced sweetness, but is an active, *event-ful re-presentation* of the non-judgmental fact of the experienced "sweetness," (whatever that may be). Even the apparently non-predictive report-statement has, in this sense, an agential function, which operates upon the experiential "sweetness" as a determining event. Up to that point, the "sweetness" is only a *somewhat* which becomes sweetness as a result of this operation. Every report statement, as a product of a *somewhat* in experience, is also an operator, in which this *somewhat* is made *available* or *becomes* a product-for-us. Thus, even in judgments about apparently cotermporal, persisting antecedents, i.e., judgments about the apparent *present*, judgment has the two aspects of determined product and determining event. What constitutes presentness is the apparent simultaneity of both aspects.

There is an intimate relation between these two aspects of the judgment: the predictive judgment is certainly not *a priori*. It presupposes some antecedent judgment that the sugar in the spoon *does* taste sweet (and therefore will continue to taste sweet) or that it *did* taste sweet (and therefore should taste sweet the next time too). This does not necessarily presuppose the antecedent *direct* experience of tasting the sugar, for its antecedent could be an inferred judgment, or a communicated and believed judgment.⁴³ But, on the other hand, neither is the *produced* judgment of an experienced sweetness clearly *a posteriori*; for to determine that what was tasted is sweet involves a subtle interplay of expectation and antecedent definition of sweetness which is of the nature of the judgment event, and which is, broadly speaking, predictive. It would be terribly neat if predictions were clearly *a priori* and

⁴³ Hypnosis, not yet fully understood, yet offers a sort of "crucial experiment" here. The hypnotized subject, "set" to believe that salt tastes sweet, will judge that it does so. No one would conclude that the *direct* experience, in relation to the constitution of the taste receptors, or the salt, in terms of its chemical constituents, is changed in such an instance. But the objective event of "tasting" has changed.

postdictions clearly *a posteriori* and both logical atomism and its correlate functional form, mechanism, would be able to build unassailable causal systems on such hard "givens."

The hortatory conditional, "the sugar in the spoon *ought to* taste sweet" serves, in a proper context, to exhibit how close is the interrelation between predictive and normative judgments. I am not suggesting that sugar is morally responsible for the way it tastes, but if it is sugar and it doesn't taste sweet, *something is wrong!*⁴⁴ I would take issue sharply with what some analytic philosophers hold is "... the logically sound contention ... that what *ought to be* cannot be deduced from what *is*, or that there is no logical bridge from the realm of facts to the realm of values."⁴⁵ This is not to deny that there is a patent difference between "fact" and "value"; but there is a logical bridge between the two, and what is taken up in judgment as fact and what is taken up in judgment as value have their relation in the double aspect of judgment. Kant reasoned that "ought" implies "can," in the brilliant dialectic which defines freedom of the will as autonomy, obedience to its own law. That this law is not the same as what Kant calls "physical law," but involves what he perceptively calls "a causality ... of a peculiar kind" implies not that normative judgments are "free" in the sense of *undetermined*, but rather in the sense of *self-determined*; clearly a case of a reflexive causality of the order of Kant's relation of *Community*, and of contemporary formulations of retroactive causality in homeostatic systems.

The connection between fact and value, approached from this direction, would involve at least the following elements:

- 1) That prediction has an existential status, as a function

⁴⁴ Granted, there is a distinction between the "ought" involved in moral considerations, and the "ought" which expresses an attitude of belief in law, i.e., in predictions in conformity with generalized formulae containing variables. But what is generic to both "oughts" in judgment, is the fact that they *are* judgmental oughts, and the point of this paper is that they are amenable to an analysis of their common "factuality" in this sense.

⁴⁵ A. Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy*, New York, Macmillan & Co., (1949), p. 23.

of a natural product, judgment; it is describable in temporal-causal terms.

2) That prediction has a normative status, in judgment; this lies in the connections between affirmations of what will be and affirmations of what ought to be.

What *will be* can be deduced from what *is*, *predictively*, in accordance with natural laws. But predictive affirmations are conditional; moreover, they are subjunctively conditional, and in this lies their normative implication. Since what *will be* is inductively proposed (probabilistically or enumeratively) and natural laws simply state this proposition, any prediction is a *belief* in what will be, and as belief, it takes on a hortatory character: "I believe this will happen" translates into "this ought to happen" as an *objective* statement. It does not mean, trivially, "I would like it to happen," subjectively, but universalizes (objectivizes) the conclusion as an affirmed "ought" about the state of affairs projected into the future. The predictive judgment *itself* (as distinct from the future state of affairs to which it conditionally refers) is an existential state of affairs, a "fact" in the "now" of the judger, and as a state of affairs signifies the predictive affirmation; i.e., the predictive affirmation *itself* constitutes this state of affairs and in terms of my previous formulation, is the *event* aspect of this state of affairs.⁴⁰

Were we to describe this in physicalistic language, we would say that the prediction "X will occur at some future time t_1 " is itself a neural event of a complex order which exists in its own local time as "now," at t_0 . It is not the same physical event as the actual content of the predicted state of affairs at some future

⁴⁰ See R. D. Bradley, "Must the Future Be What It is Going to Be?", *Mind*, April 1959, LXVIII, 270, pp. 193-208, for an interesting discussion of this point. Bradley argues (p. 204), "... that which 'is the case already' in Prior's argument, is simply the *truth* of 'pf', i.e., of some proposition about a future state of affairs, *not* that state of affairs itself ... The truth of a proposition about the future implies not that something *is* the case, but that something *will* be the case ... My question would be: doesn't the assertion of such a proposition (which assertion, Bradley agrees, is itself an event) constitute *in itself* something that is the case, namely, doesn't it imply the existential status of the assertion itself, reflexively?"

time t_1 ." In its own "now" however, it is a unity of what is (the existential status of the predictive judgment) with what *ought to be* (the normative status of the predictive judgment); in other words, predictive judgments exhibit the double aspect discussed above. The event aspect of such a judgment is merely predictive: it affirms *now* what *ought to be*. The product aspect of this judgment is its history: the relevant causal antecedents which issue in the existential product, i.e., which culminate in the prediction itself as an existent neural-social event.⁴⁷ A mis-translation of this reasoning would be the tautological assertion: "what ought to be will be," for this assumes that the judgment event is identical with its objective content non-temporally. "What ought to be," in the judgment event, is affirmed "now" in reference to an anticipated state of affairs. But whereas "what will be" apparently refers to an existential state of affairs at some future time which has no existence *now*, the prediction itself—"what will be"—refers only to the *belief* that an anticipated state

⁴⁷ Cf. Kurt Lewin, *Topological Psychology*, New York, McGraw-Hill (1936), pp. 37-8:

The goal as a psychological fact undoubtedly lies in the present. It really exists at the moment and makes up an essential part of the momentary life-space. On the other hand, the 'content' of the goal . . . lies as a physical or social fact in the future. Indeed, it may not occur at all. The nature of the expectation, and the character of what is expected, insofar as they act as psychological conditions at the moment, naturally do not depend on whether or not the event comes to pass. In either case, the person strives toward a goal which exists psychologically in the present life-space.

I should add, perhaps, that what Lewin means by "exists psychologically" is not metaphorical for Lewin, but *spatial*, at the level of objective spatiality which is field-defined by him as the "life-space." The temporality of psychological "existences," or moments in this life space is therefore a temporality of spatial events in Lewin's special, quasi-topological sense of spatiality, rather than a non-spatial Bergsonian temporality. The relation between the "goal" as *psychological fact* and its "content" as *physical or social fact*, all facts having spatial dimensions, is, according to Lewin, the "difference in time-index of psychological fact and its content" (*Ibid.*, p. 38).

⁴⁸ A prediction can be regarded as a neural event for analytic purposes. But because it involves (if it is non-trivial) commitment to a probative actualization as an event interacting with other events, the "net" in which such a prediction functions is more adequately described as neural-social.

of affairs will come about—i.e., it translates directly into the conditional “what ought to be,” and the assertion becomes tautological. The relation between the two is not one of non-temporal identity, but of a temporal identity, in which *what will be* is determined only by the intervention of judgment in the objective state of affairs. This kind of identity is akin to Hume’s *identity*, which is defined by recourse to time or duration, and is, as he puts it, a “medium betwixt unity and number”;⁴⁹ it is also akin, by direct succession, to Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception, and Hegel’s unity of opposites, in which Hume’s “fiction of the imagination” becomes first a subjective epistemological principle and then an ontological principle. The intervention of judgment in the objective state of affairs is its agential aspect, as event, in time; it is human judgment, human action. But this very participation in objective temporality takes us beyond the local time of the judgment-as-event into what Bentley has called “behavioral space-time,” or what Lewin has quasitopologically defined as “life-space,” or the temporal dimension of human activity beyond the neurally described judgment-event, and into the dimension of judgment-event no longer as “mere” prediction, but as agential actualization; in short; this is the transformation of judgment-as-event into judgment-as-product, and into a *new* antecedent for subsequent judgment events.

The converse: “What will be ought to be” represents the transformation of judgment-as-product into judgment-as-event. This is analogous to what in traditional language would be a prediction of a future state of affairs based on law-like formulations of past experience, in which the prediction functions as a guide to human action, i.e., to intervention in an objective state of affairs to bring about anticipated results at a future time, in accordance with some causal law. Past experience, broadly conceived, would be the history of judgment-as-product. Its transformation into prediction constitutes the “now” of the judgment event, and it is this transformation that constitutes inductive inference and the formulation of predictive laws. “Ought” is entailed in any prediction as the objective affirmation

⁴⁹ Hume, *Treatise*, pp. 200 ff.

that the prediction is not trivial or arbitrary. The prediction that the sun will stop in mid-course at noon tomorrow is a *possible* prediction, only in the sense that I can make such a prediction arbitrarily if I wish. In order to objectively affirm such a prediction, to say that it *ought* to happen, I would have to establish the determination of such a judgment by a confirmable antecedent history of such a judgment. It should be clear that even "arbitrary" predictions, or predictions of the fortune-telling or clairvoyant variety have some potentially confirmable causal antecedence, just as have predictions of the end of the world at a given hour on a given day, which have been made by certain sects. If there is such a history of antecedent judgment events which lead to such predictions, then the predictions are *ipso facto* non-trivial, and they entail an "ought" in their very coming into existence. In a prediction which becomes a *social* fact, it is the consensus of social "oughts" which establishes the triviality or non-triviality of such a prediction. Thus, the non-triviality of a predictive judgment is equivalent to its social acceptance, and is the measure of its social force. What is socially trivial may be individually non-trivial; and apparently arbitrary, or abnormal judgments of this latter sort have *some* causal antecedence. This becomes the province of psychological and psychoanalytic research into the background and motivation of such judgments. But the non-triviality or importance of a predictive judgment has, in itself nothing to do with its *truth* as a prediction, for a prediction in itself is neither true nor false, but merely sets in motion such human behavior as will, in its fulfillment, *prove* it true or false. Such a proof is available *only* on the condition that predictions entail an "ought" which transforms predictive judgments into products; in which a *fact*, the existential prediction itself in its "now," sets in motion that process of confirmation which characterizes its *value*. But unless a fact does entail this process, it cannot even be entertained. It may *exist*, but we cannot even entertain its existence unless we affirm its existence, and such an affirmation entails necessarily an objective "ought." Certainly, whole populations today act according to socially established affirmations of what ought to happen, and social and legal morality is thus determined. To say that such an "ought" is non-

cognitive is to play with self-contradictions: for to say that it is non-cognitive in virtue of its non-confirmability can mean only that it is non-confirmable in terms of its causal antecedence, or non-confirmable in terms of its predictive issue, in the future. But, in my analysis, the confirmation of the antecedence of a predictive "ought" is nothing else than the confirmation of the historical antecedents of the prediction itself, as a fact. And the confirmation of the fulfillment of a prediction is a future confirmation of the facts of that fulfillment. The predictive "ought" is both an event in nature, and a product in nature: it determines what will fulfill it, and it is determined by what precedes it. To claim that it is neither of these, but something else means that it is either non-existent, or non-agential; in short, that it is either nothing, or non-natural. Of course it is non-confirmable on these assumptions. But on these same assumptions, it certainly cannot be attitudinal, or emotive, or intuitive either, unless the mysteries of attitude, emotion and intuition escape me completely.⁵⁰

In the institutionalized judgment, that is, in the socially established "ought," it is the history of what is that determines the affirmation of what "ought to be." These are simultaneous aspects of the same judgment, as product and as event. The point, in terms of the temporal dimensions of such predictive-normative judgments, is that *what might become future fact* for judgment-as-product is not merely phantasmally present for judgment as event, in some realm of hypothetical shades, but is actually present as an occurrence in nature, in a matter-energy

⁵⁰ We can conceivably discover *cognitively* the causal antecedents of an attitude, or emotion, or intuition. We can conceivably investigate the effects of an attitude, an emotion, or an intuition. With the careful analytic approach to the question of introspective evidence, or of first-person reports, we move in the direction of recognizing, as object, what is cognitively "ours" as subject, and of recognition in accordance with the same criteria of cognizability that are required for other objects of cognition. To look, beyond such a process, for some substantival and non-relational "thing" called attitude, or emotion, or intuition is to hunt for a metaphysical ghost. To abolish the cognitive (*factually* investigatable) status of attitude, emotion, or intuition, to claim that these constitute a realm of ultimate simples, *from which* all other cognitions derive, but which are in themselves non-cognitive is (to mix a metaphor) to clothe the ghost in the emperor's clothes.

field, as the present imagining of that future state of affairs. The prediction as an event exists "now," as the transitional moment between its past history and what it would take to fulfill it in the future. There is no question here of equating the future content, with the present prediction of that content. This would be what Ryle legitimately calls a "category mistake." But within judgment itself, the compresence of an assimilated antecedent history and of predictive assertions involves the apparent "fusion" of past and future in a "now." The apparent paradox of such a simultaneity of past, present and future in judgment requires for its solution not merely the elucidation of what we *mean* in statements about the past, or in predictions of the future; it requires some ontological basis for the possibility of such meanings. No amount of functional description at the level of language or logic can make the ontological questions vanish, though it can usefully demolish antique ontologies, and critically demand subtler and deeper ones, or reinterpretations of classic positions in the light of advances in science and logic. It remains, therefore, to examine the basis for the apparent simultaneity of past, present and future in judgment, and the basis for temporal reference in judgment.

7. *Simultaneity and Succession*

When the judgment event occurs, its apparent atemporality derives from its apparent instantaneity. It is the end-term, in its subjective expression, of that process which is its history, objectively, which produces the judgment as object of its relevant causal antecedence. Judgment as event is forward-looking, open-ended, hypothetical; at the same time, in its apparent form, in its "now," it appears categorical. Assertion, decision, action, and the judgments congealed in artifacts are two sided: in their own self-contained dimension, they appear as culminations, actualizations, ends, categorical in their finality. Yet, insofar as they refer, insofar as their content is other than the fact of the judgments themselves, insofar as such judgments *intend* beyond what is "now" for such judgments, they are ultimately hypothetical. Such a "now" constitutes the temporal dimension of the judgment event; it is apparently atemporal, categorical, discrete and dis-

continuous with what precedes or follows it as "not-now." This is what Broad refers to as the "Instantaneous Present",⁵¹ which has temporal position but no duration; what Mead rejects as the "knife-edge present";⁵² what Whitehead characterizes as the "individual immediacy of an occasion . . . its moment of sheer individuality bounded on either side by essential relativity . . . The occasion (which) arises from relevant objects and perishes into the status of an object for other occasions."⁵³ At the same time, however, once this apparently instantaneous judgment as event occurs, it has been *produced* at the point-instant of its occurrence, which in its own time dimension is always a "now." It becomes transformed into a product; it ceases to *become*, in its process aspect, in objective historical time. Thus, its culmination as a product of relevant antecedence is its occurrence as event, in which state it is unhistorical; *existent*, rather than *becoming*. Plato puts it thus, in the *Parmenides*:

. . . that which is becoming cannot skip the present; when it reaches the present, it ceases to become, and is then whatever it may happen to be becoming.⁵⁴

Paradoxically, however, the very point-instant of the occurrence of the judgment event, its very moment of achieved existence in a "now" is not *only* "sheer individuality" or "individual immediacy," as Whitehead has it, but is simultaneously relational, and its stands to all other events in the relation *earlier-than* or *later-than*, or *simultaneous-with*. This violates its very atemporality, its non-historicity.⁵⁵ In this way, it is again *product* as much as it is *event*; judgment transcends itself, is simultaneously its own existence and its own history; its own "now" and its own past and future. Its relations temporally define its existence: what it is simultaneous with constitutes its

⁵¹ Broad, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 273.

⁵² Mead, *loc. cit.*

⁵³ A. N. Whitehead, *Adventures in Ideas*, p. 227.

⁵⁴ Plato, *Parmenides*, 152.

⁵⁵ Ayer's event "standing non-temporally in temporal relations" is only apparently, or one-dimensionally atemporal, from the perspective of the ever-present "now," the time dimension of the event itself at the instant of its occurrence.

"now," what it is later-than constitutes its past, what it is earlier-than constitutes its future. But to be able to enter into such relations somehow indicates that judgment must comprehend past, present and future, that these are not purely external to it, that it somehow subsumes them. At the instant of its occurrence as event, the judgment enters into the history of subsequent judgments as a product; judgments-as-events become transformed into causal antecedents for subsequent judgments. At the instant of their occurrence, they have ceased "becoming" as events, but simultaneously have entered into the "becoming" of subsequent events. The "instant of their occurrence" is the appearance of grasped permanency in the process of becoming, but it is, in another perspective a moment in this process with its own internal before and after, defined as a sequence within this moment: what it derives from, at one end, and where it is going, at the other. Immediacy transcends succession only to reestablish this succession in other terms. Hegel deals with this sort of transcendence in the *Logic*:

What transcends itself is not thereby become nothing. What is nothing is immediate; what is transcended is mediated, and though it is not, yet it has reached non-entity as a result approached from being. It therefore retains the determinations whence it started.⁵⁶

Judgment-as-event transcends the succession characteristic of its becoming, in objective historical time: "Now" stands above this succession. Yet, objective succession is not abolished in this "now" but subsumed, subjectivized, internalized; another dimension of succession is set up within the "now" itself. Thus, the temporal instantaneity of judgment as event both is and is not immediate, i.e., unconditional, atemporal, categorical, absolute. In its own local time dimension, its "now" is not instantaneous, nor merely "saddle-backed" like James' specious present, but is unbounded and serial. Dobbs, in his analysis of bi-dimensional time, develops Broad's original suggestion on this, in a similar way:

In my theory, all the successive phases of the content of a specious present are compresent together at a single point of time, (a moment)

⁵⁶ G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic* (Die Wissenschaft der Logik), tr. G. Struthers, London, G. Allan Unwin Ltd., (1929), p. 119.

in the second time dimension. It follows that two event-phases occupying successive instants t_1 and t_2 in the first time dimension will be simultaneous whenever they belong to the same moment in the second time dimension . . . When time is only one-dimensional, it is logically impossible for two event-phases to be both successive and simultaneous in one frame of reference. (Two event-phases can of course be simultaneous in one frame of reference, while being successive in another frame of reference, according to relativity theory).⁵⁷

The judgment event, from the point of view of objective historical time, may be what ordinary usage appreciates as a "split-second decision," or it may take an hour, or a year, particularly if we enlarge the concept of judgment beyond mere propositional assertion, and include in its range "exhibitive" and "active" judgments, as varied levels of human manipulative utterance which may legitimately be termed judgments, as Professor Buchler has argued.⁵⁸ Yet, however long in historical time such a judgment-event may last, its "now" is always, in terms of the event itself, a "point-present." As a product, however, in terms of mnemonic or other assimilative sequence, in its "working out," this "now" has an internal thickness in time, its own internal before and after, its dates and times, its relevant antecedents and its predictive issue.⁵⁹ The "now" is a unity of simultaneity and succession, in which the perspectival differentiation of event or product determines what aspect of this unity constitutes the "facts." In the event aspect of judgment, all things which constitute its

⁵⁷ H. A. C. Dobbs, "The Time of Physics and Psychology," *British Journal of the Philosophy of Science*, VII, 226 (August, 1956) 160.

⁵⁸ See J. Buchler, *General Theory* . . . , *op. cit.*, p. 48 ff.

⁵⁹ Kurt Lewin approaches a similar view, in his concept of "momentary section" of the life space, which is a "situation" in terms of what Lewin calls "systematic causation" as opposed to "historical causation," (the former "Galilean" and the latter "Aristotelian"). Within this systematic causation, there is no past and future in the sense of historical causation:

Since neither the past nor the future exists at the present moment, it cannot have effects at the present. In representing the life space therefore, we take into account only what is contemporary. This implies that in answering the questions in regard to "systematic causation," one has to represent courses of events as series of situations (momentary sections) . . . to be precise, one will have to treat the single time sections not as moments without extension, but as differential time sections, in order to be able to determine direction, and velocity of changes at given points (*op. cit.*, pp. 34-5).

"content" are comprehended simultaneously, "now"; yet the very multiplicity and distinctness of elements within a *constituted* content necessarily involve succession, in objective historical time, i.e., in the product aspect of judgment.

8. *From Ontology to Meaning in Judgments of Fact
and Judgments of Value*

The foregoing analysis of judgment as two-aspected, the distinction between judgment as product and judgment as event, is an attempt to elucidate an ontological difference, in terms of temporal description at least, between judgment as it *is*, and judgment as it *is about*, between judgment as existent and constituted, and judgment as referential and manipulative, between what makes a judgment and what a judgment makes. What constitutes the content of a judgment has this same double aspect. Ordinary language is confusing here, since it implies hypostatization: in my sense, there is no such "thing" as a judgment, and a "something else" which is its content. Rather, judgment may be functionally defined as its two-sided content; namely, on its product side, all the events which are antecedent, and which are "congealed" in a compresence of what I have called effective tokens, and on its event side, the ordering of such a compresence as to constitute an active event, an imposition, in a sense, of a predictive configuration on the set of available tokens. This latter "event" is not merely constituted, but is an emergently new fact which is, already, at the start, a moving in the direction of the prediction. It is unnecessary to assume that some external agency "does" the ordering, or "creates" the new fact. It is rather, the way things are, and modern science has proceeded far on the assumption of an infinite regress of such levels of ordering, without the need to assume a metaphysical last term in this regress.

In order to examine an example of a judgment in its two aspects, we can take as its constitutive content either an antecedent judgment event, or some judgmental signification of an antecedent natural event; for example, historical evidence in the form of records, fossils, relics, traces. Mnemic evidence, properly

qualified, would be included in this class, as would the evidence of perception and anything in short, which would constitute "information." Although my example is a judgment about something antecedent to it, and not a predictive judgment, the relation of this analysis to predictive judgments would be simple to establish; but I shall limit myself here. The example is a judgment whose proximate content, (that which it is *most* immediately about) is another antecedent judgment. Let us leave aside, for the moment the tasting of sugar in spoons, and similar philosophic activities like reflectively walking down the steps of academic buildings, interpreting red patches here now, the fact of Caesar's death, the fingers of one hand, houses that "get" smaller in the distance, and the assorted tables and chairs that have achieved atemporal immortality in antecedent philosophic judgment events. Starting from complexity rather than from simplicity, I shall choose a judgment made by Carnap *about* an antecedent judgment made by Wittgenstein, both of these fortunately exhibited in the socially significant form of propositional assertion.⁶⁰ Carnap writes:

It was Wittgenstein who first exhibited the close connection between the logic of science (or 'philosophy' as he calls it) and syntax. In particular, he made clear the formal nature of logic and emphasized the fact that the rules and proofs of syntax should have no reference to the meaning of symbols. (*Tractatus*, pp. 52, 56, and 164).⁶¹

I shall disregard the question of whether Carnap's statement is "itself" the judgment event, or whether it non-meaningfully designates (or "exhibits") the judgment event. As a judgment event, at the instance of its occurrence ("in" Carnap, or "in" Carnap's mind), it is transformed into a product; it has been "produced" and it has an objective status. Let us call Carnap's judgment event $C(e_1)$ and the judgment product that it becomes $C(p_1)$. The total description of Carnap's judgment is

⁶⁰ Non-propositional forms, artifacts, actions,—i.e., the forms which embody exhibitiv and active judgments—are not essentially different; but even then, we would have to translate these into propositional forms to be able to discuss them.

⁶¹ L. Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul (1947), p. 282.

therefore $C(e_1p_1)$. Now this judgment is *about* something which occurred antecedently to it, that is, it is about Wittgenstein's judgment concerning the logic of science. Insofar as this antecedent judgment (localized by Carnap in his page references at the end of the statement) also can be described as event at the moment of its occurrence ("in" Wittgenstein) and can also be described as simultaneously a product, we shall call Wittgenstein's judgment $W(e_2p_2)$. Then $W(e_2p_2)$ is what $C(e_1p_1)$ is *about*. In this sense, it is part of, and the proximate part of what *produces* $C(e_1p_1)$. But the relation between $C(e_1p_1)$ and $W(e_2p_2)$ is not a simple relation between two unitary elements, or simples, but a complex relation between two constituted elements, between the complex $C(e_1p_1)$ and the complex $W(e_2p_2)$. Since each is temporally complex in the way described earlier, what is involved in Carnap's judgment of Wittgenstein's judgment is a multi-dimensional temporal relationship, since in both cases, event-time is not equivalent to product-time. The differences in temporal relationality are these: Insofar as Carnap is making the assertion that Wittgenstein made such-and-such a judgment, he is describing a judgment-product in product time, i.e., in objective historical time, that time in which the judgment as product takes place. Carnap's judgment can be described as *historical* or fact-referring in this sense. Its object, Wittgenstein's judgment $W(e_2p_2)$, is asserted to have existed objectively or factually in the past. Our own assumption that this is what Carnap means is itself complex and involves a conditioning antecedence of judgment events on our part, such as "Carnap wouldn't lie," and the assumption that the page references which Carnap gives to the *Tractatus* are correct, and that the description of what is on these pages may be verified. This does not mean that this whole *sequence* is reenacted in every one of our own judgments; it does mean that our own judgments have a necessary history of such assumptions and verifications which does not reoccur in every single judgment event, but of which such an event is the product. For our purposes, therefore, this complex act in judgment of assuming that Carnap is referring to something that is the case, to the objective or factual existence of an antecedent judgment in the past, is trivial even though it is complex. In this

relative, conditional sense, it is an *a priori* assumption, (its antecedents are "short-circuited" in practice). What is important here is that such an *a priori* is *relative*, and is historically produced.

There is, however, another aspect to Carnap's judgment, which is more than an ascription to Wittgenstein's judgment of a factual existence in the past. In the restatement of Wittgenstein's judgment by Carnap, there is a normative element, an element of approval, an assertion of a different order from the first: it is the assertion that Wittgenstein was "right" in his judgment, that a "close connection" *does* exist between the logic of science and syntax, that what was "made clear" by Wittgenstein about the formal nature of logic is something whose truth or rightness Carnap assents to. This aspect of Carnap's judgment is not concerned with the objective nature of Wittgenstein's judgment as a product in objective historical time, as an existent fact; this aspect is concerned with value of $W(e_2p_2)$, with whether Wittgenstein's judgment is agreed with or disputed, or judged to be "true" or "false" in relation to what it *means*, or *intends*, and in relation therefore to Carnap's subsequent judgment about it. Clearly there is a distinction between this truth or falsity (rightness of wrongness), and the historical, factual truth or falsity of the implicit assumption that Wittgenstein in fact did make the judgment ascribed to him.

Schematically, the aspect of Carnap's judgment e_1p_1 that deals with Wittgenstein's judgment as *product* (with p_2 , therefore) is the historical fact-referring aspect of judgment; the aspect of e_1p_1 that deals with e_2 , or with Wittgenstein's judgment as event, is the value-referring aspect of that judgment. The difference in time aspect is that in historical judgment, the "fact" of Wittgenstein's judgment, p_2 , is assigned a past existence, whereas in the value-referring judgment, the "meaning" of Wittgenstein's judgment, e_2 , is assigned an existence cotemporal with Carnap's judgment event, e_1 . Two ways of expressing this cotemporality, or apparent simultaneity, are possible: either Carnap's judgment event, as value-referring, "enters into" the time dimension of Wittgenstein's judgment event, or Wittgenstein's judgment event is "brought into" the present as it exists in Carnap's judgment event, i.e., into the "now" of

Carnap's judgment event. Even though the first description is apparently, and formally equivalent to the second, it is not ontologically equivalent. We have assumed that Wittgenstein's judgment is what Carnap's judgment is *about*, that it is a proximate relevant antecedent of Carnap's judgment. Further, we have defined the temporal position of a judgment in its event-aspect as the "now" of that judgment event. Even the apparent "entry" of Carnap's value-referring judgment into the temporal dimension of an antecedent judgment is therefore actually in the "now" of Carnap's judgment event. But the "now," as we have seen, is not defined merely one-dimensionally; that is, it is not *merely* self-defined, but is simultaneously defined as a point-instant in objective historical time. It is both *non-temporal* in its own reference frame, (Plato's "whenever it is, it is always now"), and *temporal* in the reference-frame in which it is a point-instant in a given temporal succession or continuum. Furthermore, even in its apparently atemporal "now," the judgment event is temporal internally (its "now" has a spread) whereas in its temporal point-position, in a continuum or succession, it is atemporal, and is a point-instant in this "flow." Thus complex, the "now" insofar as it has a position in *objective* time, cannot enter into another "now" which has a different position in *objective* time. In this sense, Carnap's "now" cannot enter into Wittgenstein's "now," cannot be objectively contemporaneous with it. But it is precisely the product aspect of Wittgenstein's judgment, (p_2), that has this position in historical, objective time. Thus p_2 cannot be "present" for e_1 ; it has a temporal position whose determination as "earlier-than" or "later-than" is relative only to p_1 , and insofar as it is antecedent to p_1 it is past. The judgment that this is so is, as stated, an historical judgment, or a judgment of fact. Yet, the judgment that Carnap makes that Wittgenstein was right, that his statement therefore is true, or right in the value-referring sense means that Wittgenstein's statement is thus true in Carnap's "now." The event-aspect of Wittgenstein's judgment, (e_2) is atemporal in objective historical time; it has temporal position but no temporality, (the characteristics of Broad's *Instantaneous Present*, and Ayer's *event*). The reference frame in which it has temporality, in which it is "brought into" time is a subsequent

judgment event."⁶³ What is past objectively, historically, is present subjectively, value-referentially. That these two aspects of the same judgment are not totally discrete can be shown by the consideration that even the assertion that something is objectively past requires an affirmation of *that* assertion, in order to be non-trivial. On the other hand, value-referring affirmations, as judgment-events, are themselves event-culminations of relevant causal antecedents; that is, they are simultaneously affirmations "now," and products in time, they are objectively historical.

Thus, Carnap's judgment embodies both a fact-referring and a value-referring aspect: it ascribes objective historical existence to its object (Wittgenstein's judgment) and also declares it to be *true*, or *right* at that point-present in which Carnap makes this judgment. Once Carnap's judgment is made, once the judgment as event occurs, *it ceases to have any existential normative status*. It is no longer event, but product, no longer polemical but historical. Furthermore, when it is not being judged historically, it still exhibits the possibility of being so judged, by the fact that its physical signification as a judgment continues (in the case of Carnap's judgment, exhibited in a published work, engraphed thousands of times as ink on paper, or engrammed more thousands of times mnemically); or the product transformations of such a

⁶³ Cf. C. I. Lewis' discussion of the "epistemological present":

... we shall suggest that knowing takes place in the *epistemological present*; a present in which what is sensuously given is surrounded by or imbedded in a mass of epistemically pertinent surrogates of past experience in the form of memories, or the sense of past experience as having been so-and-so; and that such present-as-past items are capable of being elicited by attention and reflection and brought into relation with one another and with the sensuously given—all without going beyond the bounds of what is genuinely present now. (*Op. cit.*, p. 331).

To which I would add this: that although knowing does take place only in an epistemological present, the condition for its existence, for the possibility of its taking place at all, is an ontologically antecedent process of becoming, in which the "epistemological present" of knowing is itself a function of objective historical time. This is what makes it possible to use "surrogates of past experience," "memory," and "sense of past experience" meaningfully. This is merely an assertion of the objectivity, and historicity of what I have called *tokens* of antecedent events.

judgment continue, (in the profound common sense that a man's deeds "live" after him). Thus, judgment as a fact continues to exist historically in these ways. But in none of these cases does the judgment have any value-referring significance; it is a fact, but it has not become evidence. It is historically a confirmable fact, but its significance requires evaluative recreation in some subsequent "now." It is not transformed from product into event again, until, in some subsequent judgment event, in which it figures as a causal antecedent, it becomes the object of a value-referring judgment. For example, Carnap's judgment, cited here, continues objectively as historical fact, even if no one ever reconsiders it. It attains evaluative existence only in a reconsideration, either by Carnap (which is entirely feasible) or by someone else reading Carnap. It then becomes the object of a value judgment, and is at that time again considered in the "now" of this new value judgment. The necessary condition for such consideration is the antecedent existence of the judgment as a product, in what, relative to this new "now," is past. This is the trivial assertion, (which is trivial because it is such an ontologically pervasive fact) that I have to know *what Carnap said*, in the sense of its availability to me as presented fact, before I can judge evaluatively *what Carnap meant*.

The apparent atemporality of the judgment event, as an isolated point in objective time does not preclude its own internal historicity. True, the historical sequence in objective time, of judgment events, is "mere chronicle," or a determination of these events in space and time: "*who said what, when.*" Beyond this, there is a value-referring meta-history, however. A succession of value judgments about the same historical event (for example, various assertions about whether Wittgenstein's judgment is "right" or "wrong") takes on a historical character not identical with that of the objects of historical judgments, but distinctly its own. This becomes a history of the event aspect of some judgment over the spread of its own time dimension. This historical character of value-referring judgment is its own history, beyond the history in objective time of the events which it judges. Its historical dimension is its own event-time, or, relationally expressed, its subject-time, that dimension which apparently

violates the space-time of objective historical events. This very subject-time develops its own historical aspect, and becomes *its own* historical object. It is *reflective* judgment. It becomes the product not of some external complex of relevant antecedents, but its own product. In this process, its reflection is of its *own* historical process, which, at this *new* level, can be comprehended objectively. It is, to use metalinguistic notation, thinking about "what I am thinking about." What transpires in the subject-time of value-referring judgment itself becomes historical. In relation to the objective historicity of events in product time, however, it is meta-historical. In other words, this historicity exists at the level of value-referring judgment itself, within its "now," as the point-presents involved (the judgment events) become complex, serial, internally related. Ultimately, as the series becomes denser, value-referring judgment becomes its own historical object, analogous to, but at a higher integrative level than the objects of historical judgment. In short, value-referring judgment, transcending itself, becomes meta-historical judgment, the sequence of value-referring judgments serving as its object. This is the perspective in which we legitimately speak of "history of ideas," or of a selective genetic sequence, such as *self*, or the historical solution of problems in mathematics or logic, all of which apparently transcend objective historical time, (e.g., as does logical sequence), and yet subsume objective historical sequences as their necessary antecedents.

In discussing history and meta-history, John Yolton makes a Bergsonian distinction in differentiating between judgments equivalent to those I have called value-referring and historical (fact-referring). In his description of the epistemological problems of history and meta-history, the historian's judgments, which are "inferences from given artifacts and hence from collections of sensible qualities (! !, M. W.) to non-given events not directly perceptible" are analogous to what are here called value-referring judgments. Yolton strips such inferences, or "significance-relations" of spatial dimensionality, giving them only temporal dimensionality. But his distinction is ultimately perspectival; it is a distinction between the perspectives of the "perceptual epistemologist" and the "historian," and the per-

spectives are "directions of interest or attention." Between these perspectives, the problem of their relation is similar to that of the relation stated here between judgments of fact and judgments of value. Yolton writes:

We need not deny . . . that historical events have an ontological status independent of our present inferences and constructions; for an event once made actual takes on a kind of non-temporality and hence stands outside of time. Its non-temporality is precisely what makes it available for reconsideration. The historian cannot breathe life again into the past because he is incapable of replacing the eternal past in time; but the nontemporal independence of the past which makes it available for the present also raises difficulties about its accessibility. The historian is not concerned with the object in the same way as the perceptual epistemologist, in part because he is only interested in the temporality and not the spatiality of objects, but more importantly because the historian directs his attention not primarily upon the physical properties of past events, but upon their significance-relations. Thus the epistemology of history is not an epistemology of objects, but one of meanings.⁶³

Now, such a perspectival differentiation of "interests" is methodologically clarifying, but it assumes that inferences of "significance-relations" can be made from "artifacts" and "objects" without an explanation of how this can take place. Either the artifact has an intrinsic meaning, discoverable by the historian; or the historian himself establishes significance-relations between various artifacts and objects, which relations themselves establish meanings. Yolton resolves this by establishing a difference in the "objects" *as they are known* by the historian, and *as they are known* by the perceptual epistemologist; the objects, therefore, exist in two different perspectively established "worlds"; the physical objects for the "perceptual perspective" are in a physical world; the physical objects for the "historian's perspective" are in a social world, and "the epistemology of meanings presupposes but is distinct from the epistemology of perception."⁶⁴ I would hold that this social world in which significance-relations, and the epistemology of meanings prevail is precisely that integrative level in which value-referring judgment

⁶³ John Yolton, "History and Meta-History," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XV, 4 (June 1955), 481.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 481.

has its own objective meta-history; and that the sense in which this level presupposes a "physical" of "perceptual" world is established by the relation of judgment-as-event to judgment as a natural product, at the primary historical level; in other words, that there is not a "historical" realm of significance-relations, and a "non-historical" realm of object-relations, but that historicity is a common characteristic of both apparently different perspectival "worlds"; that what is objectively historical in object-time is differentiated from what is subjectively historical in subject-time. The *relation* between the two times establishes that what is apparently atemporal in one time is temporal in the other, and that apparent atemporality is the perspectival limitation imposed by the intersection of two time dimensions in judgment, just as in the intersection of two lines, the intersecting line "appears" to the intersected line as a point.⁶⁵ When such a "line," which I shall endow with judgment, postulates that a zero-dimensional point on it is not a "given" but must "come from somewhere," it infers that such a point is the *apparent* aspect in its (the line's) dimension of what in the point's *own* dimension is a line like itself; further, that to the intersecting line which appears punctiform to the intersected line, the intersected line must also appear punctiform. The value-referring judgment, in this analogy, would be a consideration only of the intersection itself. Were such a series of intersections to become infinitely dense, then by a consideration in value-referring judgment of this series of intersections, i.e., by a consideration of its *own* history, value-referring judgment would become transformed into a meta-historical or fact-referring judgment. Based on the line's resulting evaluative "appreciation" of its own linearity, estab-

⁶⁵ What I consider to be "right," "true," "good" *now* is, within the confines of this *now*, atemporally (categorically) right, true or good. To say that I assert this as only conditionally right, true, good, to consider the corrigibility of my affirmation does not make it *less* categorical in its *now*, but is to assume that in a subsequent *now*, I may make a different polemical assertion. To say that a polemical assertion can be *both* true and false, right and wrong, good and bad, *atemporally*, that is, within the same *now* is self-contradictory. The recognition of this and the refusal to make a value-referring judgment in these circumstances is Pyrrhonic "suspension of judgment." But *this decision itself* becomes a meta-evaluative judgment.

lished by an infinite density of intersections, or by interpolation of a finite set of such intersections, it would *infer* the linearity of whatever intersects it at a point; in this way, the apparent atemporality of a value-referring judgment (the punctiform appearance of an intersection), is translated first into meta-historical judgment, (the subjective linearity established by the series of such intersections), and then into historical judgment (the objective linearity of what appears originally punctiform).

Value-referring judgment, in this sequence of inference, works in the opposite direction to arrive at the process comprehended in historical judgment. In temporal antecedence, objectively, the intersecting line would have to be a line before it could intersect, and give the appearance of a point. If the analogy is dimensionally extended, I could tentatively suggest it in terms of the intersection of two space-time manifolds, and define judgment as the functional "history" of such intersections (or events). Such two manifolds could be generally defined as "external" and "internal," where "external" is *outside* the relativistically defined frame of reference, or field of neural-cortical activity in which judgment as a natural function takes place; "internal," then, being the field itself. We cannot, following this analogy, speak of intrinsic atemporality, or existential atemporality, but only of a relational atemporality as described previously. This does not mean that the "now" in judgment does not exist, but that it exists only conditionally, relationally. On the other hand, what exists for judgment exists only in this "now" so that even historical judgments are never categorical assertions beyond this "now," but only approach categorical status as a limit, asymptotically, in a sequence of confirming "nows," or are disestablished in a disconfirming "now." From this it also follows that what is categorically asserted as within this "now" (in value-referring judgments) is relationally conditional because the "now" in which such assertions are made is itself relationally conditional.

9. *The Unity of Value-Referring and Historical or Fact-Referring Judgment*

The differences between assertions that a state of affairs exists and assertions that something is true, good, or right are seen in this analysis as the differences between fact-referring or historical judgments and value-referring judgments. These are ontologically *different* in their temporal existence and in the way they *refer* temporally; but from the foregoing analysis, it should be clear that these differences are not unbridgeably dichotomous, but are differentiations within a field; and that judgment, in fact, has a double aspect which embodies these differentiations, and which is describable in terms of relations between two temporal dimensions. There is no dichotomy, but rather a complex identity, in time, of product and event, and of the propositional assertions which exemplify this distinction. If we translate the analysis here into fact-value terms, we may briefly summarize thus:

1) Judgments of fact are historical judgments, in that their function is to establish an objective spatio-temporal description of the events or processes which they are *about*.

2) Every judgment of fact is simultaneously a judgment event, and as such, is in this aspect necessarily value-referring. (A factual judgment involves, explicitly or implicitly, the reflexive assertion that it is true at the time it is made. It proposes hypothetically what it asserts categorically, and thus embodies both its predictive aspect and its causal determination.)

3) Every judgment of value constitutes in itself an historical fact, and, as such, becomes the object of historical judgment (or meta-historical judgment if we distinguish levels).

4) Both fact and value are objective functional relations at the level of judgment. Insofar as judgment is proposed here as a functional relation itself, as a product in nature, as a nodal system emergent within some universal matter-energy field, fact and value exist naturally as higher order relations within this field. Their interaction and interdetermination is itself a function of the internal differentiation of judgment in its product and event aspects.

5) Insofar as judgment is a natural product, its internal differentiation is an ontologically (and scientifically) describable process in time. The enlargement of the temporal-causal dimensions of such a description is the alternative to reductionism (of fact to value, or of value to fact) on the one hand; on the other it is the alternative to dualism, psycho-physical parallelism and to the absolute bifurcation of fact and value. The ontological aspect of such reductionism would be either the translation of judgment into physicalistic "observables" or inferable "illata" at the level of neural description, or the opposite translation of judgment into strictly ideational or propositional terms, such as "acquaintance," "familiarity," "habit," "disposition," etc. In its ontological aspect, the dualist or parallelist view would challenge the reductionism characteristic of the former view, but would postulate in its place two distinct realities (in the Cartesian tradition) with the attendant and persistent problem of interrelation still unresolved except by some mystical modern manipulation of the concept of isomorphism, (a new occasionalism or a new pre-established harmony), or by a denial of the meaningfulness of the problem of interrelation. The proposed enlargement of the categories of causality and temporality suggests the emergence of judgments of fact and judgments of value, as *new* events in the space-time world, without recourse to reductionism or to dualism, and would establish the unity of fact and value judgments on the basis of their interrelation in an emergent process in space and time.

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THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT AND THE CONCEPTS OF COMPLETENESS AND SELECTION

LESLIE ARMOUR

ENOUGH DEATH CERTIFICATES have been issued for the Ontological Argument. This is not another. Nor is it a defense. My interest in the argument is twofold: First, I think there is a matter of mistaken identity worth looking at briefly and, second, I think some issues which may become clear when the identity matter is examined have a potentially important bearing on the general question of deistic hypotheses.

There are several forms of the Ontological Argument, but it is more or less fair to say that all hang on the contention that the notion of a perfect being entails the existence of that being, since existence is involved in perfection. My first interest is in the word "perfect." The word, I think, is usually vague but it seems to me that, in the context of the proof, it has a meaning which turns out to be much more pedestrian than we would suspect. The argument, if it is valid, must assert that any perfect being would have to have every possible characteristic. It alleges that existence is a characteristic and it is, of course, over this that most debate has centered. It seems clear, however, that "perfect," as employed in the argument, merely means what we would call "complete" in less august transactions. In some forms of the proof, indeed, this is made somewhat clearer since the expression "greatest possible" being is substituted for "perfect." Ordinarily, no one would be tempted to pass lightly from the notion of "that which is complete" to the notion of "the deity." Both "perfect" and "greatest possible" appear to have moral connotations and "complete" usually does not. The slide, however, is made easier by the recurrent notion (especially in mediaeval thought) that evil is not a positive quality but merely the absence of another positive quality, usually goodness. If this view is held, it certainly does follow that whatever is "complete" must be "perfect" in the moral sense as well as in the other usual senses.

It is not, here, my concern to pass judgment on this notion. I am, at the moment, merely trying to trace possible sources of confusion in the argument.

The primary matter at hand is to try to understand what is meant by "complete." The word is not ordinarily vague, like "perfect," but it does have more than one meaning and two meanings of it concern us now. A bookseller who advertises the "complete Shakespeare" means "all the Shakespeare there is" though, if he were mad or held certain philosophical theories, he might want to use "complete" in the other relevant sense and intend to say "all the Shakespeare there could be." (I suppose we could, if we wanted to, speculate as to whether or not Shakespeare could have written more plays or sonnets than he did.) If "complete" is being used in the first sense—that is, to mean all that there is—it is quite obvious that "the complete being" exists since, to say this, is merely to say "everything that is, is." This hardly even deserves to be labeled a tautology. It is mere redundancy. In the other sense, to say "the complete being exists" is to say "all that could exist does exist" and this, far from being a tautology, would seem to most people almost certainly false. However, seeing that the notion of "the complete being" was disguised as the notion of the "perfect being" and, seeing that there is one sense of "complete" in which the proposition is a tautology it might not be surprising if the Ontological Argument seemed to carry more conviction that it should. If I am right, though, the argument will survive if and only if the proposition "that being which is complete, in the sense of being everything that could exist, must exist" is true.

Before we worry at all as to whether or not this proposition is true, we might try to find out what it means and see if it does, or could, carry any meaning which would give any satisfaction to those who would put their trust in the Ontological Proof. The proposition seems to have Leibnizian implications and it is surely doubtful that its meaning would comfort many deists. Such a being, apparently, must have all the characteristics which could be exemplified in any universe, or, at any rate, all the characteristics which could be exemplified at the same time. Doubtless, these would include the characteristics which mediaeval philos-

ophers usually assigned to God: moral perfection, omniscience, and omnipotence. If knowledge were possible, all possible knowledge would be exemplified. If goodness were a positive characteristic and evil merely its absence, all simultaneously possible occasions of goodness would occur and there would be no occasions of evil. But it is doubtful if the word "being," here, would have much meaning. It might be convenient to describe the whole of reality as "a being" even if this would add nothing to the description; but the "complete whole" would have to have some subdivisions and no one of these would meet the specifications of the theologian's order. Anything which had "all possible characteristics" surely would have to exhibit diversity, plurality, and individuality. We might, instead, want to say, if these characteristics happened to be wholly relational, that it would have to exhibit those characteristics the possession of which entails the relations; but this would make no difference. This amount of diversity seems to rule out any sensible interpretation of pantheism as well as to make deism highly unlikely. Deism will be rendered unlikely for a number of reasons. To take one, in a situation with this degree of diversity, nothing will count as having "all power" and, if all degrees of power are represented, it would seem to follow that no one being could have that amount of power which would be the amount greater than the sum total possessed by all beings. (The next-most-powerful will have the smallest possible fraction less than the most powerful and so on. This seems to imply that the powers of numbers two and three exceed, in combination, that of number one in the series.) Certainly, in any case, no single being will count as "complete" in the required sense.

Even if the proof gave no comfort to its propounders, however, we might still want to know if it could be sound. It seems that it could not since the description involved seems to be that of a world which is not possible. A world in which logical possibility and actuality are precisely co-extensive seems, of necessity, to be a static world. (This is to be distinguished from the case of a world in which factual possibility and actuality are co-extensive in the sense in which they might be in a world determined by mechanistic causality.) The argument does, plainly,

presume that logical possibility and actuality must be co-extensive since it hangs on the use of "could" in the widest possible sense. But such a world, a world in which nothing could happen, is literally unthinkable since thought is a process and no processes can occur or even seem to occur where nothing happens. The suggestion that there might be a proof which would convince us that the world—though we do not perceive it so—is really static appears simply fatuous. To prove anything, you must do something. If you can ask "Is the world really static?" then you can perform questioning, thinking, reasoning or at least noticing activities and none of these can occur in a static world. That some part of the world may be static, that it may contain permanent elements, that some part of it may be hidden from us for all time, I am not, at the moment anyway, questioning. But that all of it can be static, I deny.

To recapitulate: Of the two senses of "complete" canvassed, one would render the ontological argument a mere redundancy, the other would render it self-destructive. In this dissection indicates all there is to the proof, the parts do not even seem worth taking to the philosophical graveyard. If they must be buried, then perhaps the grave had better be left discreetly unmarked. I am not, however, absolutely sure that this is quite all there is to be said about the argument and, perhaps, the burial ought to be postponed a while at least.

What does interest me, though, is that the analysis necessary to get at the roots of the Ontological Argument seems to commit us to the view that the range of logical possibilities is wider than the range of actualities and this may be a matter of crucial importance for anyone who wishes to promote a deistic hypothesis. Moreover, it seems to me that some of the matter I have introduced into the discussion of the Ontological Argument may be of service in sifting the issues relevant to any such hypothesis.

It must, in some sense, be feasible to talk about that which is merely possible and not actual and such talk presupposes that any world which is represents a "selection" from a wider set of logical possibilities. If we are to "account for" this selection, it seems that we shall have to rely on one of four hypotheses. Before I outline them, it is as well to say that I do hope to give a

meaning to "account for" and I do hope, in the course of sifting the hypotheses themselves, to give reasons for believing that we can "account for" the selection. To return, the four hypotheses are these: (1) It is merely a matter of chance that some segments of that which is possible occur and that others do not; (2) The determination of that which occurs is a matter of mechanical causality; (3) The determination is the result of a "selection" in the sense that it represents some kind of choice and (4) The account is to be made in terms of some combination of these. This set of hypotheses can be made to represent a complete coverage of the possibilities if we classify anything which occurs and is not the result of chance or mechanical causality as a "choice." I think, in fact, that this is more or less the way in which we do usually apply the relevant concepts and this mode of definition may seem somewhat more easily swallowable later on when I will seek to show that, even on the deistic hypothesis, the notion of "choice" will have to be interpreted in a rather peculiar way.

The problem, now, is to see whether there is likely to be any easy procedure for choosing among these hypotheses. I will take each of the first three in turn and consider some of the possible forms of (4)—the mixed hypothesis—in connection with the others.

The chance universe of hypothesis (1) seems to be ruled out on grounds tolerably like those on which the static universe was ruled out earlier. If we can make sense of the hypothesis itself, it is plain that we can reason and no reasoning seems possible in a completely chance universe. For one thing, to reason you must use your memory since, when you come to your conclusion, you must still remember what meanings you attached to the premises. A man can reason in a world in which he is occasionally, or even often, misled by his memories; but he cannot reason in a world in which there is no way of deciding when he is misled and when he is not. In a chance universe, memories would be as likely as not to pop up at whim without causal antecedents or any connections with any experience whatever. The only way to check memory, however, is to get enough of the facts until the possibility of misinterpretation is reduced to manageable size.

We assume that, if all the facts were available, any misinterpretation would show. In other words, we assume that every mistake has a "source" and that, given ideal and specifiable conditions, it would show. The key phrase is "source of the mistake." To assert that we live in a chance universe is just to deny that mistakes necessarily have sources. And that denial vitiates all reasoning—including the reasoning which enables you to say meaningfully "perhaps all reasoning is untrustworthy." This seems to dispose of (1).

Some combination of a chance universe and other sorts of universe are not, however, obviously ruled out by the argument. A combination of a chance universe and a universe exhibiting mechanical determination is, indeed, quite often held to be the kind of universe we live in. It may, therefore, be well to consider it first. Most people who accept mechanical determinism would, I suppose, wish to say that the determining laws govern the behavior of the contents of the universe but do not, themselves, determine the nature of that content. In other words, they would assert that every phenomenon can be subsumed under one or more suitable laws but that the laws themselves do not enable us to deduce the distribution of the phenomena. There seem to be two objections to this position. First, it is doubtful whether in such a universe any reasoning could occur and it is even more doubtful whether any investigation of the universe, of the kind likely to give meaning to any specific form of the hypothesis is possible. Reasoning seems to presume some ability to sit in independent judgment upon the evidence and this kind of universe presupposes that all juries are rigged. Investigation involves sifting and sorting, application of notions of relevance, and perhaps ability to establish "controls" for experiments. If every event is already determined, it seems unlikely that these activities will make sense. Second, if nothing but chance determines the content of the universe, nothing but chance may determine the content of memories, and the problem raised above will presumably arise again since the tests for the trustworthiness of memory will now establish nothing.

It may still, however, be the case that some areas of the universe exhibit only chance, that some exhibit mechanical deter-

minism or that the universe is best described as a chance one at some times and as a mechanistic one at others. I think, however, that there are tolerably cogent objections to supposing that chance enters into the situation at any time or at any place.

Let me put it this way. I suggested above that memories had to be "explicable" for reasoning to take place and that the occurrence of reasoning sometimes and in some places was essential if any hypothesis whatever was to be meaningful. I did not there introduce the words "explicable" and "explain" nor the general notion of explanation. But now we shall have to reckon with them and try to be clear. Sometimes the word "explain" means merely "subsume under laws" and sometimes it means "account for all aspects of." I wish to maintain that memories must be "explained" in the second sense and that this rules out the occurrence of chance. If I can "account for" my memories up to a certain point but, thereafter, the matter erupts in mystery, I have not, strictly speaking, accounted for anything at all. If mystery enters at any point—and, if the mystery is in principle inexplicable this will merely mean that chance has entered in—then there is just as much likelihood that it will enter in at any other point. Now the "accounting for" of memories demands that at some points, namely those which impinge on the occurrence of certain memories, this must be impossible. But in pure chance there are no probabilities and if any events erupt merely by chance they are as likely at one point as at another. Hence any chance occurrence anywhere, any time, will destroy our grounds for ever trusting reason and therefore any ground we ever have for any hypothesis. I am taking it as axiomatic that any hypothesis for which there could, in principle, be no justification is, in principle, a meaningless hypothesis. If this is the case, then I think we are very likely ultimately to be driven from any hypothesis in which the notion of chance plays a part.

We are, then, now left with the following possibilities: (A) the universe is the result of a selection suitably described, in some sense, as a "choice" or (B) the universe is entirely determined by mechanical casuality or (C) by some combination of "choice" and mechanical determination.

I think (B) can be disposed of with comparative ease.

Against it are not only the objections already cited against the more common kinds of mechanism but also two others. The first is, of course, that it is very hard to make sense of the notion of a set of mechanical laws which not only determine the behavior of whatever is in the world but also explain why what is in the world is in the world. Laws of this kind, generally speaking, presume some plurality of phenomena for their meaning since they are, in fact, normally simply stated in terms of "regularities." The other is this: If we say "the whole world" is mechanical then we are really denying that there *could* have been any other world when, of course, all the mechanistic statement ever entails is merely that factual possibility and actuality must be co-extensive, never that logical possibility and actuality are co-extensive. Hence the mechanistic answer is never, in the required sense, complete. It appears as a general answer to the questions being asked here when, in fact, it would seem to be merely a pseudo-answer.

This seems to leave us with only (A) the selection or choice hypothesis and (C) the possibility of a combination of some "choice" and some mechanical determinism in a situation in which the elements, as it were, of the universe occur as a result of "choice." I expect, in fact, that (C) is the likely account of the matter but, for my present purposes, it makes no difference which is true.

Either of these hypotheses seem to play into the hands of the deist who will now doubtless wish to go on to talk of a Selector or a Chooser. His move does not, however, seem to be logically absolutely necessary and it might, indeed, simply throw the argument back into a tangle. The brambles of this tangle are quite apparent if it is noticed that it seems likely that the "Selector" would, himself, have to be part of the selection and could scarcely be self-explanatory unless the Ontological Argument happened to be valid. It does not, at the moment, seem to be.

What seems to be required is either (I) some account in which it would be feasible to speak of the "selector" (we may now revert to a small "s") as real but not part of the selection or (II) some account of the process which would be internally self-explanatory but not mechanical. It seems that (I) would involve

us in some account of a third factor not properly described as either possibility or actuality. Presumably, Whitehead had some such notion in mind in *Process and Reality*, though it has, I think, proved unusually baffling. As a preliminary remark, it is fair to say that (I) must introduce a rather considerable metaphysical complexity and, if any principle of economy in hypothesis is to bear upon the question, any other alternative must seem preferable.

I would suggest, however, that (II) will not work or, at least, that, if it will, some smuggled notion tending to make the hypothesis a form of (I) seems likely. The trouble, roughly, is this: If the process were "self-explanatory" it would be logically necessary. If it were logically, rather than factually necessary, then actuality and logical possibility would coincide and we would be left with the static universe rejected earlier. There do seem to be more complex ways in which the process might be said to be self-contained, self-explanatory, and non-mechanical but I think that these are really forms of (I).

Let me outline what seems to be a not foolish form of (I) and then try to explain my point. Suppose we say that the "selector" is not "an actuality" (since that would make him part of his own selection) but is instead a "valuation" which bears fruit "in actuality." This "valuation" is not a mere possibility since it has a direct bearing upon actuality and functions as a principal determinant thereof. No "valuation" presumably is an actuality any more than a man's valuation of a pig is part of his breakfast, though we would want to say that it was real enough. It will not, in other words, come under the category of "thing" (as a "Selector" with a capital "S" presumably would). Nor will it be identifiable except through and as an inference from actuality. In some such fashion we might begin to feel our way toward the notion of that which explains but is neither actuality nor possibility. More than this will be needed to make sense of the notions involved but, perhaps, no more will be needed of the "selector." The valuation, logically, will have to produce actuality and the actuality will exhibit the valuation. Talk of the "valuation" without the actuality will, of course, be quite meaningless, and so, if the gist of this argument is sound, will talk of the actuality without the valuation. There is no temporal priority to the

"valuation" over the actuality and, logically, they must be regarded as ultimately inseparable. Some complexity appears in the account since, strictly speaking, no actual "choice" is possible until some actuality occurs and there is the possibility of laws under which the occurrence of one kind of event or thing is likely to be followed by another of a determinate kind. Before this, the "consequences" of any choice would be quite open. Hence the original "valuation" can only be the valuation of existence over non-existence and richer valuations can only follow consequentially. This complexity exhibits the necessity of process, a necessity which I already sketched in other terms.

The sketch, above, of course, is to be taken merely as an illustration of a potentially sensible account given that the "selector" hypothesis seemed inevitable. From it, however, may be seen reasons for rejecting the "non-selector" alternative. Any account which literally made actuality self-contained would still have to give some sense to some "valuation" as part of the explanation (given, now that it is non-mechanical and does not hang on logical necessity, possibilities considered and rejected earlier). It would simply, however, contend that this "valuation" was part of the actuality itself. This seems simply to be a category mistake since valuations are about things and to hold that they are things themselves is probably to confuse the forms of their expression with the valuations themselves.

If this is so—and if some notion of valuation is the spike on which propounders of a non-selector hypothesis are likely to impale themselves—then there may, actually, be some reason for adopting the specific "selector" hypothesis I have outlined. I do not, however, particularly wish to press this point.

Let me see, however, if I can disentangle the hypothesis just enough to clarify one or two of the crucial issues. It is intended to provide a potential solution to paradoxes which do, or seem to, emerge from the main thread of the argument in this paper. The argument purportedly shows that any possible world must be explicable and that no explanation other than one in terms of choice will serve.

The trouble, however, is that it seems that most attempts to specify the "choosing" agency will, themselves, produce diffi-

culties. There can not be a selector which is a "thing" since that, too, would require explanation. Again, the selecting agency must not have characteristics which would lead us to expect that it would produce a "completed" or static world.

I have suggested that an account in terms of a "valuation" will avoid these difficulties, but it remains to be shown that such a notion can be integrated into the explanatory pattern while remaining separate from the process which it initiates. I think this can be achieved if it supposed that the "valuation" is, by its nature, simply a tendency to order and actualize possibilities. It can, I believe, be shown fairly readily that, without some such notion, the concept of possibility is unintelligible—and, for reasons adduced earlier in the argument, I think that the notion of possibility must be rendered intelligible.

A substantial part of the problem is this: Without some relation to the notion of actuality, the notion of possibility is meaningless. If there were no such relation we could not know that possibilities *were* possibilities, whatever else we knew about them. Unless they could become actual, they would, by definition, not be possible. Somehow, then, what is possible must be that which can become actual. There must, then, be some relevant concept covering that which, though not an actual thing, serves as a mediating agency and is not, itself, merely a possibility.

The terms which I have used, "valuation" and "tendency to order and actualize possibilities" are intended to emphasize aspects of this agency and the point of skirmishing with an actual hypothesis here is merely to show that the main line of argument in this paper does not merely lead to a logical dead end or a hopeless paradox. The notions I have used are, of course, still vague. No doubt they could be specified further but the point of this paper is not to develop a full-blooded metaphysical system.

My real contention here is simply that some form of the "selector hypothesis" seems worth exploring since the chain of argument I have outlined does seem to me to give some reason for believing that we may be driven to it. I say "some reason" and "may" advisedly. The concepts I have been juggling are, without exception, complex and every attempt to talk about them is likely to be shot full of ambiguities. The likelihood that I have

suddenly got to the bottom of the whole affair is surely remote. I merely present this argument as something worth some thought. As for the deist, I suspect that it is doubtful, even should I be right, that he can draw much comfort.

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CRITICAL STUDIES

A TWENTIETH CENTURY ARISTOTLE

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ARISTOTLE'S DISCOURSE is rather like a pronouncement from Delphi. It is impressive, in need of elucidation, and apt to be interpreted by different persons according to their special inclinations. Any appropriation of his views entails some reformulation. The consequence is notably diverse versions of Aristotle. This is unavoidable, and should not be deplored. It would be absurd not to consult Aristotle as long as one finds him philosophically compelling. The fact that what the actual Aristotle thought and said is less accessible to us than is the case with some other thinkers is almost totally irrelevant; for philosophical purposes, Aristotle is the Aristotelian corpus.

While various interpretations are allowable, questions do arise as to what treatments are legitimate, and what criteria of legitimacy may be invoked. Surely one can demand that an interpreter state his intentions clearly, that he respect the texts, and that—if he possibly can—he heed the spirit in which they were written. Spirit is hard to capture, but the consensus of informed opinion about the texts and their setting should be some help. An introductory account of Aristotle involves the difficult feat of meeting these requirements while remaining fairly simple and presenting its subject in a favorable light.

Professor Randall's *Aristotle*¹ is moderately successful. Its merits and defects are almost all tied up with its character of being an introduction deliberately written from a special point of view. As an introduction, the book contains the usual biographical data, a sketch of problems about textual chronology, and discussions of all major phases of Aristotle's work. Its novelty is its contemporary and testimonial tone. As Professor

¹ John Herman Randall Jr., *Aristotle*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1960.

Randall says in the "Foreword," he approaches Aristotle from pragmatism and process philosophy—i.e., not from philology or Thomism—and means to stress those aspects of Aristotle which are most relevant to present-day endeavors, e.g., linguistic analysis and the study of nature. He concludes by recommending "an Aristotelianism more Aristotelian than Aristotle's own," "a further advance away from Platonism in the direction Aristotle himself took but did not pursue far enough."² The Aristotle Professor Randall describes in easy, urbane, enthusiastic terms is a reflective—and somehow American—observer of natural and social phenomena. Perhaps the chief merit of this newest introduction is its genial corrective influence on the kind of student who thinks the Greeks are too ancient for any good use. What is doubtful is how well the book prepares one to recognize and understand Aristotle himself.³

The opening chapter—"The Aristotelian Approach to Understanding: Living, Knowing, and Talking"—is unfortunate but brief. Too much effort is made to assimilate Aristotle to later thinkers. He is held to resemble Spinoza in maintaining that "the highest power a man can exercise over the world is to understand it—to do, because he sees why it must be done what others

² Pages 195-96.

³ A note on pedagogical details: the book inevitably invites comparison with those by Ross, Mure, and Allan. (W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, Methuen, London, 1923; fifth revised edition reprinted 1953. G. R. G. Mure, *Aristotle*, Benn, London, 1932. D. J. Allan, *The Philosophy of Aristotle*, Home University Library 222, Oxford, London, Toronto and New York, 1952.) Of these three, the Ross is still the most thorough and neutral. The Mure is nearly as complete a treatment. Mure's Hegelianism makes one or two pages incomprehensible to a beginner and—I would say—falsifies the interpretation of levels of being; but, all in all, Mure conveys Aristotle. Allan's work is somewhat briefer and more elementary than the Ross and Mure, is nearly as neutral as Ross, and contains exceptionally apt statements of philosophical problems. Randall's book is roughly comparable to Allan's in length and ease, but it is less precise. Moreover, it is mildly handicapped by academic touches, i.e., by allusion to other philosophers (rather than simple statements of other views) and by unexplained labels ("functionalism," "naturalism," "positivist," "objective relativist," etc.) Of all four volumes, the Randall inclines most to identify Aristotle with the aspects of Aristotle which interest the author. Perhaps because of printing costs, it lacks the others' scholarly apparatus, i.e., a formal bibliography and the kind of textual references which permit a book to be used as a commentary.

do because they must."⁴ The facts of Aristotle's being an empiricist of a sort and being a Greek unacquainted with other cultures are transformed into the virtue of his interpreting Greece to the Greeks.⁵ Chiefly, Aristotle's philosophical project is described as the understanding of living, of knowing, and of talking. "Living" connotes Aristotle's avoidance of both materialism and transcendental theology, but the word is also used to suggest that what Aristotle most wanted to comprehend is human life.⁶ This does not do justice to the attitude and conscious intent of the philosopher who thought the heavens are more important than man.⁷ Professor Randall maintains properly and eloquently that for Aristotle knowing is an indubitable fact, a normal human activity, and revelatory of what is. The separate enumeration of "knowing" and "talking," however, is misleading; it suggests a radical distinction, of thought and expression, which Professor Randall admits Aristotle did not make.⁸

Chapter II is a brisk and rather ingratiating account of Aristotle's life and of the developmental interpretation of his texts. Chapter III—"Science as Right Talking: The Analysis of Discourse"⁹—first considers demonstration as Aristotle described it in *Posterior Analytics* and then goes on to examine Aristotle's actual practice of inquiry. Both parts of the chapter are clear and highly informative.¹⁰ The theme linking the two, however,

⁴ Page 3; the second half of this statement accords badly with Aristotle's conception of necessity and choice (see Randall's account, 183-6 and 73-80). There are other questionable remarks concerning Spinoza on page 3; and pages 2 and 30 appear to contradict one another about Aristotle's scope.

⁵ E.g., page 3: "Aristotle aimed to understand Greece; he never forgot that aim. He did not aim to understand something else—the Heavenly Beauty in the sky, the moral order in the universe . . ." As Professor Randall knows (see pages 18, 139-43, and 149), Aristotle discerned something of such beauty and order.

⁶ E.g., page 4: "For Aristotle, the categories of 'life' in general, and of 'human life' in particular, are the most fundamental . . ."

⁷ *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 7.

⁸ See pages 6-7.

⁹ The title is a bit of a come-on; the chapter itself does not contain any linguistic analysis.

¹⁰ There is one mis-statement on page 33: There is in the *Posterior Analytics* no concern with questions of method and procedure; Aristotle's

seems to be that the earlier Platonic Aristotle gave way to a mature inquirer who did not follow a deductive procedure. Professor Randall contrasts scientific inquiry *conceived* as the demonstration of properties for an essence, and inquiry *actually carried on* to establish "how everything in the subject matter, all the facts there displayed, are related to [a certain] function [such as motion or living]." ¹¹ In the light of Aristotle's texts, this contrast is not very sharp or well-taken. First, as Professor Randall himself points out, ¹² demonstration is not a technique of discovery but one, so to speak, of systematic presentation, the formularization of what actual investigation has revealed. Second, Aristotle differentiates science and philosophy, characterizing only the former as entirely demonstrative; ¹³ and in at least the *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, and much of the *De Anima*, Aristotle is doing philosophy rather than science. In brief, Professor Randall tries to treat deduction and induction as independent and alternative rather than complementary procedures.

Chapter IV—"Aristotle's Functional Concepts: Living and Desiring"—corresponds to the whole of the *De Anima* minus the treatment of sensation and *nous*, and plus supplementary passages on choice. The omitted analysis of sense and intellect is taken up in Chapter V, "The Power of Selective Response: Sensing and Knowing." These chapters are in a way the core of the newest *Aristotle* because they are concerned with life. *Psyché* is life, a complex power which expresses itself as the functioning of an organized body; as power, it is the *arché* or nature of the live creature; as functional activity, i.e., a set of activities, it is the end and *entelechy*. These activities are elicited by objects in the environment; and, among the activities, desiring is one of the most wide-spread and important. The climax of Chapter IV is an account of human conduct, the "intelligent re-

gaze is fixed entirely on what a completed and perfected science is like." Professor Randall here, and throughout Chapter III, ignores most of Book II of the *Posterior Analytics*.

¹¹ Page 52.

¹² Page 40.

¹³ See especially: *Metaphysics* VI 1, 1025b1-18, and *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 3, 6, and 7.

sponse to the object of desire."¹⁴ Chapter V is, for the most part, a straightforward presentation of Aristotle's stand on sense and on intellect, and a thoughtful sympathetic discussion of various interpretations of the "separate intellect." Some informed readers will regret what Professor Randall's adroit selection and emphasis leaves out: Aristotle's rigorous endeavor to achieve a definition of soul, his concern for form, and his impartiality in treating the three types of vital functioning—i.e., vegetative, sentient, and rational. On the other hand, Aristotle survives his pragmatic transformation remarkably well. Some of the spirit, but not much of the documentable content, is amiss in: "Understanding is also a biological process, a natural activity practiced by men in a world that is intelligible, a characteristically human way of living in an environment that sustains it."¹⁵ And probably no Aristotelian will object to: Aristotle's philosophy "views human experience, not as the interaction between a 'merely' biological organism and a wholly illogical world, but as a co-operation between an intelligent biological organism and an intelligible world."¹⁶

Chapter VI—"First Philosophy: The Ultimate Distinctions"—deals mainly with Aristotle's analysis of beings, i.e., the first nine books of the *Metaphysics*, and then with the theory of the Prime Mover. Professor Randall's interesting and tenable thesis, as to beings, is that in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle wanted to bring together and explain at one stroke the intelligibility of beings and also their dynamic behavior in the world. In detail, however, there are many difficulties in Professor Randall's exposition, and the chapter seems quite disconnected. The causal analysis of substances, carried on in Books VII and VIII of the *Metaphysics* is equated by Professor Randall with the study of general charac-

¹⁴ See page 72 and ff.

¹⁵ Page 59.

¹⁶ Page 106. There is, however, a slip on page 90: "nous is non-existent before it is set in operation." A statement on 102 is circular at least for an Aristotelian: "To his question, What makes us know? What actualizes universals? the answer is [i.e., ought to be] *logos*, discourse, language and communication." Some statements (e.g., page 73: "Theoretical knowledge of the structure of things supplies the means for attaining the object of desire.") would cease to be misleading if they were accompanied by textual references *pro* and *con*.

teristics—"being," "unity," "similarity," etc.—proposed in Book IV.¹⁷ Primary *ousia* is identified as any individual substance.¹⁸ The four causes are brought in¹⁹ although Aristotle treats them only passingly in *Metaphysics* VII 7. Almost nothing is said of form, except that it is one of the four causes. No use is made of the notion of analogy, so that *energeia* is consistently treated as activity—with the suggested consequence that an individual is the activity of its matter.²⁰ When Professor Randall comes to the Prime Mover, he is apparently embarrassed about Aristotle, and tries to dissipate *Metaphysics* XII by recourse to what Aristotle really thought "whatever his feeling or language,"²¹ or to what "quite possibly—'he ought to have meant'."²² Professor Randall would like to regard the Prime Mover as a myth for the sum total of specific realizations towards some one of which each individual being tends, and hence as "the 'form' of the world."²³

The next five chapters correspond to Aristotle's physical theories from *De Caelo* (Chapter VII), through *Physics* I and II (Chapter VIII), *Physics* III-V (Chapter IX), *De Generatione et Corruptione* (Chapter X), and the teleology of *De Partibus Animalium* together with the genetics and embryology of *De Generatione Animalium* (Chapter XI). Chapter IX, on place, time, the void, etc., is certainly a success. It presents simply and clearly what Aristotle held; and it points out in passing how his ideas are like or unlike other conceptions including those now current. In other chapters, a good deal less of Aristotle himself is reported, and there is a much higher proportion of general description as to the kind of views he held. The extreme instance is the treatment of *De Caelo*; the entire first half of the chapter deals with this work's

¹⁷ See pages 109-18.

¹⁸ See page 122. This interpretation is at variance with *Metaphysics* VII 3, esp. 1029a27-33, and with the remainder of VII, and all of VIII, which consider not so much individuals but their causes.

¹⁹ See pages 123-25.

²⁰ See page 130.

²¹ Page 141.

²² Page 143.

²³ See pages 140-41 and also 71.

historical importance, "imaginative" character, Platonizing tendency, and so on.

By Chapter XII—"The Practical Sciences: Knowing How to Choose Relative Goods"—the scene has been set for a direct examination of human life. Chapter XII deals with Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics*; and XIII, with both his general and his specific analyses of *technai*, especially the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*. These chapters ought to be the grand culmination of the book,²⁴ but they are not. Chapter XIII is an admiring, quite full, and competent account; but Chapter XII has extraordinarily little to say. This is largely because Aristotle is subjected to drastic surgery. Aristotle's method has to be separated from "the specific subject matter of Greek culture."²⁵ The method is "accepting as facts the moral judgments he finds prevailing and giving them a rational interpretation and defense."²⁶ It does *not* involve achieving a fixed conception of human nature.²⁷ Moreover, for Aristotle "each situation has a good which intelligent inquiry can hope to discover"²⁸—apparently without benefit of a criterion of what is good. After ten pages of this sort of revision comes a summary of the less normative aspects of the *Politics*, and a four-page account—excellent for its size—of the *Ethics*.

Professor Randall's book is written in admiration and respect, and in the very-likely-justified hope that it will gain for Aristotle new readers who might otherwise have passed him by. These readers will not, however, have been adequately forewarned of Aristotle's passion for order, that insistence which expresses

²⁴ See page 243, the opening of XII: "Aristotle's thought is primarily functional . . . His whole philosophy is built around the categories of life . . . We should expect Aristotle's treatment of human life to be the most illuminating part of his philosophy. And this is indeed true."

²⁵ Page 243, where this separation is also said to be the right understanding of Aristotle.

²⁶ Page 246.

²⁷ See page 250. See also 248, including: "Were Aristotle to write today . . . for contemporary Americans, he would not elevate knowing above practical action . . ." See too, 251: "There is no human good that is or could be common to all men on all occasions—save that of always acting intelligently."

²⁸ Page 252.

itself in classification, in the framing of *aporiai*, and in the arduous and indefatigable quest for causes and completed explanations. The readers will have been told something of all this; but what they will know by example, and so will expect to find, is a broad description of an anthropocentric cosmos.

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"AS MUCH CLEARNESS
AS THE SUBJECT MATTER ADMITS"

NEAL W. KLAUSNER

IN THE *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle observes that "Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought alike in all discussions." More recently Bertrand Russell has written: "I cannot see how to refute the arguments for the subjectivity of ethical values, but I find myself incapable of believing that all that is wrong with wanton cruelty is that I don't like it." These two statements reflect much of the dilemmas of moral philosophy—its inability to achieve precision and its failure to reach utterly convincing argument in spite of our relative success in making practical moral judgments when faced with the routine demands of existence. In some recent books¹ in ethics both Aristotle's and Russell's remarks seem to be affirmed and verified.

In *The Promise of Modern Life* Professor D. W. Gotshalk calls our attention to the sickness of modern society—its crises, panic, tensions and fears—and asks, "How did we get this way and what are the prospects of moving out?" He recognizes a disease, offers a diagnosis, and suggests a cure. The causes of our distressing condition lie, in part, in the past, that is, in the assumptions made by previous periods of society. In modern life we can distinguish three periods each with a predominant value, namely, (1) individuality, (2) creativity, and (3) interrelatedness. "We live today in an interrelational world, and the clue to

¹ Gotshalk, D. W., *The Promise of Modern Life*, The Antioch Press, 1958, 116 pp.

Ward, Leo R., ed., *Ethics and the Social Sciences*, University of Notre Dame Press, 1959, 127 pp.

Melden, A. I., *Rights and Right Conduct*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1959, 87 pp.

Edel, May and Edel, Abraham, *Anthropology and Ethics*, Charles C. Thomas, 1959, 250 pp.

Johnson, Oliver A., *Rightness and Goodness*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1959, 163 pp.

maximum human good lies in developing the value possibilities of the interrelational principle." Individuality characterizes roughly the period of revolutionary changes following the medieval world to the late 18th century; creativity from the late 18th century to recent decades. Both individuality and creativity were heretical in the medieval value scheme, the first leading to pride, and the second to rebellion against established truth. Individuality is rather loosely defined as self-assertion and the striving for self-completeness; creativity seems to mean a kind of activity having a direction or aim, a striving for productive novelty.

Our modern world, that is, post-medieval, is what it is because all its activities are based on a certain value outlook. Individuality and creativity are value principles which finally led their societies to bloody revolution in the first instance, and in the second to international war and economic depression. The problem now is whether the value possibilities of an international view will lead to a good life or to disaster.

Gotshalk surveys rapidly the characteristics of the world following the medieval period and the Renaissance. The results of taking individuality as a primary value are described in politics, economics, science, philosophy, and art. Thus in politics, individuality led to the creation of absolute monarchy separate from ecclesiastical authority; in economics, we have the drive to become rich; in science there rises a belief in a truth independent of dogma and tradition, and the development of a new mathematical method; art becomes rational, secular, and simple in form; philosophy begins to stress the importance of the observer or knower and opens the way for scepticism.

The shift from individuality to creativity is one of emphasis. But its effects are discernible again in economics when we have an industrial revolution and a vast increase of goods and wealth; in politics, we have the appearance of democracy, nationalism and liberalism; in science, the dynamic concepts of physics and the rise of the biological sciences; in art, romanticism and realism; in philosophy, the categories of growth, change, decay, activity. The knower is no longer a spectator. "Truth is relative to need, and knowledge is tentative, ever-changing, unfinished. Its goal is

not the eternal and universal, but the particular, pertinent, factual, and useful."

These are the older ways. Individuality and creativity in their unrestricted and free-wheeling forms seem to have spent their force. A new value principle is needed and is emerging. This Gotshalk calls the interrelational principle. Unhappily it is never defined adequately or clearly. We are left to feel our way into its meaning. When people have a value concern of world-wide dimensions they become mutually interdependent. The new way will keep individuality and creativity but to enhance the social order, not to destroy it. The enormous technical achievements of our contemporary society form the mechanical foundation for a world community dominated by the interrelational point of view.

There are many insights, perceptive comments and undoubtedly wise suggestions in Gotshalk's work. But one must work out for himself, to a large extent, the interpretations of the three principles of individuality, creativity, and interrelatedness. The book is largely descriptive, although Gotshalk says his aim is philosophy not history. But if philosophy means argument then the book must be described as a kind of cultural history rather than philosophical criticism or analysis. One would find it difficult to disagree with Gotshalk's desire for a new society, and not to share at least in part some of his fears and laments, for example, that science is ethically neutral, that philosophy is lost in scholastic linguistic puzzles, that ethics and aesthetics are subverted into descriptive psychology, and that politics frequently seeks a repressive authority. He places his hopes in a society whose values are based on the interrelational principle. But what is it? There are many kinds of relations and if this is to be our fundamental value it needs to be spelled out with patient thoroughness. Of course, we sense that Gotshalk wants human life raised to its maximum value, but the interrelational principle is something more than attitudes of tolerance, cooperation, kindly feeling and mutual respect. Interrelatedness does not mean a kind of special organization, says Gotshalk, which will have as its duties the reconstruction of the social life—we have plenty of these—but we do need to intensify the trends toward interrelatedness and rational leadership. So the cure is not merely to take an inter-

relational point of view but rather to develop the value possibilities of living in an interrelational world. How is this to be done? Here we have no answers. Gotshalk leaves us with the problem: What kind of values will direct us in an interrelational society? One cannot resist asking whether Gotshalk makes the picture too neat and pat. Can the lines be drawn so simply without distortion? This kind of writing tends to smooth out the differences, to see every event, person and achievement with the aid of its descriptive categories. Thus it suggests a pattern in events that may have its origin in the mind of the writer rather than in actual occurrences.

In *Ethics and The Social Sciences* we have another interest in interrelationship, but not on so vast a scale. The authors met at the University of Notre Dame to consider the interrelations between ethics and the social sciences. But this book promises more than it gives. Let us look at the various contributions.

Professor Francis G. Wilson, a political scientist, discusses the social scientist and his values. In this essay a classification of social scientists with respect to values is presented. Three major classes may be discerned each with sub-types: (i) Those who regard all values as subjective commitments of the individual; (ii) those who accept values to some degree but are largely indifferent to their role—value questions being scarcely worth discussion; (iii) those who accept the place, the significance, and a philosophical proof of values. Wilson is himself obviously in class three. He argues that the Catholic intellectual has a sense of perspective not shared by "positivistic liberals," although I find no adequate defense of this. "With a Catholic perspective," he writes, "the social scientist can see readily the newer trends in subject-matter and method, for methods of inquiry are often used to discriminate between philosophical positions." There is in this essay a curious tendency to identify holding certain religious beliefs with philosophical inquiry. Also little recognition is given to the possibility of arriving at a value-system independent of religious dogma. It is clear that Wilson wants the voice of the Thomistic social scientist heard in contemporary value debates, but I am not convinced by his statement that only in Thomism can

any real basis for values be found and that all other social scientists have only a "recessive moral sense."

In an interesting essay called, "The Knowledge of Value and The Value of Knowledge," Professor Kenneth E. Boulding applies his theory of the "image" to questions of fact and value. "Image" means, "the *cognitive structure* or 'subjective knowledge' possessed by an organism or organization." It is the "view of the universe" held by any organism from amoeba to man; the differences are only of complexity. The author distinguishes between "image of fact" that is, of the world of space and time, objects and persons; and the "image of value" that is, the ordering of the parts of the field of images into first, second, third, etc. "No matter what and when the valuation process, however, and no matter how lofty or how low its frame of reference, the process itself always consists in matching a set of ordinal numbers with parts of the field." This would seem to prevent us from ever saying meaningfully that anything has value in itself. Indeed Professor Boulding has nothing to say about that possibility. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values is not mentioned, perhaps because there can be no place for it in this view.

Now the theory of the image leads also to a theory of behavior. Roughly, it is that "An organism moves toward the highest valued part of its image of the future." Thus all value-orderings are essential to behavior, for mere images of fact will not result in behavior but rather in vegetative inactivity. Images may come from within or without the organism; they may overlap, be le ned, be inconsistent, rejected, grow, change, and reevaluated. Image making can occur far below the level of self-consciousness; even in the beginnings of the fertilized egg images of fact and value may be present! "There is self-sacrifice in the interests of a higher cause, even at the level of the cell!"

What about the truth of the image? It is clear that we cannot compare our images with external reality. All we can compare are images with images. We are locked up in images and there seems to be no escape. But Boulding wants to say that there is a difference between "truer" and "falsar" images even though we cannot know their absolute truth. Images which lead to disaster for the organism may be called "false." Thus "true" and "false"

refer to the pragmatic workability of an image, not to some ultimate truth. "It is a leap of faith, of course, from this proposition to the proposition that the knowledge of values is knowledge of a real, objective world, and that values can be true or false in the sense of correspondence to some outside reality. This leap of faith, however, is no greater than the one required in believing that the image of fact likewise corresponds to a real, objective world and that knowledge of fact likewise implies that there is something there to know. In neither case can we ever compare directly the image with the correspondent reality, for, as we have seen, only images can be compared with images. In both cases, however, there are processes of validation or confirmation, some of which operate on very simple, unsophisticated, common sense levels and others of which require an elaborate theoretical system and experimental control." Professor Boulding allows for the possibility of escape from the image-predicament by Revelation.

One cannot expect all the details of a theory to be worked out in a single, brief essay, but there is a point which must be mentioned. Can we ever say that some images of value are in fact morally wrong or evil? Thus, to return to Russell's point, is one's horror of wanton cruelty merely a matter of having a different image pattern? Perhaps there is no argument other than appeal to authority or to a moral-sense that will answer this. Perhaps we must learn to get along in a world of risk and image-preference. I, for one, would be happier in a world which permitted the latter than in one which offered me only authoritarian directives.

Christopher Dawson in "Notes on Culture and Ethics" presents briefly his convictions that cultural relativism and a universal divine truth are to be reconciled in a Christian (Catholic?) view of the world. Cultural relativism may mean that man's standards of values are related to his culture, or it may mean that all values are relative in the sense that one culture is as good as another and all moral values equivalent. The first view "implies" that culture is a moral order. Thus the following syllogism emerges: (Dawson does not present it as such). Culture is a moral order; all moral acts depend upon a moral order; therefore, all moral acts depend upon culture. Whether this makes possible an absolute truth in religion, philosophy, morality

and science is up to the individual philosopher and theologian to decide. Dawson accepts an absolutism. He thinks a universal moral order is impossible without a universal spiritual community. But no argument or evidence for this conclusion is given—nor is any clarification of “universal moral order,” or of “universal spiritual community” offered. There is little in this essay that presents anything new or convincing to the philosopher.

The paper by Professor David Bidney, called, “The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism,” is, I think, the most valuable in the book. He takes “culture” to mean “The art of living evolved by man in society,” and “a culture” to refer to “the specific modes of actual behavior and thought, to the institutions and social values together with the material, social and mental products of these activities which are shared in whole or in part by members of a given society.” By accepting behavior as necessary to an adequate theory of culture Bidney rejects the view of some anthropologists that culture is a “logical construct,” something to be found only in the minds of anthropologists. On the contrary, he advocates an existential, polaristic theory of culture involving a “distinctive mode of actual, historic living in human society.” We will see why it is “polaristic” in a moment.

Morality, he says, is a cultural universal, that is, all known societies have “some system of norms and rules for the regulation of interindividual conduct.” Conduct approved by a society is called good; conduct prohibited is called evil. Thus all morality is humanistic and naturalistic for it represents a set of norms and institutions designed by man for his preservation and happiness. Morality, then, is a function of human creativity in the attainment of certain ends. In this sense it is relative—but it is also an end in itself for it involves the exercise of man’s distinctive characteristic, namely, his potentiality for rationality.

But morality is also absolute from another point of view, in that it extends over all mankind and all human societies. It is relative in that it does not extend to other species of animal or rational beings. This is Bidney’s “relative absolute.”

Now, moral relativism, a view which he attacks, rests on two assumptions; “First, that all moral evaluations are culturally con-

ditioned or determined and hence that the cultural origin of moral values limits their validity to the social and cultural context in which they originated. Second, it is claimed that it is impossible in practice to establish any universally acceptable criterion for measuring and comparing moral values. Hence each moral system is to be regarded as having equal validity." These assumptions lead to the prescription of tolerance as the primary social virtue, but do not necessarily end in skepticism and nihilism because morality is essential for the corporate existence of any society. Bidney rejects cultural relativism because he finds its epistemological and ontological presuppositions questionable, namely, that reality as known is always cultural reality; that there is no reality beyond man, or in addition to cultural reality. Against such a view he postulates a *meta-cultural reality* which "exists independent of human experience and which is gradually discovered but never fully comprehended in the course of human experience." This is the polaristic emphasis we mentioned above. In addition to culturally determined reality there is, "The other pole or dimension of reality . . . (namely) that of nature, cosmic and human, which provides human experience with a common frame of reference and enables man to correlate his cultural constructs with the coercive power of nature and his own individual and social needs and desires."

There is much that is well-argued and persuasive in Professor Bidney's essay—and more than I have been able to present in this space. It deserves fuller discussion. But I am somewhat puzzled about the relation between the meta-cultural reality, and the moral absolutes. The latter function, says Bidney, as ideals which are only approximated in actual cultures. Does the meta-cultural reality guarantee the validity of these absolutes? Do the absolutes have an ontological status in this unconditioned reality? Moreover, can we ever really escape from the cultural predicament, except by postulates? And isn't this kind of escape an illusion? Are we not as effectively shut off from the meta-cultural reality as Kant was from the *ding-an-sich*? I know of no escape except to say that the "reality beyond" is what it is known as but it probably is a good deal more. That is, reality actually does have the characteristics it exhibits from any possible point of view;

what it is from no point of view, or from the point of view of an Infinite Observer, that is, one who has all points of view, I think we can not know. But perhaps that is just what a metaphysician strives for.

The last two essays in the book are interesting, but, I think, futile attempts to relate Catholic theology with the social sciences. Professor Herbert Johnstone invites us to consider a classificatory scheme of knowledge based on the distinction between speculative and practical knowledge, and then to find a place in this scheme for ethics and the social sciences. I do not wish to be flippant with respect to this essay, but the author's concern for classification seems infinitely remote from the real problems of the social sciences and the real questions of ethics. The effort to find a proper slot for a subject matter appears to me of little use, and even if successful I cannot resist a "so-what." Professor James R. Brown argues for a sharper understanding of the relation between theology and the social sciences and declares that theological beliefs have a role to play in policy making and decisions which affect the economic and political life of society. I would think the work of the philosopher or metaphysician is called for rather than that of the theologian. Moreover, Professor Brown doesn't separate the empirical from the logical problems. What may follow logically from certain theological assumptions may be quite fruitless for the specific demands of the social sciences. No attempt is made to show why or how given theological beliefs entail certain actions, or whether this is possible at all. But one should not be too harsh here, for these essays were papers read at a conference and largely used for stimulating discussion rather than to present an extended position or argument.

In *Anthropology and Ethics*, May Edel and Abraham Edel have produced an excellent study which is the result of cooperation between philosophy and one of the social sciences, not, as in the previous book, between theology and the social sciences. It is a much more useful, thorough-going, and exciting presentation than *Ethics and the Social Sciences*. The book suggests that anthropology is just beginning to see the importance of ethics in a culture, and the authors deliberately seek to cross discipline

lines. Their aims are in part expressed by the following: "We hope . . . to establish 'coordinates' for the more systematic mapping of particular moralities, to explore more explicitly the relations of morality to cultural patterns and social processes, and to see how philosophic issues of ethical theory become refined and reformulated when their cultural content is made manifest." The whole work is remarkably free from both philosophical turgidity and anthropological jargon. The lucidity and smoothness of style make it a genuine pleasure to read. Certainly beginners in either field can read it with understanding, and old timers can find information as well as quiet, but stimulating discourse.

The book has really two major parts, although the table of contents would not reveal this architecture. In the first the authors consider the question of whether there is a single mark of the moral and how we could know it. They point out that philosophers have offered a variety of definitions and that this in itself is troublesome. Instead, therefore, of accepting a single mark, previous to investigation, they propose that we look for a number of different topics, all falling within the description of the morality of any people, such as, injunctions, prescriptions, rules, attitudes, character-traits, goals, sanctions, and how all these are conceptualized, systematized, and related to other aspects of the community. The danger to be avoided is ethnocentrism, that is, "of forcing the criteria and selective patterns of one morality, upon those of another." The authors remind us that in all these aspects of morality wide differences are found in diverse cultures, but that this should not be particularly startling to philosophers, who presumably are acquainted with the different ethical theories in the history of their own subject. The Edels find variations in what are taken as the marks of morality, the major moral claims, the nature of the moral community, the meaning of ethical concepts, the types of ethical generalizations, and the acceptable and non-acceptable forms of sanction. Nevertheless, the authors also point out that diversity is not the whole story, that modern anthropological study has overcome its fascination with difference and now, with a more mature science, has found important similarities. There are "common needs, common social tasks, common psychological processes" and these are

"bound to provide some common framework for the wide variety of human behaviors that different cultures have developed."

Also in the first part of the book the authors take four moral concerns generally regarded as playing a significant role in any moral community, namely, maternal care, incest taboos, aggression, and distributive justice. These are offered as examples of what might be done in an attempt to find invariants in a cross-cultural survey. They find few absolute rules or common goals, and nothing to deplore in this result. "There is far too much emphasis placed on uniformity as a standard for a pan-human morality. After all, an invariant 'deep down in human nature' may represent only something that served its role in evolutionary development long ago, a kind of moral 'appendix' we are stuck with, even though it gives rise to perennial troubles."

In the second half of the book the authors turn their attention to various structural aspects of morality, considering in turn the moral community and the person, ethical concepts, ethical generalization, justification, sanctions and moral feelings, and moral configurations. Here also they present the discoveries of anthropological study along with philosophical criticism. As much of morality must be articulated in discourse so we find every culture having terms for evaluating, judging, approving and disapproving, behavior. It is, therefore, a mistake to read one culture's "evaluative connotations into another's concepts," for ethical concepts have a rich cultural content and must be understood by reference to it. In our own culture there are different forms of moral discourse, for example, absolute rules, factual reports, general principles, imperatives, proverbs, models, etc. With the richness of their anthropological knowledge, the authors show that other cultures also exhibit different kinds of moral utterance. Moreover, the systematizing of moral concepts is itself a culturally rooted process. So also is justification, that is, giving reasons why a certain pattern of behavior is defended or rejected; the same is true for sanctions, that is, the pressures which maintain conformity in the community vary from culture to culture.

But the Edels also state that many needs would survive critical evaluation and that common goals would be found acceptable.

They even list some of those they think would emerge and survive: "That it is better for children to get good maternal care than to be neglected; that a distribution system is better in so far as it satisfies the hunger of all the people; that aggression minimized is better than aggression expressed in open violence and killing, though there may be a cost for muting aggression that still needs to be studied; that the widening of the moral community, at least in the sense of treating all people however different or alien as human individuals who count, is a human good; that inner sanctions are preferable to sheer imposed external force, but that the dictatorial voice of conscience is perhaps not the ultimate means of human self-regulation; that justification in terms of satisfactions is a nobler base for human moral consideration than fear of demons or of malice, though perhaps harder to implement." How do such ends arise in a moral community? Here philosophers have often stressed the factor of transcendence, that is, that any evaluation seems to transcend the existential situation. But the Edels do not engage in the philosophical difficulties of this question. Rather they point out that all evaluation is a matter of deciding which ends are desirable, preferable, and better, and which ought to be chosen to guide us well. Each of these concepts require some criteria of choice, for example, virtues are less desirable if they frustrate other needs, sanctions are judged better or worse according to the degree of violence, and so on. Now these concepts and criteria do not come from some external source but have their roots in culture and their meanings in the functions they perform in the culture. "On this view there is a kind of double dialectic in the ethical process. Evaluation does transcend each presently existing situation, but the detached elements whereby it does so are found in turn to have their own connections with the existential context. The detachment lies, as we have seen, in the continuous possibility of asking as we take our stand in time and look forward, 'Where do we go from here?' The attached connections are seen in the local reference in 'we' and 'from here.' It is always in the light of what we are, what needs we have, what aspirations characterize us, what resources are available, that we—taking our stand in time and looking forward—pose the problem of reconstruction."

It is the authors' conviction that science and ethics have much

to say to each other, that "ethics can be wedded to science." No effort is made to define science and indeed it seems to me that much of what the authors appear to mean by science can be read as "critical thinking," or even as philosophy. For the most part I think they mean a reliance upon some of the methods of some of the sciences, although this problem is never mentioned. Certainly it would seem strange to find anything useful in, say, astronomy or mathematics or geology, for ethics. The authors have a low-voltage tendency to think of "science" as a sacred cow, and to assume that of course everyone agrees and knows what science is. This is slightly annoying especially when it is not always clear whether they are talking about the methods, attitudes, or results of science.

But now, what is to be achieved by this union of science and ethics? Well, in the first place, "the path of evaluation is opened rather than closed by each wider description, and each deeper explanation." Also we may be better able to tell just what we want, how to get there and the difficulties on the way. Second, it can help us to consider the suitability of our own ways of behavior, and whether we think too narrowly about the limits of the moral community and the responsibility of the individual. Third, by understanding the grounds, occasions, and conditions of the various forms of morality we can see what alternatives are possible, and raise questions of reconstruction and evaluation.

Thus the question of the role of science in ethics is not specifically whether it can tell us what is really good, or whether we can deduce ethical conclusions from scientific premises, but rather to show us in various ways what possibilities are open, how they may be limited, and how we are to understand the terms in which ethical questions are formulated. If ethics came within the scope of scientific inquiry,

We would know a great deal more about the moralities of the past and present, their systematic character and relations to man's basic biological and psychological equipment and social and cultural conditions. Under favorable conditions, we would know what human aspirations were perennial and recurrent; which problems had to be faced under all conditions and which under analyzable particular conditions; what means were essential to what ends; what ends we have, as it were, built into us, and which ones we grow as we go along depending on conditions, and which ends are arbitrary or of chance

occurrence. We would know how aspirations shape obligations, and we would be able to distinguish genuine limits from spurious necessities, and basic human needs from transient desires. We would know the different kinds of qualities in moral experience and the psychological and cultural conditions of their growth and selection; how they could be muted or intensified, which could stand alone and which went in teams. We would know the effects of different types of sanctions, the human costs of restrictive negative sanctions and the degrees of effectiveness to be expected in what cultural settings from positive rewards. We would have a natural history of different ethical concepts, and an understanding of the different ways in which ethical expressions have been employed, in what use-contexts they serve what purposes, where they direct or trigger action, where they commend, where prompt appraisal, where they persuade, under what conditions they become standardized and informative; we would see, in short, how concepts express and are geared to perspectives of inquiry, need and practice, and what they are capable of doing in reformulating and refashioning moral outlooks. We should understand more clearly the careers and relations of criteria or standards of morality—how a need or a goal or a trait rises in the cultural economy to a position of moral power and authority, fusing behind its claims strong feelings and sanctions, dominating the processes of criticism and evaluation. We would understand how different pictures of the world and of man serve in many different ways to stabilize policies of action, furnishing comfortable rationalizations to cling to, or guiding principles for reconstruction. We would know these not only as separate items, but in systematic configurations.

Now if we could know all this from the union of science with ethics it would undoubtedly be an impressive achievement—such knowledge should lead to some kind of enlightened existence. But in spite of these claims is it really silly to ask, Would we know the good, or the right, or the just? Would we know how a specific ethical dilemma ought to be resolved? Not merely how it has been or is commonly resolved? Perhaps we must give up asking such questions. They smack of absolutes. The authors warn us of the vagueness of the notion of absolutes and suggest that a clearer understanding of them will come only if they are studied in their cultural context. They do not agree that our basic moral principles lose strength if they are given a modest interpretation as guides for evaluation. We are the source and the ends of our moral principles. The authors refer to Neurath's suggestion that all our knowledge can be compared to a boat that is never in dry dock and thus must be repainted and repaired while in action. "Suppose we went further, and had the boat

carry the very soil by which it grew the trees from whose timber it made its repairs. Of course, the globe itself is such a boat! A model of this kind could hold for morality as well. As a matter of fact, this might help us remember that what we want is not so much a safe harbor in which to anchor as good instruments for charting a purposeful course."

The whole tone of this book is so sane and well-balanced that I find it difficult not to be annexed by the authors' point of view. It is an excellent study in descriptive ethics. It is true that the authors raise many issues, and ask many questions without following them up, or suggesting speculative solutions. I suspect that more philosophical questions are raised than anthropological. By this I mean that I think there is much more material here for a philosopher to investigate than for anthropological research. And in this brief account of the book I have left out many asides and insights, and perceptive remarks that contribute much to its quality. I would like to ask the authors whether the fact that a moral ideal, etc., is culturally relative makes it any less binding or lessens one's obligation to strive to fulfill it? And, granting the facts of cultural relativity, how do we account for, recognize, and come to accept, a critic of the culture? Finally, I still am not sure that "culture" can be or is used precisely. Does it refer to home, community, region, state, or what? Nevertheless, philosophers who are interested in something more than the language of ethical discourse must come to terms with the argument of this book.

The problem and method of A. I. Melden's *Rights and Right Conduct* is totally different from the Edels' volume, yet I think they would probably find much to agree with in each other's work. Professor Melden's slim little book is a tightly-packed, closely reasoned argument, almost every line of which needs to be read with care. As an example of a philosopher at work on a relatively limited problem I think it is superb but it is extremely difficult to say briefly what is already said with remarkable conciseness and persuasiveness. I'm sure I will leave out important steps in the argument, but if this sends the reader to the book both he and Professor Melden will be rewarded.

The author begins with the statement that the subject of

rights in contemporary philosophy is very unsatisfactory. Philosophers have been more concerned to discuss the adjectival use of right than its substantive use, or else have confused the two. There is a difference between "right action" and "having rights." Thus one of his immediate objectives is to "explore some of the so-called foundations of certain familiar moral rights and the manner in which these operate in the moral justification of conduct," for conduct may be justified by an appeal to a recognition of rights.

Now rights may be related to authority as when we ask "By what authority . . .?" This has nothing to do with whether the act is beneficial or desirable. There may be many reasons for claiming we have a "right" to do something, e.g., going to a theater, but, in general, interested persons have the right because, "they are mature moral agents capable of deciding for themselves how to conduct the course of their lives." If it were morally desirable, one would say that he *ought* to go to the theater, not that he had a *right* to do so. Thus there is a difference between right and ought. As an illustration of such rights think of going to the movies on Sunday, choosing our own neck-ties and drinking moderately. All these are actions a "responsible agent can be expected to perform without interference and as he chooses."

Now someone, say B, may claim the right to prevent A from engaging in these actions, e.g., when there would be disastrous consequences. Usually B cannot claim this right because of some special privilege or status. On the other hand B might interfere with A's contemplated action because explicit authority has been granted B by A himself. And finally B may have a special right because he is A's parent. Thus, so far, the source of rights is two fold: (i) authority, proper or acknowledged, and (ii) a certain status or relation, e.g., a parent. These are closely related but distinguishable. It is the second source that the author wishes to investigate more specifically. And so we come to the central problem: "How is it possible that a right of this kind can 'derive' from one's status as a parent and how is it possible for a right so 'derived' to function as a consideration that justifies the conduct of the parties concerned?"

The status of being a parent is to be distinguished from the

moral right possessed by the parent. The right is derived from the status. But how is this possible, remembering Hume's remark about deriving the ought from the is? Well, we must distinguish between the right a person has and the obligations this right confers upon an action; and between the rightness of action and the right of the agent. To assert a right is to present a warrant in support of the claim. When A, the parent, has a right, then B, the son, has a correlative obligation not to do something, but to the other person. "By being under an obligation to one's parent, one's conduct is now restricted by the interests and desires of one's parent in ways which are both exceptional and reasonable." Now how does the parent obtain this right? Simply by being a parent? This does not appear acceptable for certainly there are some parents who have no rights over their offspring. But if we cannot deduce morality from matters of fact, and thus not the rights of parents from their status as parents, how is the right derived? This is the problem which will be attacked indirectly by first considering the way in which a right is related to the rightness of the action for which the right calls, that is, how a right may justify conduct.

A son is said to have an obligation to a parent. This obligation can be met in different ways. Now is an obligation-meeting action itself obligatory? No. These two notions must be kept distinct because (i) it is possible to make errors or mistakes in demanding rights; and (ii) if a parent waived his right this would be a "failure of moral nerve" and contribute to the delinquency of the offspring by encouraging him to turn away from his duty, even though we often praise a parent for so doing. "If it is not self-contradictory to say that one is morally justified in waiving one's right, then it does not follow from the fact that an action is obligation-meeting that it is obligatory." (iii) Unless these notions are kept distinct, conflicting obligations would present not merely practical problems calling for moral wisdom, but logical absurdities, in which one would both be doing and not doing his duty.

Rights are said sometimes to be claims, but Melden thinks this is a bad move. I agree, for as he says, one may have a right without registering a claim, and if it is further said to be a

justified claim there is either a redundancy in the expression or an awkwardness leading us to speak of a "justified right." He correctly points out that it is not self-contradictory but may even be morally commendable to say, "I have a right but I ought not to assert it," and "I have a right to special consideration from B, but it would be wrong for B to give me special consideration at this time." Moreover, rights as well as obligations may conflict and moral wisdom must weigh these competing claims to arrive at what is morally required.

There are philosophers who distinguish between *prima facie* rights and rights *simpliciter*. Thus if one says, "I have a right to special consideration from you," this might be a claim to rights *simpliciter*; but if one used the sentence merely as a reminder that one has a right, it would involve only a *prima facie* right. According to these philosophers it would be self-contradictory to say, "I have a right to special consideration from you, but you ought not to give me special consideration in this situation," if and only if the right were an 'unqualified,' 'absolute' right or a right *simpliciter* . . . ; but because the right in question is to be construed as a *prima facie* right no contradiction need arise." Melden grants these philosophers a point, namely, that one may have a right but be morally unjustified in requiring its fulfillment, but otherwise he does not regard the distinction with favor, for those who employ it are "guilty of confounding two quite different questions—the question whether a person has a right with the question whether, given that he has a right, he is justified by the particular circumstances in which he finds himself in exercising it."

When there are conflicts between competing obligations how are we to deal with such cases? Melden rejects the intuitionist's way as leading to a dead end, and also the move which suggests a modification of a general statement into a specific one, e.g., from "One ought to tell the truth" to "you ought now to tell the truth to Jones," for there can always be a doubt whether in that specific situation one ought to tell the truth. Again he rejects the idea that we could have a list of exceptions and codify the rules or set up an order of preference, for, "It all depends upon the particular circumstances of the specific case as to which of these

sorts of action takes moral precedence" "Surely it is preposterous to suppose that we can so qualify 'One ought to tell the truth' that every 'exception' can be foreseen and nothing need be left to the good sense of the agent in learning how to employ such 'rules.'" Now another move is possible. One may look for general principles, rather than rules, e.g., the greatest happiness, or the promotion of well-being, etc. Melden, however, objects to this too. "For now what we are morally required to do is really or strictly . . . not to tell the truth, keep one's promises or give special consideration to one's parents, but to produce pleasure, for this and this alone, on this monolithic doctrine, one is duty bound to do."

The way out is to realize that morality, like science and all rational inquiry, is self-correcting. One is reminded here of Neurath's ship. Certainly in this respect Melden and the Edels agree.

But still we haven't come to Melden's primary problem. He gets at it in the following way: Consider these two locutions: (i) "One should bathe" and (ii) "One should give special consideration to one's parents." Now, says Melden, these expressions are different not because one is a non-moral right and the other a moral, but because giving special consideration to one's parents in any situation may be the same thing as doing what is morally required of one. "Hence it is that bathing may explain how it is that one has become healthy, but does not justify that one is healthy; whereas in the case of one who has done what is morally required of him, the justification of the claim that he has done so might well consist in pointing to something that, in an important respect, is the very same thing as the doing of what is morally required, namely, giving special consideration to his parent." This is really the heart of Melden's argument. It can be generalized as follows: ". . . how is it possible that the doing of x which is in a similar respect the doing of y can justify the claim that y is being done." He rejects the notion that it is some mental happening that makes the difference, e.g., intentions, but asserts that it is the circumstances that surround x . Thus giving a child a penny may be, depending on the circumstances, making a present, bribing, paying a tax, making a purchase, or teaching the cur-

rency. But the argument does not take this form: Whenever one puts a penny in the hands of a child under such and such circumstances, one makes a gift of the penny to the child. I put . . . etc. Hence, I made a gift of the penny to the child. There is of course the difficulty of spelling out the circumstances, but more serious is the uselessness of the major premise. When would one utter such a sentence? "Given that I do put a penny in the hand of a child in the relevant circumstances, it *follows* that I am making a gift of the penny to the child. No further premise is needed at all." When these conditions occur we understand what is taking place.

Thus, "one should give special consideration to one's parent" is categorical. There are no exceptions given the concept "parent" which in our language means more than the mere biological ancestor. So there really is no gap between, "giving special consideration to one's parent" and "doing what is morally required," that needs to be bridged by another premise. So parents do have a special right to special consideration, and offspring correlatively have a special obligation to parents. Melden does not wish to call this a rule, or principle, or command, or regulation. It is a maxim. "To act on a rational maxim is to act on a relevant consideration, to be guided in one's conduct in a rational manner." Thus between the two locutions there is no unbridgeable gap because there is no gap at all. The first expression, that is, "giving one's parents special consideration," is already invested with moral import simply because of the use which it has in a moral context. In this case the context is the institution of the family and all that implies in the way of responsibilities and privileges.

We thus arrive at an answer to our original question: How does the right derive from the parental status? It isn't derived at all. The parental status is the moral role or status of the parent, and the special right is the moral status of the parent *vis à vis* his offspring. "Granted that friendship is desirable, the friendly action of A with respect to his friend B is right *because it is a friendly action—the action of one friend to another*—and as such maintains the friendly relations between the two persons. Similarly, given the moral status of a parent with respect to his

son (and surely it is analytic that it is right that this moral relation be preserved) the considerate action of the latter with respect to the former, which is not a case of a failure to meet any other obligation the latter may have, is in the same way the right action—not because of any consequences it may have, but because it is the action it is, namely, the action of a son towards his father . . . The action is understood to be right because it is understood to be the characteristic action of one whose status with respect to that of another is that of son to father. In this given case this is all that is involved in the understanding of the action as right."

There are other interesting and important aspects which Melden develops in the course of the argument, but this has already become too long. However, I wish to make some brief comments. The author's purpose is to illuminate at least part of the subject of rights. Thus the argument presumably holds for any kind of status where rights are present, such as, teacher-pupil, sovereign-subject, priest-parishioner, lawyer-client, physician-patient, etc. But to take just one instance, does the argument mean that the King or Ruler has a special right because he is King, and are we morally required to recognize that right. If so, when can we protest? Or when are protests by children against parents justified? In short, I think further analysis is needed on the problem of the relation between "having a right" and "having that right acknowledged." Does one really have a right to anything unless that right is admitted by those concerned? Moreover, in legal and political matters rights depend upon certain permissions or laws, for example, the right to vote, etc. This aspect of rights I think needs to be investigated too. I have the feeling that even in asking such questions I have missed or misread Melden's argument and that he would have a proper answer.

Another point, slightly disturbing, is that with all the talk against conceptual confusion and the "older ways" of speaking in philosophy, and the need for clarity, the author uses frequently such terms as moral wisdom, moral agent, moral life, moral community, common and healthy moral understanding as if these were free from obscurities. Related to this is the question of a possible ambiguity in the phrase "giving special consideration to

one's parents." Does one have to *do* something in order to give this special consideration? Can't one be thinking about them, or be concerned over them, and this also be a mark of special consideration? I am sure Melden could reply pertinently to these remarks and probably point to places in the book which would dissolve them. At any rate I know they will not restrain other philosophers from working through this admirable analysis which illustrates, I think, that piece-meal philosophy can be as exciting and stimulating as speculation in the grand manner.

Professor Melden's work, as we have seen, concerns itself with the difficulties in the substantival use of "right." Professor Oliver A. Johnson, in *Rightness and Goodness*, has written one of the most lucid, and competently argued analyses of the adjectival use of "right" that I have read. Anyone unfamiliar with certain trends in contemporary ethical philosophy will learn very much from this volume, and those who think they know all the twists and turns of recent moral argument will still find Johnson's extremely competent critique of great value. The book is a detailed exposition and criticism of deontological ethics with utilitarianism coming in for its share of the assault. In the final chapter Johnson offers us his own view, although there are hints of it throughout the book.

The deontologists, or Oxford intuitionists, or neo-intuitionists revived intuitionism as an interpretation of the moral life, and also raised objections to utilitarianism. Intuitionism is the theory that rightness and wrongness are fundamental, irreducible, and immediately apprehended. It is opposed to all axiological theories which take goodness and badness as the fundamental ethical concepts and derive rightness from goodness. Between the two traditions, (i) those who stress right and wrong, duty, shalt, shalt-not, and (ii) those who stress goodness, goals, ends, there is tension; ". . . for once one has accepted either rightness or goodness as the fundamental concept in terms of which to explain the moral data it becomes a difficult task either to fit the other concept into one's interpretation or to do full justice to its importance in the moral life". The deontologists reject the second tradition as an inadequate expression of our moral convictions and practices. I should like to stop here

for just a moment and ask what the force of the "our" is? Does it mean very generally "man," or "civilized man" or "man in western culture"? Questions of a like kind troubled me occasionally throughout this essay. In fact, wherever attention is given so patiently to argument there seems to be an ignoring or a dismissing of the sort of data presented by the Edels.

Johnson's summary, criticism and exposition of the deontological movement, its main figures, the major writings, and its critique of axiological theories are excellent. Generally, the deontologists hold that to say an action is right, or is my duty, is equivalent to saying that I ought, or am morally obliged to do that action. The deontologists differ explicitly from the axiologists, says Johnson, because the latter affirm and the former deny "that an act, to be right, must be *optimizing*, i.e., must be the act whose performance in the situation in question will make the greatest *total* contribution of goodness to the world." Thus the deontologists argue that one cannot provide satisfactory ground for the rightness of an action on either (i) consequences or (ii) motives.

Johnson's aim is to examine the deontologist's criticism of axiological theories. He admits he will reach conclusions on normative questions and states candidly that "all my normative conclusions will rest on an appeal to intuition or moral insight" (16). So far there is agreement with the deontologists. Here, again, one sees the difference between his method and the Edels. In all honesty he does not appeal to the intuition of the "plain man" or the "educated man," but to his *own* moral insight. "In doing so I assume full responsibility for all intuitive normative judgments I make. I hope that most of my insights will prove sound. . . ." One is tempted to ask here how one can tell whether they are sound except by appealing to something other than intuition.

Now the deontologists, says Johnson, assume that there are only two sources of goodness which can serve as a basis for the rightness of actions, (i) utilitarianism, the theory that grounds rightness of actions on the goodness of their consequences, and (ii) the theory that grounds rightness of actions on the goodness of the motives. The deontologists are critical of both. Johnson

thinks there is another possibility, his own theory, which will avoid the difficulties mentioned by the deontologists. But first he examines their criticisms and finds disagreement with some of their arguments. For example, he agrees with Prichard's notion that "ought" cannot apply to consequences, but rejects his notion that it applies to actions. Johnson says it applies properly to persons, for they alone can have duties. Rightness, then, is the proper predicate to apply to actions. We ought to do an act because it is right. Moreover, he says Prichard's fundamental assumption, namely, that an ought can only be derived from another ought, is an error. Johnson thinks an ought can be derived from rightness and goodness. "In so far as an action is right any moral being has a duty to perform it. And insofar as its performance will create something good the same holds true." So we come to Johnson's description of the moral situation. "We do have obligations or duties. That a given action is our duty in a certain situation is derived from the fact that it is the right act in that situation. Its rightness in the situation, in turn, is derived at least in *some* instances, from the fact that it is the act whose performance in that situation will produce the best possible consequences. When we have duties sometimes we apprehend that fact, sometimes we do not. When we do apprehend our duty, we have a feeling of obligation. This feeling psychologically is immediate but is derivative in that it is the apprehension of something—our duty."

I do not find the term "derived" very clear. Does Johnson mean "logically derived" as a conclusion from premises? If so does he really escape Prichard's assumption? Or is "derived" used loosely to refer to "source"? In which case the "ought" would seem to possess very little strictness. In the whole of Johnson's work much attention is paid to argument and the analysis of argument. Often examples of perplexing ethical dilemmas are given to illustrate the point of the argument. For example, a soldier *x* under suspicion is discovered to be innocent. But he has been punished in various unofficial ways. Now a sought-after promotion in rank is open. Soldier *x* and *y* apply. *Y* has never been under suspicion. Both men are equally competent. Who should be picked? The utilitarians have no advice to give, says Johnson.

The deontologists can say x should be picked because a wrong has been done him which should be corrected and the obligation can in part be fulfilled by advancing him. But here, it seems to me, Johnson is not aware of the distinction made by Melden between an obligation-meeting action and an obligatory action. Moreover I am not convinced that the utilitarians are as helpless in the situation as Johnson supposes. With a little ingenuity I think they could drum up some answers consistent with their theories. In many of the examples Johnson talks about men of "moral sensitivity," or those who are "morally acute"; and conclusions are said to be "morally sound"; or something does "violence to our deepest moral convictions." These locutions are offered without clarification, and surely there is some ambiguity in their meaning. Do they mean that men wish and try to do the right thing? Or that they know what is right? Or that they are able to tell when there is a moral problem? Somehow these expressions seem question-begging.

Johnson goes even farther in disavowing utilitarianism than the deontologists for he asserts that an action may be right and thus a duty even if it produces no good results at all. He agrees with the deontologists that the rightness of actions cannot be based on the moral goodness of the motive because this involves arguing in a circle. Now in examining the deontologists theory of rightness he considers Ross's example of the promised return of a borrowed book. The obligation is fulfilled, says Ross, only if I actually get the book back to its owner. Johnson contrives a number of test cases, e.g., (i) through an accident the book is damaged and I must return a different copy. Does this fulfill the obligation? Not strictly. But Johnson admits this isn't a serious criticism for "the book borrowed" does not necessarily mean "that book" but any copy of the same book. (ii) But suppose it is a rare book which I have been looking for and my friend has found. Then on taking it home I become so upset that he owns it and I do not that I throw it into the fire. Here, of course, the obligation is not fulfilled. Moreover, my own churlishness has complicated the moral situation. (iii) The book has sentimental value to the friend but I am robbed of it on the way home. In this case I have failed to fulfill my duty. (Johnson does not consider

another possibility. Suppose the friend had died, or that I die, then the book would not be returned either. Would I have failed to do my whole duty? Strictly on deontological grounds it would seem to be the case. But isn't this nonsense? In short, whenever we promise to do something, isn't there always an unexpressed but implicit premise, namely, that the promise will be fulfilled if I have control over all the relevant circumstances.) In some of these cases, "what the man is, what he tries to do, and the reasons why he does so all seem fairly clearly to be connected in a necessary way with the rightness or wrongness of his act. Ross, though, explicitly denies this to be true." Thus Johnson finds a weakness in Ross's position, and rejects the deontological theory of rightness. "And the basic reason for its failure is that the criterion of right action which it sets up takes no account of the *person* acting. Thus it is an ethical theory without an agent." Rightness and goodness cannot be separated without falsifying the moral situation.

There does seem to me to be something disturbing about the use of examples and twisting and modifying them to fit one theory or another. It comes close to making moral philosophy a matter of ingenuity and gamesmanship. But if morality is a matter of reasonable men behaving in reasonable ways what do we really learn from the examples? Only that one simple rule, maxim, or principle, is never sufficient to deal with the complexities of human behavior. This, undoubtedly, is an important lesson to learn. But Johnson could reply with some force that the examples bring out the various possibilities and complexities which must be considered in any reflective morality.

Now Johnson also rejects the deontological theory of putative rightness, i.e., the theory that a person cannot fulfill his duty completely unless he believes that the act is one which he ought to perform. He does so because it too, in the last resort, assumes that our motives can never form part of the content of morality. Johnson does favor the view of Ross and Broad that rightness may be interpreted as fittingness or suitability. However, he finds Ross's views contradictory regarding the relation between rightness and moral obligation. The source of the difficulty is the fact that Ross has two theories, the putative theory of rightness, and

that of moral rightness, the first of which maintains that motives can never affect the rightness of acts, while the second holds the contrary. With a thorough criticism of Ross's "ought-can" and "infinite regress" argument against the role of motive in the performance of duty, Johnson also rejects these deontological views. But this is already too long and we must invite the reader to work through his critique.

The final chapter contains Johnson's position. It is designed to answer the question, "Can we, or can we not, discover an element of value involved in the performance of right actions, other than either the moral goodness of the person's motives in acting or the goodness of the consequences to which his actions lead, capable of providing additional grounds for the rightness of such actions?" In this section he defends the necessary connection between rightness and goodness and comes to one single, all-embracing duty, namely, "*maximize goodness*" (or minimize evil.) His defense of this thesis rests on an appeal to moral insight. There is, he claims, a way of life which is intrinsically good. It can be known to be superior or "better than" other ways by moral insight. Thus men have an obligation or a duty to follow it. This is called "organic goodness," which exhibits the following attributes: "(1) It characterizes an entire situation rather than a single element of that situation; (2) it is a result of the relationship in which the elements of the situation, stand to each other; and (3) it gives the situation, as a whole, a value greater than the total of the separate values characterizing the elements of which the situation is composed." There is not room to examine this theory but I should like to comment briefly. What is "the entire situation?" Where are the moral boundaries of a moral situation? And how are they to be known? It seems to me only God could know the "entire situation," and we are morally perplexed because we are not God.

There is a common gambit in moral philosophy that is not absent from some of these books. I mean the tendency to pounce upon certain terms because they are "unclear," "ambiguous," "ill-defined" and so on. But often the critic is guilty of the same practice. Moreover, there is also the temptation to generalize from a single example. For instance, Johnson quotes a statement

from Ross which illustrates both these points (although he does not make this criticism). Ross writes: "But if we contemplate a right act alone, it is seen to have no intrinsic *value*. Suppose for instance that it is right for a man to pay a certain debt, and he pays it. This is in itself no addition to the sum of values in the universe." Now it seems to me there are other instances of "right" which do not fit Ross's contention, e.g., let us suppose it is right for a father to sacrifice so his son can graduate from college, or a man to give a blood transfusion to a sick neighbor. Are not these "adding to values?" But is the phrase "addition to the sum of values in the universe" clear and intelligible in itself?

There is first-rate argument, insight and wisdom to be found in these recent contributions to moral philosophy but still they have only "as much clearness as the subject matter admits."

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HEAD, HEART, AND GOD *

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PEOPLE have been trying for a long time to reconcile their heads and their hearts, their thoughts and their feelings; and for almost as long a time philosophers have been trying to do it for them. A crucial problem in all ages and places, this problem of the integration of intellect and emotion—or the similar social problem of what C. P. Snow calls “the two cultures”—is especially critical in today’s mechanized and depersonalized western world where intellect is so often divorced from feeling and where feeling is so often irrational. While this problem is seen and felt in all aspects of human life, nowhere is it as pure and extreme, perhaps, as in our attitudes toward and our talk about God. “The God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob, not the God of the philosophers and scholars,” cried the outraged heart of Pascal; and this cry is echoed in the more circumspect and sophisticated contemporary “God beyond God” of Tillich. The God of the head cannot be worshipped, the heart cries out; and the God of the heart is intellectually disreputable, rejoins the head.

Of the philosophers in recent times who have striven to heal this rupture between head and heart perhaps none has caught the fancy or stirred the hopes of the American philosophical community as Alfred North Whitehead has. But since the master started this task too late in life, it was left to his disciples to complete his work. And of those disciples who have continued the master’s healing in theology, perhaps none has been so energetic or resourceful as Professor Charles Hartshorne. While Professor Hartshorne has usually practised this therapy alone and unaided, he has on one notable occasion enlisted the aid both of another contemporary theological therapist, Professor William L. Reese, and also of most of the great philosophers in history. The fruit of this collaboration, *Philosophers Speak of God*,¹ while

¹ Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953, pp. xiv, 535. (I owe Professors Hartshorne and Reese, and the readers of this *Review* an apology for the extreme and inexcusable lateness of this study.)

not adding anything essentially novel to Professor Hartshorne's earlier work, presents the physician not only as an isolated laboratory researcher (in the "Introduction" and "Epilogue") but also, with Professor Reese's help, in the process of actually confronting and healing his patients (in the selections and "Comments"). Hence this book is an especially interesting and valuable case study of one type of contemporary attempt to cure theological schizophrenia. Theological therapists are to be found among scientists as well as among philosophers, moreover, for even in science the intellect does not succeed in quieting the restless heart until it finds the God for which that restless heart seeks. Going "through the world with a reverent attitude yet an almost total absence of doctrine or belief—with a religious heart and a skeptical head . . . is," as we are told in a recent book representing this theological therapy from the point of view of a scientist—a biologist and natural historian—Alexander F. Skutch's *The Quest of the Divine*,² "a most unsatisfactory way to live."

The cure presented in these two books is, in most general terms, the Whiteheadian³ one that God includes oneself and the whole world, with all its temporality and plurality, in his very own being; its name, according to Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese, is "panentheism," "surrelativism," or "dipolar theism." It would be unfair, and even impossible, to compare these two books, for while *The Quest of the Divine* is a distillation of personal wisdom intended for the lay reader, *Philosophers Speak of God* is, although it is also designed for text-book use, a sophisticated and important work by one of America's more dis-

² Boston: Meador Publishing Company, 1956, 440 pp., p. 13.

³ Mr. Hartshorne's debt to Whitehead is well known, and he and Mr. Reese confirm it in no uncertain terms in their comment on Whitehead (282b): "It is impossible to avoid a feeling of impertinence in attempting to comment on thinking so great as this. Not in many centuries, perhaps, has such a contribution been made to philosophical theism." I can find in Mr. Skutch's book no admission that he is indebted to Whitehead; but he quotes Whitehead, refers to him several times, his theological views are Whiteheadian (note especially immortality, pp. 366 and 375—though Whitehead would not like this becoming the "immortality" it twice becomes on p. 384), and he repeatedly uses such Whiteheadian terms as "process," "novelty," "harmony," "concrescence," "ingression," and "society."

tinguished philosophers in collaboration with a very learned and astute colleague. While this reader is not yet converted to panentheism by the *Philosophers Who Speak of God*, he has learned much from them and their position and their arguments are very strong indeed. While he cannot pretend to do justice to their work—or even to that of Mr. Skutch, for that matter—an outsider's view of some of the more striking characteristics of the attempts made in these two books to unite head and heart in relation to God may be useful at least as a symptom of their still unhealed fracture.

(I)

The heart must of course get its due in any adequate synthesis of head and heart; and this it does, and more, in these two books. "Reason is as little the primary source of our religious insights as it is of the other beliefs we hold as true" (428), Mr. Skutch tells us. Even more, "spiritual truths . . . are not so much demonstrated as felt; and their acceptance depends upon their appeal to something deep within us. With respect to them, the task of reason is not to prove their validity so much as to show that at least they are not incongruous with the accepted facts of experience or science" (17). Mr. Skutch's book is "an attempt to reach . . . a concept of deity which satisfies the spirit's demand for something ampler and more powerful than itself to which it can give its unrestricted allegiance, yet which is wholly consistent with our current scientific construction of the world" (47). Accordingly, "the ethical aspect of the Divine is paramount" (76), and so "the final decision as to the reality of a deity must always be a judgment of value rather than an affirmation of existence" (136-137). Ethics and value are thought of primarily in terms of feeling, so Mr. Skutch's arguments often take the form of "we find it difficult to accept this gloomy conclusion" (423-424): personal immortality, for example, is accepted because it "alone imparts any high and lasting significance to the world process and man's attempt to perfect his character" (405), and those "who disclaim the desire for immortality" are saying "sour grapes" and are also "irreligious" (407). There is, throughout

this book, a remarkable lack of concern for whether or not something is objectively true, a noticeable failure to see logical and ontological requirements—thus on p. 78 he seems to say that there might be a time when there is nothing at all.

The same "pathological" theology, in Kant's sense of the word, is to be found in Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese, though with much greater sophistication, in what strikes this reader as a pervasive disdain for ontological and causal arguments. Their rejection of "the superstition of etiolatry or ontolatry" (164a) because it ignores "the other pole" of effect and becoming tends often to be a rejection of *aitios* and *logos*, for Messrs. Hartshorne's and Reese's reasons are often ones of the heart rather than of the head, emotional rather than logical reasons. The inclusion of the selection from Alan Watts, a very interesting account of the role of feeling in religion which otherwise has little connection with the main theme of the book, is a good indication of this pathological approach. It must be noted, however, that the authors justify this pathological approach as logical: "If love is the central reality of human experience, as science itself now testifies, then the idea that love, rather than stuff or bare spatio-temporal process, is the key to the universe is simply good epistemology. Also biology is finding that the social principle pervades all life, and this means that there is no anthropomorphism in taking love to be central, to life at least" (301b). And we should further be reminded that Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese also insist that reason must be used as well as feeling—thus they criticize James, for example (though not Watts), for sacrificing intellect.

Aside from the relevance of feeling to theology, these two books do show a keen sense of the importance of feeling in religion and in life in general. Mr. Skutch has an extraordinarily fine feeling for the holy in nature; he is almost a nature-mystic. Though he fails to dissect finely, he certainly does not "murder to dissect." The value of Mr. Skutch's book is, in general, not theological but ethico-religious; Chapter IX, for example, amounts to a primer of mysticism and salvation. His ethic is essentially a biologically oriented natural law, perfectionist ethic—the book is reminiscent of Ashley Montagu's *On Being Human*—and as a popular lay ethic, anthropology, and cosmology, it

seems to me to be basically sound. There is much wisdom in this work, no less true because it is old; and it receives here a new form which sharpens one's understanding of the old. Messrs. Hartshorne's and Reese's appreciation of the affective element in religion and life I find academic rather than experiential; while there is in their book little actual feeling for the holy in life and nature, the place of such feeling is emphasized.

The effect of this affectivism upon the content, and especially on the form, of these two books is to this reader quite striking. The most general character of this effect is a lack of concern for the *-ology* in theology and ontology, a lack of concern for evidence and argument. The books are not, in general, logically oriented; they are examples of "philosophico-religious speculation," in Messrs. Hartshorne's and Reese's terms, rather than of theology in a logical sense. Evaluation tends to be in terms of good and bad, superior and inferior, likes and dislikes, etc., rather than in terms of true and false. Thus, for example, Mr. Reese; "The brutal truth seems to be that certain types of minds like the abstract as such . . . The contrast, good and not-good, cannot on objective grounds be identified with that between abstract and concrete. Some abstractions are superior to others if they both compete for the same function . . . But abstract and concrete cannot compete with each other . . ." (220a-b). And Mr. Skutch argues for religion on the ground that "the prospect of ample time, like the survey of vast spaces in open or mountainous country, elevates the spirit, excites the fancy, may even bring us feelings of exhilaration and enhanced energy, and stimulates our best effort. Our hopes, when rosy, stretch before us in endless perspective. A blind wall anywhere ahead of us, no matter how great its distance, chills and depresses us. In order to preserve our spiritual tension unimpaired, each occurrence and stage in our lives must lead on to another, there must be no final term of our inner discourse" (415).

One particularly important manifestation of this lack of concern for truth and fact is the slighting of arguments concerning the existence of God. Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese do include in their selections some arguments concerning the existence of God, but they omit what are probably the most famous

ones: Aquinas' "five ways" and Kant's "slavishly accepted" (97a) criticisms of the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments. They sketch what they take to be the general character and the main forms of argumentation for the existence of God, and they maintain that "every one of these arguments for theism can . . . be given a more exact and perspicuous form than has hitherto been given them;" but they add that "this is a subject for another occasion" (25b)—which to me seems odd indeed. Mr. Skutch rejects as invalid his distorted forms of the traditional arguments for the existence of God—"the First Cause argument for the existence of God" he understands as only one argument and for a first cause in time, and the "Argument from Design" he understands only in the version which Hume gave it, not in the sense of Aquinas' fifth way (28-30). Yet he accepts the main conclusions of these arguments, that God exists as the "cause of all things" (346) and "the source of harmonization" (102). A more logically minded thinker might more likely accept the traditional arguments as valid while rejecting their conclusions, in the sense of holding their premises to be false or arbitrary.

Messrs. Hartshorne's and Reese's book is pervaded by an evangelizing enthusiasm, and everything in the book tends to contribute to their message. The selections are primarily occasions for the authors to develop their own point of view, and most everything is seen as anticipating Hartshorne and Reese in a more or less bumbling and confused way. As the authors put it, "the book is designed partly as a historico-systematic argument pointing to a definite conclusion" (viiib). "Some will say we have imposed this pattern upon the material; but we rather think we have found it there—or, at least, that we have found something like it" (1a). I myself cannot help but feel that for the most part the "Philosophers" who "Speak of God" in this book are Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese. This is strikingly evident in the allotment of space to the various points of view. 327 pages are devoted to the authors' point of view, 211 of these being the authors' own words and the other 161 being selections labeled "panentheism" with 21 representatives (including "quasi-" and "limited" panentheism but excluding "temporalistic theism"). All other included points of view receive a total of 223 pages, and

of these only the 89 pages of selections from "classical theism," with 11 representatives, are ultimately opposed to the authors' view, because the "skeptical or atheistic view" (8 representatives) are more or less forgiven—the authors often answer critics of religion by saying that they were not aware of panentheism (v. 478h)—and each of the 6 represented pantheists (46 pp.) is "merely a half-hearted panentheist" (197b). Furthermore, the 89 pages granted to the real culprit, "classical theism" (i.e., Aquinas *et al.*), present those passages which tend to give aid and comfort to panentheists; many of the best known and most influential parts of classical theism are omitted, and the authors tend in each case to select what is, from their own point of view, "the key problem of classical theism" (132a). All this hardly tends to encourage the use of the book as a teaching text, as the authors intend it to be used, save by convinced panentheists, or by masochists, or else by those who believe their own non-panentheist positions to be strengthened by the character of the book.⁴

Looked at in another way, the book is very like a trial with Mr. Hartshorne as the D.A. and Mr. Reese as his assistant questioning a parade of carefully chosen witnesses. Adverse testimony is carefully prevented from reaching the witness stand, each witness is measured by how far "panentheism is carried . . . toward its complete expression" (307a) in Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese, there is no cross-examination by a defense attorney, and the D. A. Opens the case for the prosecution in the Introduction and Concludes for the jury in the Epilogue. The Accused is,

⁴ For text-book purposes it is also unfortunate that the authors often refer to ideas and people not presented in the book and with which the beginning student would probably not be familiar—for example, Kant's distinction between humans as ends and as means (149b) and the fairly frequent references to DeWitt Parker. Also the commentaries are often too abbreviated to understand, at least for me—for example the one on Aquinas—though some of them are very valuable: the comment on Leibniz, for example, strikes me as very good, and there is an interesting discussion of Kant's epistemology. One good feature of the book for text purposes is the location of the selections in the original texts. But the use of the same letter symbols in the Epilogue and Introduction would avoid some confusion, and beginning students would be helped by a brief biographical statement included in the introduction to each author.

of course, that Arch-enemy of divine relativity, contingency, and temporality, the intransigent monopolist, Classical Theism.

The tactics employed by the prosecution include not only all the old tricks of the law court and the debating hall but also the new ones of the Madison Avenue human engineers. In the first place, the witnesses are carefully selected and questioned to bring out the whole "truth" and nothing but the "truth." Naturally most of the evidence favors the plaintiff, and witnesses are not permitted to air contrary evidence. Thus, for example, is Royce's powerful argument against realism ignored: "Royce defined realism as the doctrine that being is independent of our ideas; but from this he inferred that our ideas must be wholly independent of being, from which, again, it would follow that they had no tendency to be true. This of course is fallacious; independence need not be a symmetrical relation" (197a). It is all very well to say that the relation need not be symmetrical and that ideas are dependent on things while things are independent of ideas (and I personally agree with this); but this ignores Royce's argument that if this were true one would be able to infer the existence of the relevant thing from the idea dependent on it, and this would make all ideas true. More interesting than the exclusion of contrary evidence, however, is the fact that the prosecutors occasionally slip by omitting favorable evidence and permitting unfavorable evidence. Thus, for example, in the selection on Aristotle they fail to adduce the standard (but debatable) contention that the active reason in man is identical with God, and they fail to exploit the quoted (66b) passage that "life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God." And the attorneys miss the damning slip of the "panentheist" witness Iqbal that "the ultimate Self . . . 'can afford to dispense with all the worlds'" (294b).

In the second place, the classification of the witnesses manifests at least as much engineering as their selection does. The major ostensible classification is into the two extremes of classical theism and pantheism with panentheism the golden mean represented both from the witness stand and the prosecuting attorneys. "Could anything be more hopeless than the attempts to adjudicate this issue [between classical theism and

pantheism] without attaining a higher standpoint than either party has to offer?" (177b). " 'You are all of you right and all of you in error, right in refusing to accept your opponent's position, wrong in supposing the choice lies between you' " (512b). Damning all these parties from the outside are the skeptics and atheists, but they sin by reason of ignorance of panentheism.

Some of the classifications seem more amusing than irritating. Plotinus' "Emanationism" is classified separately, for instance, in spite of the assertion that "emanationism, in its treatment with respect to contingency and necessity, is not a distinctive position with respect to Spinozistic pantheism, classical theism, or panentheism" and "can only coincide with one of these or else dissolve into mere ambiguity" (221b). Again, if "Ramanuja is perhaps closer to classical theism than to genuine pantheism" (186b), why not so classify him and thus add seven and a half pages of weight of apparent evidence for the prisoner in the dock, classical theism? If Feuerbach is a "skeptic or atheist," why isn't Wieman? And why is Royce "classical," especially if Schelling and Peirce are "modern"? Is it because Royce is a "pantheist" and Schelling and Peirce are "panentheists"? Why, in general, are only panentheism and "extreme temporalistic theism" 'modern'? Why is there no modern "classical theism" or "pantheism"? Is it because, while "we should be grateful to our theological . . . ancestors who sought simplicity in their notions about God and thus took a necessary first step in our behalf . . . It is harder to feel gratitude toward their contemporary disciples . . . who employ the 'method of tenacity' in defense of ancient ideas" (1a)? Or is it because everyone wants his theology, like his cigarette and his car, to be modern and for the young in heart?

Some of the classifications, however, seem to me irritatingly inaccurate. The outstanding example of this is the classification of Plato as a panentheist, albeit an "ancient or quasi-" one. The authors constantly identify "soul" with "God"—e.g., "the self-moving deity of the *Phaedrus*" (54b)—even though there is no evidence for this in their selections, nor even in other Platonic texts, so far as I know. The sole basis for the classification of Plato as a panentheist, so far as I can see, is Plato's reference in

the *Timaeus* to the "creature," the "child," as a "god"; and the authors do not discuss the relation of this occurrence of the word to the Demiurge-God. Mobility is not connected with the word "god" in any of the other selected passages, and there is no mention at all of the Receptacle, the principle of becoming, which is quite distinct from the Demiurge-God. To sustain the classification of Plato as a panentheist the Receptacle would have to be said to be an aspect of God. Finally, the notion of the Demiurge-God, which would seem to count against their classification of Plato as a panentheist, is first ruled out as "mythical" and then, after the classification has been made, apparently readmitted as genuine: "Certain conceptions of deity contrary to those we have considered, such as the conception of a demiurge . . . are mythical" (56a). Yet, in apparent contradiction, they allege that "Plotinus . . . really does substantially reaffirm the Platonic view. The three aspects of the ultimate in the *Timaeus*—the form of the Good . . . , the eternal demiurge, and the created divinity or world soul—reappear as the One, the . . . *Nous*, and the World Soul of Plotinus" (211a); and "for Whitehead . . . the primordial nature of God . . . is . . . Plato's demiurge . . ." (276a). The interpretation of Plato is, it seems to me, rather far-fetched.

The affectivism of these two books results in their use of quite a number of other non-logical techniques. Another Madison Avenue technique, institutionalized, I believe, by George Washington Hill and noticeably utilized by Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese, is constant repetition. The weary reader tends to be beaten into an exasperated acceptance of panentheism through sheer repetition of its sales-pitch and slogans in the Introduction to the book, the introductions to all of the selections, the comments on the selections, and, finally, in the Epilogue which, so far as I can tell, adds nothing essential to the Introduction. The hidden persuader is also effectively employed; who would expect, for instance, that the book's best summary criticism of "classical theism" would be hidden away in the Comment on Sankara (though the pages are thus referred to in the index), especially when Sankara is classified as a pantheist? Still another persuasive technique is the argument *via* pejoratives, which takes a number of forms. There is Messrs. Hartshorne's

and Reese's frequent use—in common, it must be said, with many philosophers—of the disparaging "mere": "the distinction between panentheism and mere theism, on the one hand, and mere pantheism, on the other" (302a); "the merely abstract absolute essence" (301b); "'being' connotes a mere abstraction" (242b). There is Mr. Skutch's unexplained and disparaging use, characteristic of the scientifically minded, of the word "improbable": "Russell's assertion that the Universe contains nothing non-human worthy of our worship is an inherently improbable statement" (47), for example; or again, "the highly improbable assumption that [the mind] will eventually be equipped with a resurrected body," it being "more probable that spiritual survival depends upon the cultivation in this present life of interests which lead the mind forth from its fleshly habitation" (418). It is strange that a scientist should not be aware, as Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese apparently are (in their Comment on Dennes, 492-495), of the fact that probability and hypothesis can have no meaning with respect to propositions against which nothing could count as evidence. "... *the wise and prudent man* ... will accept immortality as a working hypothesis, whose truth is to be tested by the outcome of the great experiment of living" (417), even though if that "hypothesis" is false it cannot be so proven. Again, there is Messrs. Hartshorne's and Reeses's use of the expression "not real" to damn a position which Falls Short of "real" panentheism. Among Messrs. Hartshorne's and Reeses' "panentheists," some—Schweitzer, for instance—seem not to be *real* ones, so that the authors' own panentheism seems to be the only *real* one, just as Camels is the only *real* cigarette. Yet Radhakrishnan, according to our authors' presentation of his view, might well seem to be just as real a panentheist as the authors, if not a realer one. And then there is the argument-by-hyphenation:⁵ "To describe the knowing-of-all-things is to describe all things known" (21b); "if the having-been-of-the-half-line is fact, then the half-line . . . is fact" (96a); "if the awareness-of-X is an immutable whole, then X is immutable too" (93a); if "There is God, the cause, and there is the world,

⁵ Discussed on pp. 344-45 below in a different context.

the effect," then "there is God-and-World, Cause-and-Effect" (190b). The circular argument is also used, at least in one important place: "All views other than ETCKW [i.e., panentheism] sacrifice categoriality." To omit the T, for instance, is to "make the category of temporality (and with it contingency, relativity, diversity, complexity) extrinsic to God . . . Thus ETCKW is the truly categorial conception of the supreme, the conception that reduces the categories to their proper status as essentially expressions of deity" (21a-b). But this begs the question, for a "category" is universal (15a) and for time to be universal it must also apply to God. Hence if time is a category, it applies to God. But time is a category only if it applies (also) to God. Then there is also, as one might expect from theological therapists, the psychoanalytic argument: ". . . consciously Descartes has the classical pseudo-idea of the divine nature but . . . unconsciously he has the genuine idea which all men . . . intuitively have, the dipolar conception . . ." (136b-137a). To this I hope that the only alternative is not Mr. Skutch's: "One's knowledge of himself as subject is complete; for obviously he can have no thought or feeling of which he is not aware, no shade of consciousness of which he is not conscious" (49).

Finally, in our random list of utilized techniques of persuasion, Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese demonstrate that they are true Americans in their use of "the bigger the better (and truer)." "More," "greater," "inclusive," "contains," etc., are constantly used as synonyms for "better" and "truer." The most basic instance of this logical Americanism is the argument that God must include the world since if God excluded the world then God plus the world would be greater than God who is by definition "the greatest": ". . . if this independent factor be all of God, [as classical theism maintains] then God-and-what-is-other-than-God must be a total reality greater (more inclusive) than God . . . nothing can be more than the totality of being and value" (505b).⁶ When I read this argument I thought of

⁶ Cf. Mr. Hartshorne in this *Review*, I, (September 1947), p. 26: "... the very notion that there is a better than the totality self-contradictorily posits a super-totality inclusive of the value of this 'better'."

William James' hunters arguing whether one goes round a treed squirrel; a thing may be quantitatively greater without being truer, more real, or qualitatively more perfect. Yet Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese apparently intend to identify these two meanings of "greater" in their doctrine, and their book is in general marked by quantitative thinking: "... to depend . . . upon all other things, is . . . a unique maximum, since ordinary things depend only upon some other things . . ." (505a). I should think that the maximum of dependency is rather dependency *in every respect* than dependency *on everything*—to be helpless, to have next to no being. Be that as it may, while Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese thus seem to argue that their doctrine is truest because it is biggest or most inclusive, their own selection from and comment on Professor Paul Weiss' seems to make his theory truer still, for his view seems to synthesize not only classical theism and pantheism but panentheism as well.

(II)

The head, as well as the heart, must get its due in any adequate synthesis of head and heart; and this it does, in these two books, in the rationalism that is heir to Descartes and his followers. In addition to rationalism in the sense of a methodology of logic and coherence, reason gets its due, or more than its due, in the form of an epistemological rationalism that thought or the rational is constitutive of or identical with the real.

In Mr. Skutch this epistemological rationalism is primarily Kantian (v. 56-57), though he goes further than Kant both in the direction of idealism and also, paradoxically, in the direction of realism. "Our effort to understand" is not "an attempt to seize or recover that which already exists," as the realist says it is; it is rather a "radically constructive endeavor" (308) in which "the universals or general ideas under which we try to subsume all our impressions . . . are never given to us by the external world,

⁷ Taken from "God and the World" in *Science, Philosophy and Religion: a Symposium*, New York: Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Inc., 1941.

which invariably shows us only particular men, trees, and violets, but are distilled by the mind from its own experience" (307). Not only universals, moreover, but "even our immediate sensuous impressions are the mind's own creations" (307). "Whenever we look at some external object, our mind produces something new, which did not previously exist. The image which springs up in consciousness . . . is no mere copy of its original but a newborn child, of which the mind is the mother and the external object the father. We suppose that the child bears some similarity to its sire; but we can never know the degree of this resemblance; for the father reveals himself to the mother only in their child . . . The uncritical mind is apt naively to confuse the child with its father, failing to distinguish between them," but the "father" is "unknown" (306-307). Even though the external object is unknown, however, we know that there is an external thing which fathers our mental creation, according to Mr. Skutch. Even though our knowledge is confined to our own mental creations, we know that these mental creations are "based . . . upon the objective world" (307). "That they somehow correspond or run parallel to the hidden course of the objective world, follows from the fact that when our theories are of the sort that we call "true" we can draw from them deductions or predictions, which we can verify by their correspondence with observed events" (307-308). Mr. Skutch seems to have forgotten, however, that he has just said that these observed events are themselves mental creations, so of course their occurrence in no way indicates the existence or correspondence of an objective world. "As Berkeley insisted, only an idea can resemble an idea" (306); "how can we pluck an idea from the mind and place it beside the original . . . and see whether . . . the two correspond?" (58). The joint assertion of "the mind knows only its own creations" and "there is an independent world to which those mental creations correspond" seems to me to be clearly and inevitably a contradiction, and Mr. Skutch grants that his doctrine "must, of course, contain no logical inconsistencies" (431). This mentalistic epistemology must thus force Mr. Skutch to "start our inquiry with ourselves in the manner so congenial to philosophers" (50), even though

he claims to reject this mentalistic approach as well as "the scientific" approach from matter to mind (52) in favor of "a provisional dualism" which provides that mind and matter "possess one 'dimension' or attribute in common" (53) and have "a common origin" or "one single ground or substance" of which matter and mind are two "modes of appearance" (54). And it must also force Mr. Skutch to *end* his inquiry with mind in the manner so congenial to idealistic philosophers, and not even assert that there is matter or a single ground of which matter and mind are both appearances, for his mentalistic epistemology claims that our sensory and conceptual objects are all "the mind's own creations."

Some philosophers, perhaps even Kant, have seen this problem of the incompatibility of universal mental constructionism with realistic assertion of extra-mental things and have argued that there is no contradiction present here. But Mr. Skutch does not seem even to see that there is any problem here in his epistemology, nor that his idealistic, Kantian epistemology could never support his realistic, natural law, Aristotelean ethic of actualization and "harmonization." He rather merely asserts, ambiguously and paradoxically, that "we add to the totality of existence a new 'dimension' or realm, which rests upon and from one point of view duplicates the physical world of bodies and movements, but in another sense is a wholly new construction" (308), that "knowledge . . . rests upon the natural world and . . . is controlled by it, yet . . . is in the fullest sense a new creation" (310). This feature as well as others in the book⁸ indicate that philosophical sophistication is not Mr. Skutch's *forte*—though I assume that it should not be expected to be since he is not a professional philosopher. Of his philosophical naivety he seems, moreover, honestly aware: "I am acutely conscious of the perils I incur in offering . . . this first fruit of my meditations"; and "there will be those who point out that the mind that conceived this work was not adequately critical, but rushed to premature conclusions on some of the most

⁸ For instance, on p. 113 his argument that "there can be only one primary beneficent principle" or God on the ground that God is the maker of unity and order seems oblivious of the criticism, famous in Hume, that a unified product may be authored by several agents.

difficult and controversial questions of philosophy" (14). Mr. Skutch is clearly widely read in philosophy and also in literature, however; and he assures us that he has "in fact pondered these problems far more carefully than might appear from the book," that he has condensed his "more important conclusions into a smaller volume," and that if his book "proves attractive to enough readers," he "can promise them a more adequate discussion of some of the more difficult points in the near future" (14-15). I myself am a reader who is enough attracted to want more from Mr. Skutch, not for his technical philosophy but for his intuitive appreciation of nature and life.

This contradiction of knowing a trans-empirical, extra-mental unknowable is avoided by Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese, not so much by denying that the object of knowledge is mental as by denying that there is anything else but the mental. True, the object of knowledge is not dependent upon or related to the mind that knows it: "The cognitive reference is something real in and for mind, not in the things referred to" (148a). "Aquinas . . . makes a fine contribution to the theory of "external" and "internal" relations in his view that "knowledge or science has to conform, and thus incur genuine relations, to its objects, not *vice versa*. Only with fictions, which are not cognitions, is the object conformed, related, to thought about it. Knowing is relative to the known, . . . but what in particular is known in a given knowledge is not in its existence relative to this knowledge" (119b-120a). However, while "we can admit that man is directly aware of something other than just his own mental states . . . the point is, while this non-human reality is actually given as non-human, as something not ourselves which acts upon us, it is not for all that given as nonmental or merely material . . . In the case of an inanimate object (or of microscopic entities, such as single cells), any such psychic character is, if present, not obvious." But "the highly recondite natures of minerals or cells may be of a psychic nature. And, since no alternative nature attributable to them is clearly given directly, we have no positive alternative mode of conceiving the recondite natures of things" (436a). Not only is the object of knowledge psychical or mental in character, in spite of its claimed independence of the

knowing mind, but it seems for Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese to be, after all, contained in or identical with a part of that knowing mind. To know a thing is apparently to be that thing or to be characterizable by it, according to this homeocognitive epistemology; and this is not a far cry from the identity of mind and reality which starts with Descartes and culminates in Hegel. "To know something adequately is in the most absolute sense to possess it, and it is then meaningless to say that the known is outside the actual knowing" (177b). This is true, however, only "in the highest sense of knowledge" (19a). "Granted that we do not 'include' mountains when we 'know' them, unless in some very attenuated sense of include, equally we do not know mountains, except in a very attenuated sense of 'know'. . . . Wherever our knowledge achieves something like infallibility, it also becomes evident that it includes the known within itself" (19a); "knowledge is deficient unless it fully and literally contains its objects" (18b). But is not such mental containment of the object in violation of the independence of the object just proclaimed? One must here "distinguish the truism that the thing known is other than the knowing from the quite different stipulation that the known must be outside the knowing. A constituent of a whole is certainly other than the whole, yet obviously not outside it! But, we shall perhaps be told, the object must not only be other than—it must also be independent of—the knowledge. Suppose this too be granted, why may not parts be independent of the whole containing them?" (18b-19a).

This principle of the containment of the object in the knower and of identity with one of its mental states is illustrated time after time in inferences from the fact that a mental state of the knower possesses a certain characteristic to the conclusion that the object known also possesses that characteristic, and *vice versa*: "If the awareness-of-X is an immutable whole, then X is immutable too" (93a); "nonnecessary events cannot enter into a wholly necessary 'knowing' as its objects" (228a); "could the adequate, full, concrete knowledge of a particular state of suffering be anything else than a sympathetic participation in that suffering?" (104a); "the only way to intuit a feeling is to feel it" (196b). This proposition that objects of knowledge are parts

of the knower and thus have the characteristics of the knower explains, I think, the many arguments which seem to commit the fallacy of composition or division: "if the having-been-of-the-half-line^{*} is fact, then the half-line, which is constituent of this fact, is fact" (96a); if "the totality of happenings does not happen" but "just is," "then nothing happens" (92a); "a necessary whole cannot have contingent parts" (189b), etc. While arguing that parts and wholes must have the same characteristics is, as it stands, a case of the fallacy of composition-division, such argument is not fallacious but tautological if one assumes that it just is the case that parts and wholes have the same characteristics, even though we qualify that assumption by adding that "properties of parts are not necessarily in the same sense properties of their wholes" (161a). But what is the evidence for saying that the objects of knowledge are in fact parts of the knower, and that as parts they must share the characteristics of the knower? The only evidence I can find is that the thing known is an item in the knower's experience: "In the clearest case of direct and certain knowing—thus . . . when we know a color, a sensory quality—it is . . . clear that this quality becomes a determination of our own actuality, our own experience" (271a). But "experience" is here certainly ambiguous; from the fact that the experiencing is part of the knower it does not follow that the experienced is. Obviously and tautologically anything known is part of the knower's experience, but it certainly does not follow from this that the object known is part of the knower's "own actuality"; even one who sees red does not thereby become red. And this cannot be merely because no one experiences red "adequately" save God, for the authors grant that the independence of the experienced from the experiencing is universally true, and hence even of God. Thus Messrs. Hartshorne's and Reese's thesis of the cognitive independence of objects means that objects of knowledge *need* not be parts of the knower and *need* not possess the same characteristics as the knower. Hence I can find no other status than that of an "absolute presupposition" for the authors' doctrine that what is true of thought is true of its objects, is true of reality.

^{*} Also cited on pp. 338-39 above as an example of argument by hyphenation.

One particularly important and striking instance of this presupposition that what is true of thought is true of reality is the lack of any distinction in Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese between logical and real possibility¹⁰—a distinction which Mr. Skutch, in line with both his Kantian and his realistic epistemologies, seems to make (78). For example, Mr. Reese tells us that "since [Alexander's] deity is conceivable, it would seem to be possible," that "a luminous possibility [*sc.* conceivability] is advanced which, we are then told, is not really possible. But it may be that the 'impossible possibility' which Alexander poses is resolvable even within the context of his careful affirmations" (366a-b). Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese do make a distinction between what is logico-really possible for humans and what is logico-really possible for God (*e.g.*, 509b), but there is no distinction between what is possible in thought *per se* and what is possible in reality.

Another striking and important instance of the presupposition that what is true of thought is true of reality is "the Law of Polarity," according to which "ultimate contraries are correlatives, mutually interdependent, so that nothing real can be described [*sic*] by the wholly one-sided assertion of simplicity, being, actuality, and the like" (2b). Even if we suppose, which is doubtful, that "all thought is by contrast" (117b), it does not follow, without the assumption of "the Law of Polarity," that objective reality possesses these same contrasts. And yet Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese constantly argue as if it does, and their basic doctrine of God depends on this type of argument: since (*if*) the contrast between eternity (necessity, *etc.*) and temporality (contingency, *etc.*) is absolutely universal in human experience, it must be true of God (15). However, while "all contrasts, according to dipolarity, do fall within God, . . . only really ultimate or categorical contrasts can be used to describe the fixed character of God . . . Now evil, in the sense of wickedness, is not a universal category"¹¹ because, "for example, the animals are incapable of it . . . Thus wickedness is not in the divine

¹⁰ John Wild made this point in this journal, IV, (September, 1950), p. 63.

¹¹ Mr. Skutch, however, maintains that "good and evil are correlative terms, each inconceivable without the other . . ." (31).

'character' at all" (15a). The same is true of the contrast between creation and destruction: "Destruction is not coordinate with creation," although "for us men, who forget nearly everything, past values are, it is true, mostly lost" (509b). Here, it is again to be noted, there is a distinction between what is true of men and what is true of God; but there is still no distinction between what is true of thought and what is true of reality. Whatever is true of thought is true of reality and thus of some aspect of God, but only what is universally true of thought is true of the essence or "fixed character" of God. (One wonders whether Messrs. Hartshorne's and Reese's choices of the "categorical" or absolutely universal features are not sometimes arbitrary: are eternity, necessity, or creation, for instance, *ever* present in human thought at all, let alone being absolutely universal?)

This fundamental presupposition that what is true of thought is true of reality is also at work in Messrs. Hartshorne's and Reese's treatment of the ontological argument as presented by Anselm. The authors regard the argument as passing from the *possible* to the *actual* existence of a perfect being; the distinction, which philosophers as different as Aquinas and Kant thought to be the important one, between the *conceptual* and the extra-mentally *real* existence of a perfect being is not discussed. Granting that it is self-contradictory for a perfect being even possibly not to exist, is this fact true of objective reality or only of thought? Thus the philosophical function of the ontological argument as treated by these authors (and probably also by Descartes) is to reassure themselves that what is true of thought is true of reality. The authors have saved Anselm's argument by destroying it, by changing the conclusion. "What a triumph for Anselm—even though one which might have surprised and troubled him!" (105b). Anselm argued for an extra-mental, non-logical individual; Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese argue for a logical universal. Since all the criticisms of the argument were against concluding extra-mental individuality, of course the authors by-pass these criticisms. But what have they proved? That there must be, at any time, some state of affairs greater than any other. But this could be a different state of affairs from one

moment to the next, and it could be a mental idea of such a greatest state of affairs with no corresponding objective reality.

(III)

Thus the basic presupposition of the philosophico-religious speculation of panentheism, especially in Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese but also in Mr. Skutch, appears to be that whatever is true of thought is true of reality. But since they argue to God from heart as well as from head, from emotional as well as intellectual experience, this presupposition may now be seen to possess the more general form that whatever is true of human experience, both intellectual and emotional, is also true of objective reality and of God. And this presupposition seems to me to account for the basic difference between the God of panentheism and that of its main opponent, classical theism. The God of panentheism is relative to the world as well as absolute and independent of the world, and therefore also contingent, temporal, and complex as well as necessary, eternal, and simple. The God of classical theism, on the other hand, is purely actual, necessary, absolute, non-relative, and non-temporal.

One is tempted to conclude that this disagreement is entirely verbal. Both theories maintain that reality contains both an absolute, independent, eternal, and necessary factor and also a relative, dependent, temporal, and contingent factor. "Classical theism has the great merit that . . . There is . . . Something immutable with all mutable things really outside it," Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese admit; ". . . The classical deity does have a world to know and to act upon" (176b-177a). What panentheism calls the relative, *etc.*, pole of God, classical theism calls the world,¹² and what panentheism calls God, classical theism calls reality. Indeed, in many, many places in the book the word "reality" could be

¹² Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese do make a distinction between "world" and the relative pole of God, but I find this distinction very unclear. For example on p. 514b: ". . . the superrelative is the many as also one, or the one as also many. The world as not God is the many merely as many . . ." But the many *as many* cannot have a singular name, "world." Hence there seems to be no *world* distinct from God.

substituted for the word "God" with no change in meaning whatsoever. Here Mr. Skutch's terminology seems preferable to that of Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese, for the former refers to the relative, contingent factor as "the Divine" in contradistinction to "God," "deity," or "Primal Substance or Cosmic Ground" (208). Indeed, it strikes me that this issue between classical theism and panentheism is one to which the famous passage from the conclusion of Hume's *Dialogues* (quoted on 432b-433a) might apply, *mutatis mutandis*, as well as it does to the issue Hume was treating: "I ask the" panentheist "if he does not allow that there is" in reality an absoluteness, necessity, and independence radically distinct from everything relative, contingent, and dependent: "The more pious he is, the more readily will he assent . . . and the more will he be disposed to magnify the difference . . . I next turn to the" classical theist "and I ask him, whether" there is not also relativity, contingency, and temporality: "He will readily acknowledge it . . . Where then, cry I to both these antagonists, is the subject of your dispute?" And so far as the choice of words is concerned, granting that it is arbitrary, I must agree with Schopenhauer (quoted on 441b): "To call the world God is not to explain it, but only to enrich language with a superfluous synonym of the word 'world.' Whether . . . 'the world is God,' or 'the world is the world,' comes to the same thing."

Yet this conclusion that the issue is wholly verbal would not be entirely correct, I believe. Reflection upon the question of the order of *priority* of these two factors indicates that there is here a genuine and basic disagreement between panentheism and classical theism. While both theories recognize both factors, the necessary and the contingent, they disagree on the question which of these two factors is prior or more fundamental. The view of classical theism is that the absolute factor is prior ontologically and that the relative factor is prior epistemologically. The purely necessary and absolute (God) is "first in the order of being and last in the order of knowing," and the contingent and relative (the world) is first in the order of knowing and last in the order of being. From the world we come to know God, but God is the source of the being of the world. Mr. Skutch certainly seems to agree with this ontological priority and epistemological posteriority of the abso-

lute: "Beyond the phenomenal world revealed to our senses lies only the Primal Substance, . . . the transcendent ground of all we know and can conceive" (99). God is "primary" (112) and is like a "hermit" who "will never take . . . reward of any kind" and who "helps from the fullness of his love and spiritual strength, not because he needs anything . . . he gives much but receives nothing" (75). But this absolute ground "we can know . . . only by what he *does*, never by what he *is*" (129). Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese do not agree, however, although it is hard to tell which of two disagreeing views they actually hold.

Their official doctrine seems to be that neither of the two factors is prior to the other, that they are correlative and coordinate. Indeed, this seems to be entailed by their (previously discussed) "Law of Polarity." The idea that one pole must be prior to the other would seem to "embody the monopolar prejudice," for "prior to both potentiality and actuality [contingency and necessity, *etc.*], according to the Law of Polarity, is the tension between them; their union in a process which is neither simply actual nor simply potential" (14a). In spite of the fact that this is their official doctrine, however, in spite of "the conviction . . . already expressed many times that monopolar doctrines are always irrational, that the law of polarity to which dipolar theism appeals is a supreme law of rational understanding" (293a), many passages suggest a favoring of one of the two poles—the pole, as should be expected, of relativity.¹⁸ "Assume possibility and necessity is an abstract identity common to all possibilities; assume free creativeness, and causality can be understood as the relevance of an act of creating to the already created . . .; assume relativity and the absolute can be deduced as an aspect thereof. But if we start with the absolute, necessary, and merely unitary, then no

¹⁸ Some few other passages, however, seem to suggest that the pole of absoluteness is ontologically prior to the pole of relativity: "The absolute . . . factor in God . . . is the pure cause which neither is nor contains any effect; the unmoved mover . . ." (514a). ". . . the absolute is the pre-cosmic nature of God . . ." (310a). Further, Whitehead's expressions "primordial" and "consequent" natures of God seem to suggest this priority, and the authors seem to approve of these expressions (357b). Such passages as these when taken in conjunction with the passages favoring relativity would seem to support the view that the two poles are coordinate.

relations, potentialities, process, can ever be deduced or derived" (293a-b). Again, "... the relative, according to sur-relativism, includes the absolute, as the concrete the abstract, so that to say that the absolute is in any sense more than the relative is to say that x is more than xy " (310b). Again: "... that a man can only act according to his nature, his being or essence, is a clear instance of the monopolar prejudice that being is prior to becoming. According to this view, we derive action from nature, becoming from being. We do not, in fact. A man's 'nature' is a cross-section of his acting and not something with prior status. It is an explanation after the fact, an abstract of the concrete reality which is process, and never more than mere being or essence" (444a). In short, "... becoming is the more inclusive category" (9a). One might of course interpret these and other like passages as asserting only the epistemological and not the existential priority of the factor of relativity over that of absoluteness. Such epistemological priority does clearly seem to be a thesis held by Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese—in spite of their contention that "a merely 'empirical theology' is a contradiction in terms" and that the proofs for the existence of God "are all a priori; proofs from principles or categories, not from facts" (14a), for such principles or categories and "at last all reasons reduce in some sense to experience" (3b). Yet the priority of the pole of relativity expressed in these and other passages seems rather to be a complete priority in every respect, ontological as well as epistemological; the deduction or derivation of the absolute from the relative seems to be an existential as well as a cognitive one.

No matter which of these two alternative interpretations, which mode of disagreement with classical theism, is intended by Messrs. Hartshorne and Reese, however—whether relativity is coordinate with or existentially as well as epistemologically prior to absoluteness—both doctrines are, it seems to me, traceable to the same basic presupposition: that what is true of thought is true of reality. The alternative that the two factors are coordinate is entailed by the authors' "Law of Polarity," and this "law" is established, as shown above, on the basis that what is true of thought is true of reality: "all thought is by contrast." And the other alternative interpretation, that relativity is existentially

prior to absoluteness, is also traceable to the same presupposition. For the view that contingent, relative, temporal facts about the world come first in the order of knowing and that it is from these that our categories and principles, and hence our conception of God, are formed is, as has been noted, held by panentheism as well as by classical theism—and, I should suppose, by most contemporary philosophers. But classical theism lacks the presupposition that what is true of thought is true of reality and thus concludes that while the relative is first in thought it is last in reality. Panentheism, however, involves this presupposition, if I am correct, and thus holds that the relative is first in reality since it is first in thought. But human thought is not merely rational and ratiocinative; it is also affective and emotional. And so what is true of human emotion, as well as of human reason, is also, when extended to its extreme "categorical supercase," true of God. Thus are the God of the head and the God of the heart united in the one dipolar Deity of panentheism. Whether the relative factor be prior to or coordinate with the absolute factor, therefore, the panentheist view of a dipolar God, in contrast to the classical theist view of a monopolar God, seems to be a final and most basic instance of the presupposition that what is true of human thought and experience, intellectual and emotional, must also be true of objective reality and of God.

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NOTES AND OBSERVATIONS

ARISTOTLE AND THE QUESTION OF CHARACTER IN LITERATURE

FREDERIC WILL

IN THE *Poetics*, Aristotle divides tragedy into six elements: plot (μῦθος), character (ἦθος), expression of thought (διάνοια), diction (λέξις), music (μελοποιία), and spectacle (ὄψις).¹ His remarks on plot and character are of great importance because they establish a conception of the nature of literary plot and literary character which has remained common, almost canonical, to this time. Most schoolboys take their place in that Aristotelian tradition when, at the teacher's prompting, they discuss the "plot" and "characters" of a book, and do so with the Aristotelian assumptions: of the total separation of "plot" and "character," and of the primacy of plot. Yet there is a serious weakness in Aristotle's notion—of plot and character—at least as we have it in those inspired lecture notes, the *Poetics*. After first stating Aristotle's position, I shall return with counter-proposals and a counter-theory, to that weakness. For here, as so often, there is more to learn from Aristotle's weaknesses than from most men's strength.

Aristotle considered the plot the most important element in tragedy.² By μῦθος—from which our word "myth" comes—he meant an imitation of action—of action in the "real world," that is. Here, as elsewhere in Greek literary criticism, "imitation" does not mean simply "exact reproduction." To what extent it may mean something like "symbolic," or otherwise "oblique," representation, is hard to determine.³ It will be enough, for our purposes, to think of "imitation" as exact reproduction with

¹ *Poetics*, 50a10-11.

² *Poetics*, 50a15 ff.

³ Cf., for a recent coverage of this argument, Gerald Else, *Aristotle's Poetics: the Argument* (Harvard: Cambridge, 1957) 12-13, 320-22, 447-50, and *passim*. Else's treatment of the key terms of the *Poetics* is detailed and valuable.

allowance made simply for the transference—always radically transforming—into another medium: from life into art. What, then, did Aristotle mean by “action”? The noun *πρᾶξις* (action) takes us back to the verb *πράττω* (to do). Action meant a “doing” to Aristotle, rather as poetry (*ποίησις*) meant to him a “making.” Such a “doing,” then, is a time-crossing event, in fact an event whose nature is closely involved with its temporal status. Such an event has a personal agent, or vehicle, and transacts with other persons, or more generally, with the “other.” In fact, the notion of a transaction is especially fitting to describe action, for that notion emphasizes the dialogue-like structure of action, which always involves its agent with “the world,” whether of people or of things. Plot, for Aristotle, was the turning of such action into art.

Character, for Aristotle—and here, again, we must think first of character in “life,” not in “art”—meant that by which a person was of a particular sort (*ποιός τις*) rather than of some other sort.⁴ Put in another way, character is a quality (a *ποιότης*). Action, on the other hand, is not “qualitative,” for Aristotle, though it may *reveal* character, and thus quality. That is, things that people do may indicate what kind of people they are, but those actions, according to Aristotle, *are* not the qualities of the people who perform them. This point is sufficiently important, in Aristotle, that it should be put in an additional form. Aristotle seems to say that, whereas one may, in his character, have “goodness” or “badness” as qualities, “goodness” or “badness” are not possible constituents of actions. Good men and bad men act, but their actions, which are the chief subject of the imitation which is the plot of tragedy, are not themselves good or bad. This distinction is the basis of Aristotle’s particular distinction between plot—the imitation of action—and character, in literature. Plot retains, for him, the unqualitative nature of the action which it imitates. We unthinkingly echo this literary distinction when we say, of the character of Oedipus, for instance, that he was irascible, courageous, and honest—that these traits were his qualities—but of the play *Oedipus* that it concerns a man who

⁴ *Poetics*, 49b37.

killed his father, married his mother, and blinded himself in despair, when he discovered his sins; that is, that it concerns a series of doings which are not in themselves qualities or qualitative. It was in just the spirit of this literary distinction—by which character was considered qualitative, thus passive and inert, while plot was dynamic and unqualitative—that Aristotle considered plot more essential than character for tragedy. Indeed, in a rare burst of exaggeration he wrote: "Without action there can be no tragedy, but without characters there can be one."⁵

What, then, is the relation between tragic plot and tragic character for Aristotle? Does he consider them distinct, unconnected parts of tragedy? Surely this is unlikely: we know that Aristotle appreciated the organic wholeness of works of art.⁶ Yet in his brief remarks on the parts of tragedy he does not discuss wholeness. In fact he does not make it clear what he considers the relation of plot to character. Here is a chief weakness in his theory. Yet Aristotle anticipated this objection. (He may well have satisfied the objection—for that matter—in other works, which are lost to us). For example, he writes,⁷ in another place than the one cited above, that tragic imitators imitate "men in action" (πράττοντας). Here he considers, as the object of the imitation which constitutes plot, neither action nor "character," but rather something like the "action of characters." This is more interesting: the idea seems to provide a bridge between plot and character. Or, more exactly speaking, the plans for a bridge. For Aristotle has given us no way to understand the kinetic principle of character, by which it may be transformed into action, by which "goodness" and the action of the "good" man may appear in their unity. But there is still another kind of observation in the *Poetics* which assures us of Aristotle's interest in a synthesis of plot with character. He prefers, as the character of the appropriate hero for a tragedy, a man who is good, but who

⁵ *Poetics* 50a24-25. Translation by Allan Gilbert, in his *Literary Criticism: Plato to Dryden* (American: New York, 1940) 77.

⁶ Cf. *Poetics* 50b27 ff., where the beginning, middle, and end of the tragedy are discussed. Aristotle also frequently insists that the parts of tragedy must follow one another in necessary, internal order. Cf. *Poetics* 51a30 ff.

⁷ *Poetics* 48a1.

has some important flaw.⁸ It is precisely this flaw by which the hero falls, when his fortune turns from good to bad. In other words, the man's character is an ingredient in what happens to him, in the action (or "passion") by which he falls. Could the imitation of the particular action ($\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$)—that is, the imitation which makes that particular plot—not be also, at the same time, an imitation of the hero's character?

Aristotle failed to account suitably, in the *Poetics*, for the stubborn unity within the division of the parts of tragedy. What may surprise us especially, though, is not merely that Aristotle failed to account for the unity of the parts of tragedy, but that he did not discuss the peculiarly fruitful unity which exists between literary plot and literary character, a unity which is grounded in metaphysical relationships which deeply interested him, and which he treated with exemplary depth in others of his writings.⁹ This unity has, in fact, been seldom discussed by students of literature, precisely because it does involve metaphysics.

This kind of unity of plot, or action, and character in tragedy—or in literature in general, for this entire argument is broadly applicable—has direct, and important, analogies to the structure of existence. In fact, we can best understand that literary relationship by understanding the structure of existence which underlies it and serves as its model. Each of us is, as an individual, in one sense character ($\gamma\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$). There is something in us by which we are of a certain sort ($\pi\omicron\iota\omicron\varsigma$ τις) rather than of some other sort. Perhaps we might call this something "personality." Here we will call it "character." This quality ($\gamma\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$) which we are, or which is us, does not exist statically, or timelessly. That through which one is of a certain sort need not be immobile, or outside of time. In fact it cannot be, for we exist, with all that we are, only within time. Our character exists only as enacted,

⁸ *Poetics* 53a15-17.

⁹ Cf., for example, the insistence in B of the *Ethics* that the "good," for man, consists in doing, not simply in "being" good, that action is a perfection of character. Or, in Θ of the *Metaphysics*, the treatment of potentiality and actuality. The "realization" of matter through form, there, is comparable to the "realization" of character through, and in oneness with, action in tragedy. The *Poetics* could well be studied, much more than is now the case, in terms of other works of Aristotle.

used, introduced into time. It comes along with us, so to speak. Thus, of course, it also exists as relation to other aspects of what-is, of reality. Quality, despite Aristotle's suggestion in the *Poetics*, can enter into relationships. Let us take the example of our moral will, one of the clearest expressions of the character by which we are of a certain kind, by which we are quality. That will is always being confronted with new situations, thus being situated, temporally, in different configurations of what-is. We exist, as moral potential, both kinetically and "in relation" to other people, places, or, often, to that part of our own unity—our memory, our hope, our body—which may be relatively inactive in consciousness at a particular instant. So significant is this relational aspect of our moral existence—to stress the point even harder—that we appear to owe even our moral self-consciousness, our awareness of ourselves as responsible beings, to other people. When we are infants, other people point us out to ourselves: they name us, scold us, attempt to teach us—by calling our attention to what we have recently done, to that from which we can learn—and by multiple influences elicit from us an awareness of ourselves as potentials for "acting well" or "acting badly" (in their terms, of course). This active, and relational, situation of the moral expression of our character, as we live it, deserves close thought. And it, obviously, is only one aspect of character. We might make similar points about our aesthetic or rational ways of being : both of which ways are fundamentally relational, fusing character with the beautiful or the true. Yet even in terms of these preliminary remarks it would have to be strongly said that the relational situation of existence is only a context. Man's character ($\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$) is not a static substance, a product of environment. We cannot admit the idea that society creates or fundamentally directs character. Rather character is an inalienable, unique way of handling and organizing the encountered world, a unique and consistent configuration of the happenings to which it is related, to which it relates itself. This active style is the style by which each person is, his personality: it marks, like linguistic style, all that "otherness" with which it transacts.

Action ($\pi\rho\alpha\gamma\eta\varsigma$), as we know it in the structure of existence,

is simply one form of the kinetic, relational situation of character. I am referring to the popular, and literary, sense of the word "action," not to the whole network of events which happen to and by character in the constituting of a life. "Action," here, is a form of character in which it creatively, that is transformingly, transacts with what-is. The relation of character to its actions—its transactions—is one of identity: character *is* its actions. To be sure, just as in the analysis of literature, character and action in existence are separable by analysis, but only artificially so. They are not separable in "reality." Character is really its actions, then, in somewhat the same sense in which form is its contents. We cannot claim that under actions (*πράξεις*) lies a separable, independent agent, an *ἦθος*. Yet we may claim that, in those actions and one with them, an element of organization is present which in analysis can be thought of as a distinct emphasis within the whole. That element of organization is character (*ἦθος*).

The intimate relation of character to action, in existence, is the model for that relation as it appears in tragedy's—or any genre's—fusion of character (*ἦθος*) and action (*πράξεις*). The word "model" needs explaining. The relation of literary creation to basic experience of existence is oblique and magical. The literary mind does not copy life, or a world "out-there." In fact, for the literary mind there is usually doubt about the very existence of a so-called "external world." We may say that a certain orientation within existence, a sense of the composition and intimate nature of existence, is what transfers itself, in the case before us, from "life" to literature. Literature is that deeply rooted in life. This transference, which is of utmost importance to anyone concerned with what literature does to life, was certainly suspected by Aristotle, as I have suggested. For he wrote of plot as an imitation of men in action, that is, of men who were their action. Characters, embodied dynamically in action, are truly "men in action." And as such, familiar as they are to us, they form the subject of that "imitation" which constitutes, according to Aristotle, the plot of tragedy. Aristotle was not far from an adequate statement of his problem. We have seen, here, how the unified structure of existence, with its interplay of character and

action, serves as model for the unity of $\lambda\theta\omicron\varsigma$ with $\mu\upsilon\theta\omicron\varsigma$ via $\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$ in tragedy, as Aristotle conceived tragedy. Aristotle needed—we may presume to say—a better appreciation of that unified structure, as it provides a model for literature.

The nature of this unity, as it expresses itself both in life and tragedy—for that matter in literature in general—may be suggested a final time by a grammatical analogy which Aristotle himself offers, and which is of considerable verbal interest. The unity which concerns us revolves still about the notion of "men in action," that notion which seemed to draw the three elements of plot, action, and character into one. This notion—"men in action"—is expressed in Greek by a participle ($\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\omicron\nu\nu\tau\alpha\varsigma$) in the plural, and describes a characteristically participial situation, as distinct either from a substantive or a verbal situation. Man, as described here, has "character" or essence, but only to the extent that he puts it into act. Like a participle, that is, his substance must be dynamized to exist. Man exists, then, as a verbalized substance, or a substantialized verb: in short, as a participle. Man is a participle. He is not completely substantialized—a noun, nor is he merely act—a verb. This particular conception of man in action describes a familiar situation of existence, and serves as a key to the unity of character with action with plot, whether in literature or in life.

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PROBLEMS AND PERPLEXITIES *

The *Review of Metaphysics* offers the following \$25. prizes:

19. For the best discussion of the influence of non-Euclidean geometry on the philosophy of mathematics. M. Prasah.
20. For the best account of the essential points of the difference between Thomas Aquinas' and Duns Scotus' treatment of individuation. M. Prasah.
21. For the best explanation as to why there never was a great woman philosopher.
22. For the best statement of the main differences between the brain and mind.
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24. For the most plausible statement as to what writings, if any, the positivists had in mind when they said that metaphysics was nonsense.
25. For the best discussion as to whether or not it is illuminating to say that Phenomenalism and the mobile movie camera came into being about the same time.

Papers should not be more than 1,000 words long, and should be in the hands of the editor of this *Review* no later than February 15th, 1962. Submitted manuscripts will either be published in the *Review* or returned to the authors.

Readers are invited to submit questions. Ten dollars will be paid for each question that is used.

* This section was inaugurated in March, 1960. Questions listed in that and subsequent issues are still open to competition.

BOOKS RECEIVED

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS *

JOYCE E. MITCHELL AND STAFF

- BACHEM, A. *Beyond Matter and Mind*. New York: Vantage Press, 1960. 182 pp. \$3.50—The author attacks recent as well as traditional philosophic speculation and attempts to formulate his own resolution to all the outstanding problems in philosophy. But the elaboration of his "psycho-physiological monism" results in involving the author in most of the difficulties he claimed to avoid. — R. T. L.
- BALLARD, E. *The Philosophy of Jules Lachelier*. Trans. and Introduction. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. xv, 118 pp. Dfl. 8.50—A portion of the works of Lachelier give a comprehensive view of the kind of neo-Kantian idealism he espouses. In his introduction Mr. Ballard presents a summary of Lachelier's philosophy, expanding somewhat on the more obscure sections of his work. — R. T. L.
- BECK, L. W. *Six Secular Philosophers*. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. 126 pp. \$2.75—A series of lectures, directed to philosophical laymen, tracing the effects of secular philosophy on religious doctrines. Relevant reflections by Spinoza, Kant, Hume, Nietzsche, James and Santayana are briefly and sensitively discussed. — J. A. B.
- BERTOCCHI, P. A. *Education and the Vision of Excellence*. Boston: Boston University Press, 1960. 31 pp. \$0.50—A single lecture setting forth the authors's view of excellence as "creative insecurity." — J. A. B.
- CONGER, G. P. *Synoptic Naturalism*. Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing Co., 1960. 805 pp. N. P.—An extraordinarily stimulating work, in which Prof. Conger presents his "hypothesis of epitomization." According to this theory the natural world is divided into three basic realms (cosmogonic, biotic and neuropsychological) which are ordered in a number of complex ways. Logical and mathematical entities form realms also, and are epitomized by a "chronogeometric" realm which provides a relational system that constitutes the "milieu" of the natural world. — J. A. B.

* Books received will be acknowledged in this section by a brief résumé, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgment does not preclude more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. The Summaries and Comments will be written by the Managing Editor and her staff of assistants, with the occasional help of others. Reports have been contributed to this issue by L. Kent Bendall.

- DUTT, K. G. *Existentialism and Indian Thought*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960. \$2.75—A clear and highly readable account of the main currents of existentialist thought, together with a briefer discussion of the relation of these ideas to the recurrent themes of Indian philosophy. — R. T. L.
- FERRATER MORA, J. *Philosophy Today*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. x, 193 pp. \$4.50—A brief and neutral review of the many "isms" in current philosophic discussion deals with questions of what philosophy is and what the role of philosophy can be in the twentieth century. Professor Ferrater Mora singles out the conflicting Russian, Anglo-American and European philosophies and suggests possible reconciliations. He also examines the role of philosophy in relation to art, science and religion. — J. E. M.
- FREUND, E. *Die Existenzphilosophie Franz Rosenzweigs. Zweite durchgesehene Auflage*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1959. viii, 196 pp. Paper. DM 18—This book, first published in 1933 but prevented from distribution in Nazi Germany, serves as an introduction to a German philosopher who, together with Martin Buber, attempted to rethink the central motifs of existentialist philosophy from the perspective of Jewish faith and tradition. The author provides an outline of the over-all content of this philosophy. In particular she stresses Rosenzweig's debt to the later Schelling and the main themes of his major work, *The Star of Salvation*. — D. D. O.
- GARNETT, A. C. *Ethics: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Ronald Press, 1960. v, 526 pp. \$5.50—A textbook intended largely for beginning students in ethics. In a very interesting concluding chapter, Prof. Garnett presents and justifies his own view of the meaning of ethical terms and of the nature of moral principles. One section of the book is as unusual as it is valuable: it contains collections of opinions on such practical problems as marriage and the family, right of property, and war. — J. A. B.
- GELLNER, E. *Words and Things*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960. 270 pp. \$5.00—This controversial book professes to be a "critical account of Linguistic Philosophy and a study of Ideology." It is clearly written and abounds with entertaining aphorisms. Philosophically important objections against the Oxford School are developed in the first hundred pages. The rest is highly repetitious, and, aside from rhetorical effects and remarks on the psychology and sociology of the movement, contribute little to a "refutation" of Linguistic Philosophy. As an alternative to Linguistic Philosophy, the book only vaguely hints to a "clean," "non-oblique," and "non-insinuated" form of naturalism. — A. P. D. M.

- HOCK, A., M.D. *Reason and Genius: A Study in Origins*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960. 138 pp. \$3.75—The author conducts an investigation into the biological foundations of mental phenomena, together with a short history of reason itself, in the course of which he discovers that "the formation of abstract concepts did only begin at the time of Plato." — R. T. L.
- HOLMER, O. and RESCHER, N. *On the Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences*. Santa Marina: the Rand Corporation, 1960. 40 pp. N. P.—Following a distinction of the sciences into exact and inexact, based on the kinds of methods and reasoning processes involved in explanation and prediction, the authors briefly develop the peculiar method of the inexact branch, with special emphasis on the systematic use of experts in the formation of limited scientific generalizations, and on the use of simulated experiments. — J. A. B.
- JAFFE, R. *The Pragmatic Conception of Justice*. Vol. 34. Berkeley: The University of California Publications in Philosophy, 1960. 117 pp. N. P.—After a brief review of pragmatic arguments against emotivism, the author of this monograph proceeds to outline and criticize two conflicting concepts of the *morally right* in Dewey's writings. A third interpretation, involving an "interaction of the factual and the normative" is advanced as more conformable to the spirit of instrumentalism. — A. D. P. M.
- LEYS, W. A. and PERRY, C. M. *Philosophy and the Public Interest*. Chicago: Committee to Advance Original Work in Philosophy, 1959. 72 pp. \$1.00 —The purpose of this pamphlet is to formulate the problems of, and to stimulate thought and discussion on, the concept of the public interest. The authors present a number of common and current theories on the nature of public interest, its relation to earlier, similar ideas, and its significance as a part of political theory. — J. A. B.
- MANDLER, G. and KESSEN, W. *The Language of Psychology*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959. xviii, 301 pp. \$6.75—A quasi-genetic account of language, intended to be based on an analysis of the science of psychological language and of theories in psychology. Scientific terms are defined in terms of invariant usage. "Protocol statements" are taken as the bulwark of this science. Their definition of psychology: "the study of animal movements and human speech." — J. A. B.
- PFLUG, G. *Henri Bergson: Quellen und Konsequenzen einer induktiven Metaphysik*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1959. 393 pp. N. P.—The author interprets Bergson's five major works as an attempt, ultimately unsuccessful, to reconcile the rigor of scientific method with metaphysical knowledge. He concludes that Bergson's final solution—a separate faculty of metaphysical intuition—is not philosophy but religion. The value of this careful study is enhanced by a detailed bibliography of Bergson's writings. — D. D. O.

STAMBAUGH, J. *Untersuchungen zum Problem der Zeit bei Nietzsche*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. xix, 239 pp. N. P.—Miss Stambaugh argues that the fundamental paradox on which Nietzsche's philosophy seems to rest—the doctrine of eternal recurrence and the doctrine of the will to power—can be mitigated, or at least clarified, by an understanding of Nietzsche's theory of time. This line of investigation results in a re-interpretation of the basic categories of Nietzsche's philosophy. — D. D. O.

WEISCHEDEL, W. *Wirklichkeit und Wirklichkeiten*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960. 286 pp. N. P.—A collection of essays, addresses and occasional pieces written over the past fifteen years by Prof. Weischedel, a pupil of Heidegger. The pieces are grouped in four categories: history of philosophy, problems of metaphysics, contemporary art and contemporary ethico-political problems. There is some interesting material, but the book suffers from the defects of what C. S. Peirce called 'the pitchfork method of book-making.' — D. D. O.

WINN, R. B. *A Concise Dictionary of Existentialism*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960. 122 pp. \$3.75—A short dictionary of quotations from Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Marcel, Heidegger, Sartre and de Beauvoir provides the reader with some idea of peculiarly existentialist understandings of standard philosophical terms as well as of terms which are more especially associated with existential thought. At times the selection seems rather arbitrary in some cases. — J. M. W.

WYMAN, M. A. *The Lure for Feeling*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1960. 192 pp. \$4.75—In this refreshingly different study of Whitehead's thought, Miss Wyman attempts to elicit the aesthetic relevance of Whitehead's categories by means of comparisons and contrasts with such men as Goethe, Emerson, Whitman, and particularly, Wordsworth. Although not a technically rigorous discussion, Miss Wyman's book is useful and instructive. — R. T. L.

Studies in Philosophy. S. H. Bergman, Ed. Jerusalem: Magnus Press, The Hebrew University. 315 pp. N. P.—A collection of essays by members of the department of philosophy in the Hebrew University, on a variety of topics. Jacob Fleishmann's careful analysis of "Hegel's Theory of the Will," is perhaps the outstanding contribution. The volume also includes a valuable study by Rotenstreich on Collingwood's philosophy of history. — J. A. B.

John Dewey and the Experimental Spirit in Philosophy. Charles W. Hendel, Ed. New York: The Liberal Art Press, 1959. vi, 119 pp. N. P.—Centennial lectures delivered in New Haven by four Yale philosophers. Prof. Hendel's essay locates Dewey in the philosophical tradition and clarifies his brand of empiricism. Prof. Lawrence distinguishes fact from fiction in Dewey's philosophy of education. The essays of

Professors Bernstein and Smith develop central but often neglected theses of Dewey's speculative thought. An attractive volume which advances the creative thoughts of the man it honors. — D. D. O.

Philosophy of Knowledge: Selected Readings. Edited by Roland Houde and Joseph Mullally. Chicago: Lippincott, 1960. xiii, 427 pp. N. P. —Reprints some well-known articles, some new translations (of Gilson and von Balthasar) and some hitherto unprinted articles by F. H. Parker and Y. Simon. In all, 22 contemporary authors are presented in a way which manages to cover most of the problems in epistemology. The selection tends to favor realism, but other views are ably represented by such authors as Perry, Wisdom, Lewis and Cassirer. This book could be used as a text in courses on knowledge theory or as an introduction to contemporary philosophy. — D. D. O.

The Philosophy of C. D. Broad. Paul A. Schilpp, Ed. New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1960. xii, 866 pp. \$12.50—Remarkable for its array of distinguished contributors, the volume begins with a modest autobiography, followed by some twenty-one essays which delve into various aspects of Broad's philosophy. Broad displays a tenacity for the main outlines of his philosophy in his "Reply to My Critics," and concludes by noting that his philosophy is antiquated "without having yet acquired the interest of a collector's piece." This handsome volume is a fine rebuttal. — J. E. M.

ARISTOTLE. *Metaphysics.* Trans. by Richard Hope. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (Ann Arbor Paperbacks), 1960. xvii, 394 pp. \$2.45.

HACKFORTH, R. *Plato's Examination of Pleasure.* New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1960. 144 pp. \$1.00.

HACKFORTH, R. *Plato's Phaedrus.* New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1960. 172 pp. \$1.15.

KAUFMANN, W. *From Shakespeare to Existentialism.* New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1960. xvi, 455 pp. \$1.45.

KIERKEGAARD, S. *Selections from the Writings of Kierkegaard.* Trans. by Lee Hollander. New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1960. 259 pp. \$0.95.

MONTAIGNE, M. *The Complete Essays of Montaigne* (3 Vols.). Trans. by Donald M. Frame. New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1960. xxvii, 329 pp.; viii, 503 pp.; vii, 418 pp. \$1.45 each..

NEF, J. *Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization.* New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960. xv, 164 pp. \$1.25.

RAWCLIFFE, D. H. *Illusions and Delusions of the Supernatural and the Occult*, New York: Dover Publications, 1960. 551 pp. \$2.00. (Originally published, 1959, *The Psychology of the Occult*.)

SCHOPENHAUER, A. *Essay on the Freedom of the Will*. Trans. and Intro. by Konstantin Kolenda. New York: Library of the Liberal Arts, 1960. xxx, 103 pp. \$0.80.

WALSH, W. H. *Philosophy of History: An Introduction*. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960. 176 pp. \$1.25.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The International Congress of the History of Science will hold its tenth meeting August 26-September 2, 1962. Opening sessions will be held at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, and the concluding sessions will be held at the American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, Pa. All inquiries should be addressed to Professor C. Doris Hellman, Secretary, Xth International Congress of the History of Science, West Sibley Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York (U.S.A.). Announcements will be sent upon request.

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